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INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents a study of the Twenty·-Fifth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States of A1nerica. The Am.endment 
\vas first proposed to Congress as Senate and House Joint Resolutions 
in February 1965. It became law in February 1967, when Nevada 
secured the distinction of being the 38th state to ratify it, thus ful-
filling the required agreement by three·-fourths of the states. 
The Amendrr1ent has not yet been tested. It is the first compre-
hensive legislative attempt to solve three related problems that have 
plagued the executive branch of our government since the earliest 
days of the Union. 
The nwst hnpo:rtant of the three problems is Presidential in-
ability or disability (the two words are used int'~Tchangeably through-
out this paper). What happens when the President, because of illness 
or other reasons, is unable to discharge the duties and powers of his 
office? Article II, SeCtion 1, Clause 5 of the Constitution provides 
that: 
In Case of the Removal of the Presi.dent from Office, or 
of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the 
Powe:t·s and Duties oE the said Office, the San1e shall de-
volve on the Vice-President, ... 
In spite of this provision, no Vice Pn~sident has dared to take over 
the President's office, even temporarily, while the President lived. 
One result of this inactivity was that the United States has been without 
an active Chief Executive for periods o£ time totaling one year. This 
second problern, created by the first, is the problem of Vice 
11 
iii 
Presidential succession to the Presidency. 
The third of the problerns can be phrased as Vice Presidential 
vacancy. Following the one occasion on which a Vice President 
resigned, the seven on which a Vice President died while in office, 
and the eight on which a Vice President succeeded to Presidency 
(see Appendixes A and B), there has been no way to fill the Vice 
Presidency until the next Presidential election. For rnuch of our 
history this void has troubled us very little but, since the Eisenhower 
Adr.n.inistration, the office of the Vice President has been evolving 
from one of relatively little importance in political powe1· to sorne-
thing 1nore nearly approxi1nating the office of an assistant President 
or Deputy Chief Executi\re. This growth coincides with a growing 
awareness that in this nuclear age we cannot afford to wait until the 
next election to assure that there is a back--up to the Corrnnander in 
Chief. 
This historical development of the proble1ns and of attempts to 
solve therr1 are sumrnarized i.n the first three chapters of this paper. 
Much 1nore definitive studies of these aspects already exist. 
1 
Cha.pter IV describes, in greater detail, the drafting and Congressional 
passage of the Twenty-Ti'ilth Amendment, and Chapter V follows its 
------~--.. ---~~~L------
1 A;:non!?' the n1ost authoritative wo1·ks are: 
Ruth c·: Silva, Presidential Succession (Ann Arbor: Uni.verGity 
of Michigan Press, lrT51).------·-··------------
Richa rd B. Hansen, The Year We Had No President (Lincoln: 
Universi.ty of Nebraska,· 196?;r~--···----------------·-··----------
John D. Feel"ick, Frorn. Failing Hands (New York: Fordha1n 
University Press, 19 65) .·--·----------·-----·-----
iv 
ratification through the states. Chapter. VI is devoted to an evaluation 
of the Arnenchnent itself: its intent as well as its strengths and weak--
nesses. Definitive evaluations will be possible only after the Am.end-
ment m.ust actually be used to solve the proble~ms of Presidential. 
inability, Vice Presidential succession, and Vice Presidential vacancy. 
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THE PROBLEMS AND THEIR POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
At least three times during this nation's history the President 
has been unable to carry out the duties of his office. James A. Garfield 
lay dying for eighty days after he was shot; Woodrow Wilson, following 
a stroke, spent the last eighteen months of his tenn as a semi-invalid; 
President Eisenhower had three separate and serious illnesses. 1 Yet 
no Vice President has been able either to substitute temporarily for the 
Chief Executive while retaining his Vice Presidential office or to succeed 
to the office of the President so long as the Chief Executive lived. Never-
theless, in at least two of the three cases, the Presi.dent'::; disability 
was clea:dy apparent. 
Because the Constitution was ambip,uous and precedents had been 
set, no disabled President has felt a.ble to call upon his Vice President 
to act as his substitute, 
2 
even though the President might recognize his 
own disability. Similarly, no Vice President has been willing or able 
1 Raynwnd J. Celada, Presidential Continuity and Vice Presiden--
tial Vacancy Arnendment (Wasli1ngf6n~-TY. c:·:ceg1srillve lTcTei;ence--
··-----·--------··----;:--·)----------Service, l9o7 , p. 2. 
2
The only exception took place when Wilson went to Paris for the 
treaty m.eetings following World War I. At Wilson's request, in his 
absence Thomas R. Marshall beca:me the first Vice President to pre-
side over Cabinet meetings, Marshall, however, had doubts about the 
legality of presiding, and he ernpbasized that he would not be respon-
sibJe for any consequences. Donald Young, Arnerican Roulette 
(New York: Ffolt, Rincbart and ·winston, 196S)-i)-:--T:rO-:-------··-
1 
2 
to take the initi.ati~le to declare his Chief disabled or to declare hhn-
self to be acting Chief Executive while the President lived. On reason 
for the Vice President's refusal to act is the lack of both legal and 
constitutional machinery for certifying the disability of a Chief Execu-
tive. Another is the danger that an honest atternpt to p~ck up the reins 
of goverm:n.ent frorn his disabled Chief n1ight be misconstrued as usur-
pation. The results of such Inisunderstanding might be tantamount to 
political suicide for the Vice President, or create a power struggle so 
damaging it could, one Vice President has suggested, end in civil war. 
3 
Until recently, Presidents have consistently refused to 1·equest 
that their Vice Presidents act for them in time of disability out of fear 
that, once having "given up" the Presidency, it could not be constitu--
tion<).J.ly returned to them. In so1ne cases, Presidents have concealed 
a disability so that fh.c problem could be avoided. 
4 
The refusal of the President and the Vice President to act in 
cases of Presidential disability stems from. two sources. The first 
3Louis W .. Koenig, The Chief Executive (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & World, Inc., 19"64y;-p:-,ro---:·---···--·· 
If he acted as President, [Vice President Thoma.s R. Marshall J 
told Ira E. Bennett, editor of the Washington Post, he would surely 
be ass<:tssinated and the country thrown "into civil war." 
Young, op. cit., p. 138, reports that Vice President Marshall 
confided to hfs-\v1Ie-;·- "I could throw this country into civil war, but I 
won't. " Ma:r shall did not explain to his wife what action. he. might take 
that could re[;ult in civil war. He did, however, rernark to his sec-
retary, Mark Thistlethwaite, "I an1 not going to seize the place [the 
White House] and then have Wilson, recovered, corne around and say 
'Get off, you usurper!' " Perhaps he feared that a civil conflict might 
result from. such a situation as this in which there would be two rnen 
clair.ning the Presidency. 
%ee Presidents Cleveland and Wilson in Chapter II of. this 
thesis. 
3 
is the gramm.atical construction of Adicle II, Section 1, Clause 6, of 
the Constitution, and the resultant controversy over the antecedent of 
the word 11 sa1ne". That clause reads in part: 
In case of the removal of the President from office, or of· 
hi.s death, resignation, o1· inability to discharge the powers 
and duties of said office, the sarne shall devolve on the Vice 
President 
Does the word "same'' mean that the office, or merely the powers and 
duties of the office, shall devolve on the Vice President? 
If only the powers and duties fall to the Vice President, the ap-
parent intentions of the writers of the Constitution would be fulfilled: 
the Vice President would become an acting or substitute President. 
However, if it is the offic;e that "same" refers to then the Vice Pre-
sident who acts during his Chief's disability would become President 
until the end of his Chief's tenure, although the disability may have 
been of only a ternpora.ry duration. 
The former argument seems to be the stronger. The language 
of the Twelfth An1endment, which became a part of the Constitution on 
September 25, 1804, would indicate that "same II referred to duties and 
·powers: 11 ••• then the Vice President shall act as President, as in 
the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President. 11 
As discussed rnore fully at the end of this chapter, the writers of the 
original succession clause also intended that a Vice President .should 
be able to become Acting President during a period of temporary Pre-
sidential disability. It also seems to have been the intention in cases 
of permanent disability that, contrary to established practice, the 
Vice President would continue as Acting Chief Executive either until 
such tin-teas Congress might call a special election or until the end of 
the ele etc d terrn. 
. 4 
The second of the two sources of inaction in di.sabili~y is the 
Tyler "precedent" and the usage which grew fron1 it. John Tyler 
assumed the office of President following the death of President 
William Henry Harrison. In sor:nething of an inaugural speech, on 
April 9, 1841, Tyler asserted: "For the first time in our history the 
person elected to the Vice Presidency of the United States . . . has had 
devolved upon hirn the Presidential office. "5 The Tyler precedent is 
more fully discussed in Chapter II. 
The Tyler precedent taught Vice Presidents how to deal with a 
President's death, but not with his temporary disabilities. No Vice 
President, from Tyler's time to the present, has even given the ap·· 
pearance of acting as President until the President's actual death; then 
the Vice President has assumed the office, taken the :Presidential oath, 
and se:n·ecl out the rernainder of the term as a full--fledged President. 
Since the problern of disability was ignored as long as the Pre··· 
sident lived, certain awkward questions that might have arisen during 
the President's life did not. For example, what constitutes executive 
disability'? Is it only a medical condition or could it also be a psychi-
atric condition? Can the President be considered as disabled if, through 
force of circumstances, he is unable to cornrnunicate with his govern-
ment? 6 One ;might logically conclude that any condition which causes 
5 
Young, 9..E.: __ ci!:..• p. 45. 
6President Wilson asked his Vice President to handle certain 
formaliti.es for hirn when he went to Paris following World War I. 
.Marshall complied by presiding over Cabinet meetings, "the first of 
which Wilson him.seH actually directed by wireless." Ruth G. Silva, 
Presidenti.al Succession (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
-r951}";-···r-:---q-T:·---:-----
5 
the President to be unable to exercise his authority is a disability, and 
that any legal or constitutional definition must, of necessity, be faidy 
broad for [ear of excluding sorne unforeseen, yet truly disabling con-
clition. 
A related problem that the custom of ignoring disability has 
supressed is: who should, will, or must m.ake the determination of 
the President's disability? The best answer would be the President 
hirnself, if he is able. Had it not been for the question of how to re--
gain the "office" or its powers, there have been Presidents who would 
have done as Lyndon Johnson did after the Eisenhower Letter precedent 
was established. 7 A President would have notified the Vice President 
of existing or irnpending disability, such as surgery, and further re--
quested the Vice President to assume the role of Acting President. 
But vlhat if the President is unable or unwilling to declare him-
self disabled? Woodrow Wilson, during the course of his illness, 
rnay have been at first unable and later unwilling to admit to being dis-
abled. There have been a number of proposed answers to this vexing 
question. One is that the Cabinet should make .such a determination; 
another is that the President might appoint a medical comrnission for 
this pm·pose at the time of his inauguration. However, in spite of 
7 President Johnson twice asked his Vice President, Hubert 
Hurnphrey, to stand by to make any necessary executive decisions 
when he entered the hospital in 1965, and again in 1966. New York 
Times, October 6, 1965, p. 1, and November 17, 1966, p-:-~---­
----·-·president Eisenhower, on March 3, 1958, entered into a private 
agreement with Vice President Richard Nixon that would have enabled 
Nixon to act as President if circurnstances had required. Richard 
H. Hansen, The Year We Had No President (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska, 1962}~-p·:--·ys-.-·----.. -·-------~-.---
6 
inaction in the past, it appeared to rnoGt autho:dties that it was the 
Vice President's duty to 1nake this deterrnination with, as Mr. Eisen-
hower put it in his letter, such consultation as he rn~ght find necessary. 
A way was needed for the Vice President to declare his Chief's dis-
ability and assmne his authority, v;ithout appearing to usurp the Pre-
sident' s position. The onus could be rernoved from a Vice Presiden-
tial declaration by giving some other group close to the President a 
share in the decision and by making it clear when, how, and under what 
circumstances the President may regain his office. Historically, there 
has been much fear but little evidence of power hunger in Vice Presi-
dents. On the contrary, Vice Presidents have been paralyzed by fear 
of a·n.y suggestion that they were "making a power grab." 
It follows that, if a Vice President who is acting as President 
should disagree with a Chief who clai1ns to be recovered and who wishes 
to resmne his duties, the procedures for resolving such a disagree-
m.ent must be both certain and swift. The knowledge of .such certainty 
of procedure n~ight act to prevent a disagree1nent frorn arising in the 
first place. If disagreement did arise, swift settlement would protect 
the nation from the paralysis brought on by a protracted power strug-
gle. The certain knowledge that procedures exist for regaining his 
office fl·orn his Vice President would also tend to encourage the Pre--
sident to make a self-detel-rnination of disability whenever he might be 
able. 8 
8 For an extensive statement of inability problems see Silva, 
Presidential Succession, Chapter IV, pp. 83-111. Also see Edward S. 
·corviiri·,--TCTie-.fYresident: Office and Powers, Fourth Revised Edition 
( N';;w York--l'lev~-YOr k -Ullivei:-sity-Fi:-e-s·s~---19 57), pp. 53-· 59; and 
Koenig, 01=:_:_52!.:...• pp. 71-83. 
7 
The Vice Presidency was created in the last days of the Consti-
tuti.onal Convention of 1787 as something of an afterthought. The 
Constitl1tion ga\re the Vice President only two duties: to preside over 
the Senate and to fulfill Presidential duties in any circumstances that 
n'light prevent the President from. so doing. This unique combination 
of legislative and executive functions was, perhaps, as at least one 
delegate to the Convention argued, in violation of the principle of 
separation of powers. 9 
The original method of election assurned that Vice .Presidential 
candidates would be persons of stature, cornparable to Presidential 
c&mdidates. But, after the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment, the 
Vice Presidency rapidly declined. Candidates for the office were se-
lected to give geographical balance to a party ticket or· to appease 
dissident elements of the party. Little attention, if any, was given to 
the qualifications of Vice Presidential candidates to act as or to succeed 
the President. 
It was not until the second half of the twentieth century that the 
decline of the Vice Presidency was arrested and the office began to 
take on greater significance. Today, the Vice President is a vital 
member of the executive branch. He is a me1nber of the Cabinet and 
of the National Security Council. He is often chairman of important 
cornmitt.ees such as the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, 
9John D. FeeJ~ick, From Failing Hands (Nevv York: Fordham 
University Press, 1965), ·-p.-LJ7~-c1e_s.E1·1Sesaelegate Elbridge Gerry 1 s. 
reactions. 
8 
the National Aeronautics and Space Council, and the Advisory Council 
of the Peace Corp. The Vice President also coordinates various gov-
ernment programs and can, if necessary, act as liaison between the 
.President and Congress. He serves as his Chief's personal repre-
sentati\re, both in dornestic and sometirnes in foreign affairs. l:<'urther, 
in this nuclear age, the 1nan who is but a heart beat away frorn the 
Presidency m.ust be prepared to succeed to an off.i.ce having graver 
responsibilities than ever before. 
While the Vice President's prestige and duties have been limited 
during much of our history, the office has proved to be of vital im-
portance on the eight occasions when the Vice President has succeeded 
to the Presidency upon the death of his Chief Executive. 10 On these 
occasions the office of Vice President bccmne vacant. It was also 
vacant when seven Vice Presidents died in office and when one, John C. 
Calhoun, resigned. 
11 
In spite of the number of tilnes the Vice Presidency has been 
vacant, and in spite of the growth of the office from a Constitutional 
afterthought to its present i1nportance, no serious effort was n1.ade to 
devise a rneans for filling Vice Preside·ntial vaomcies until a(ter the 
assassination of President Kennedy. It was only after Vice President 
10See Appendix A, Vice Presidents Who Succeeded to the 
P1·esidency. 
11 John D. Feerick, "The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
to the Constitution, 11 Fordham Law Review, XXXIV (December, 1965), 
p. 180. The Vice PresidenfSwEo ha-v:e-dleain office are George 
Clinton, Elbridge Gerry, William R. King, Henry Wilson, Thornas A. 
Hendricks, Garret A. Hobart, and James S. Shennan. See Appendix 
B, Vice Presidential Vacancies. 
9 
Johnson had so s1noothly made the transition to Chief Executive that the 
necessity for the office of Vice President to be always filled forced it-
self into public awareness. 
Several ci.rcmnstances brought this necessity into focus. Ii~irst, 
there was the question of Mr. Johnson's own health. With a history of 
cardiac problerns, he might well not survive until the next election. 
Second, there was the age of the potential successors to the Presidency. 
Both the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the 
Senate were of rather advanced age, a circun1stance not unusual, given 
the system of seniority for these offices. There was also sincere 
questioning of whether the Speaker was, in reality, the 1nan best pre-
pared to succeed. 
All these circum.stances prompted consideration of how the office 
of the Vice President might be kept filled. Except in cases of multiple 
disaster- -that is, the simultaneous death of both President and Vice 
President·- -the con.cern was to assure succession to the Presidency 
from within the executive branch. Thus, the use of the llne of sue-
cession beyond the Vice Presidency might be avoided, if only for the 
very practical reason that it is unlikely to be changed in the foreseeable 
future. This was true for two reasons: with all the discussion and 
concern rega,rding Speaker 11/fcCormack's age, 
12 
there was also con-
12
There v;as even s01ne thought that Congress may have delayed 
passage of the 25th Amendment until McCorrnack was re1noved fro1n 
direct succession by the election of a Vice President: see Charles 
J\!lohr, "Johnson Will Ask Curb on Electors," New York 'fhnes, 
E -··-----------· January 5, 19 -,r:;, ·p. 18. 
10 
cern to avoid a personal affront to hirn; and, aside [rorn nonnal iner-
tia -when there is no crisis, there is a kind of legislative jealousy that 
would not pennit the Congress to give up the power of choosing <.:.. poten-
13 ti.al President in the form of its speaker. 
There has been a body of thought which suggests that the line of 
succession beyond the Vice Presidency should be given careful consider-
ation. 
14 
The viability of the 1947 succession statute was not tested 
and, as already indicated, the ever pref>ent possibility of nuclear or 
natural disaster, cornbined with the fear of what might have happened 
had Mr. Johnson been kilLed along with President Kennedy at Dallas, 
forced the conclusion that the line of succession may one day be of 
n1.ore than theoretical i.mportance. 
The 1947 statute placed the Speake:t· of the House next in line 
after the Vice Pi"esident. The Speaker, by the nature of things, would 
13 
For a more complete statement of the problern of Vice Presi-
dential Vacancy see Feerick, From Failing Hands , Chapter XX, "Vice 
Presidential Vacancy, II pp. zs-rr:--z-rr.----·-----
14Feerick, From Faili.ng Hands, pp. 174-176, would appear to 
favor a rctm·n to -tne-T8BO--caoui.eCTine of succession; Birch Bayh, One 
Heartbeat Away (Indianapolis and :New York: The Dobbs-Merrill Com·:··· 
i>any;-J.t1c·.·-;--Ilj6B), pp. 350-352, includes his resolution 139 (original 
fonn), Sec. G, of which very closely rese1nbles the 1886 success-ion 
law; the Research and Policy Cmnrnittee of the Cornrnittcc for Econom.ic 
Developrnent, Presidential Succession and Inability (New York: Com-
lnittee for Econ·o-mrc-~bevelopi1lerit,-19'b5);-pp-.--rr=I9, recommends the 
restoration of the 1886 line of succession; and on CBS Reports, 11 The 
Crisis of Presidential Succession, " as broadcast on January 8, 1964, 
former President Eisenhower expressed a preference for a return to 
the 1886 line o£ :;ucces.sion. For the texts of the three succession 
statutes of 1792, 1886, and 1947, see Appendixes D, E, and F'. 
11 
bt:! a rnan of long standing cxpcrierlcc with the House and wi.th legisla-
tive matters. He should certainly have the confidence of the legis-
lative branch and, after the President and Vice President, he might be 
considered the highest elected official in the government. But there is 
little rnore to re~ornmcnd him. On the contrary, (the Sp~aker 's lack of 
participation in and, hence, preparation for executive responsibility 
could rnake hirn a less preferred candidat~Jhan the Secretary of State 
who, before the 1947 statute, was next in line to the Vice President. 
Mr. Truman justified the change by which the Speaker of the 
House would head the line of succession, after the Vice President, by 
the argument that the President should not have the right to appoint his 
potential successor. 
15 
This argument nlay have some theoretical 
merit but it runs counter to the long standing practice of allowing the 
Presidential candidate to choose his successor in the fonn of his Vice 
Presidential running rnate. 
If. the goal of a succession statute is to assure the smooth and 
uninterrupted continuity of government, then the Secretary of State 
seerns at least as well qualified to succeed as is the Speaker of the 
House. The Secr·ctary would be an appointee of the President G.n.d thus 
vwuld presmnably be in syrnpathy with the current executive policies . 
. He would be familiar with the workings of the executive by virtue of 
his participation in the Cabinet. The Secretary would be both familial' 
with and, it is hoped, capable of dealing with the nal;ion 's foreign 
15The thought was also expressed that Mr. Truman sought to 
hono:r Speal.':er Sam Rayburn, a long ti1ne friend and fellow Democrat. 
''( o u n g, ~~·--<::.~!:_.' p. 3 2 6 . 
12 
relations at a tirne of presupposed crisis. He· would also likely be a 
rnernber of his President's party, another factor tending to smooth the 
transition.) 
Although a case has been made for a return to the 1886 statute 
which places the Secretary of State next in line of succession to the 
Vice Presidency, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not specify sue-
cession beyond the Vice Presidency. At present, there is sxnall chance 
of arousing interest, or overcoming enertia, to settle this problern 
without so1ne dramatic event which, by its nature, might preclude any 
consideration at all. 16 
.T!_:_::_.S:_O_!lS!~!.utic:na_~ _ _S:ol::_~.~~~-on as the Or~~in _ _9£ the Probl~m~ 
An examination of the records
17 
of the Philadelphia Convention 
leads to the conclusion that those who f.l·amed and ratified the sue-
cession clause had three rnain intentions. First, in case of the P:re-
sident's death, resignation, or rernoval, the Vice President would act 
as Chief Executive until the end of the term or until, and if, Congress 
might call a special election. Second, in the event of a Presidential 
disability, the Vice President would serve as Acting President until the 
disability was ended. 
18 




The line of succession beyond the Vice Presidency is thoroughly 
treated in Silva, Presidential Succession , Chapter V, pp. 112-151; and 
in Feerick, From"1i"'";:.t1I1ngT!ana·.s-;--cnapter XXI, pp. 264-269. See also 
Clinton Ross1rei~-;--,-rTi'e Am.erT·c-an Presidency, Revised Edition (New 
York: Men tor Book s--:-I9 6 4}',-pp -:--2Ts:-zz--r.r:·--
17.I.V£ost authorities have referred to Max JTarrand, The Records 
of the Federal Convention of 178 7 (New Haven: Yale Uni vei-:-::sTfy ... 11re~ss, 
.19TI-;:-lnd19 3 7). ------
18C'l •. ~t va, Preside.ntial Succession p. 13, 
13 
A draft embodying these foregoing principles was submitted to 
the c01nmittee on style. When the draft submitted to this cornmittee is 
com.pared with the draft r·~turned to the convention, it seems evident 
that the committee introduced sorne confusing changes in the process 
of revising the language of the succession clause: 
Article X, Section 2: . . . and in case of his removal as 
aforesaid, death, absence, resignation or inability to dis-
charge the powers or duties of his office, the Vice President 
shall exercise those powers and duties until another Presi-
dent be chosen, or until the inability of the President be re-
moved. 
Article X, Section 1: The Legislature may declare by law 
what officer of the United States shall act as President, in 
case of the death, resignation or disability of the President 
and Vice President: and such Officer shall act accordingly, 
until such disability be removed, or a President shall be 
elected. 
After Consolidation by the Cornmittee on Style and Later 
i:C~?_rTe cr----·---·---------------· 
Article II, Section l, Clause 5: In case of the removal of the 
president from office, or of his death, resignation, or in-
ability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, 
the sam.e shall devolve on the vice-president, and the Con-
gress rnay by law provide for the case of re1noval, death, 
resignation or inability, both of the president and vice-pre-· 
sident, declaring what officer shall then act a.s president, 
and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be 
rernoved, or a president shall be elected. 19 
In joining the two separate clauses into one, the cornmittee: 
dropped the ''absence" contingency; dropped the word "disability" 
while retaining the looser tern1 "inability"; substituted the words 
"the sar:ne shall dev-olve on the vice-president" for "the Vice Presi-
dent shall exercise those powers and duties 11 ; and left ambiguous the 
---------
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length of time during which the Vice President might act as President. 20 
With the .substitution of the words "the sarne shall devolve on the 
vice--president'' for "the Vice President shall exercise those powers and 
duties, 11 the succession clause becarne most troublesorne for those it 
vvould rnost affect. What devolved on the Vice President? Was it the 
office of President, or only the powers and duties of that office? If the 
Vice :President becatne President, he would probably re1nain so for the 
rest o£ the tern1. If. it were the powers and duties which devolved, the 
Vice President would be only Acting President. Whatever devolved, it 
would do so in all cases- -Presidential removal, death, resignation, 
d - 1 'l't 21 an 1nao1 1 y. 
If one takes the grammatical approach, it can be argued that: 
. The subject of. the clause "the same sball devolve on 
lhe \rice-president" is th-e pronoun "same, ;r whose antecedent 
is the object of the verb "discharge, 11 i.e., ''powers and 
duties of the said oUice, 11 not "office, " which is the object of 
the preposition "of. 11 On the other hand, it is argued that the 
proper rule of construction is that where there is a relative 
pronoun, it refers to the nearest precedp.g noun. In the case 
of 11 f:Ja:cne" the nearest noun is "office. rr~ 
The debates at the Constitutional Convention indicate far rnore 
clearJ.y than can the foregoing grannnatical gymnastics that the Vice 
President was intended only to discharge the powers and duties of the 
President; all drafts placed before the cornrnittce on style cor:tobo:t'ate 
this conclusion. 23 However, the confusion and debate over g1·arnrnar 
2
°Feerick, F'r_?l? Failing 1~_':.':!:~-~-· pp. 48-49. 
2111:- l . llC ., p . 50 . 
22 
Ibid. 
.2 3[' - 1 _ DlC. See also Corwin, ~:_12_:__::_!:~, pp" 344-345. 
15 
did allow two events to occur the first tinJ.e a President died in office: 
first the Vice President rnade a decision and took an action '\vhich, after 
study, proved to be contrary to the intent of the Constitution; and sec-
ond, once taken, the decision was debated in the legislature and press 
hut was allowed to go unchallenged and to stand as prec!'!dent . 
.:'?:-"g_umen~s to Support the Need for a Sol~:!.i:~-~.1_ C~nst~~:_tional 
AmendnJ.ent 
Although there were, and are, those wbo pointed to a long his-
tory of what might be termed "getting by, 11 and som.e few who believed 
that the "Eisenhower--Nixon Letter 1124 had set a precedent for the . 
n1<~st pressing issue, a consensus grew, following the death of Presi-
dent Kennedy, that so!ne determined effort rnust be r:nade to find a 
solution which was both Constitutional and dependable. It was gen-
erally agreed that action rnust be taken v:hi.le the n1atter of succession 
was again of grave concern; otherwise it might, as in the past, be 
pigeonholed once the atmosphere of crisis had passed. 
In order adequately to correct the flaws in our. Constitutional 
system or in its interpretation, it had beconH:i necessary to (l) clearly 
establish that the Vice President would assume the Presidential office 
in cases of the rernoval from office, death, or resignation of the 
President; (2) p1·ovide that, in the event of inability, the Vice President 
would exercise the powers and duties of the President as Acting Presi-
dent; (3) establish procedures for deterrnining the existence of in-
2 4nuoted in part on page 4 7 o£ this thesis. 
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ability and its tennination, with the resulting retu:rn of power to the 
President; (4) provide for filling any vacancy occurring i.n the Vice 
Presidency so that the use of the line of succession might, in all bllt 
the most drastic situations, be avoided; 25 and (5) assure that at all 
tirr1es it \VOuld be understood who is to act as, or is acting as, Presi-
dent. 
Once the foregoing objectives were agreed upon, the question 
arose as to how they might be achieved m.ost effectively. The two 
most likely solutions were by Congressional statute or Constitutional 
amendrnent. There was expert opinion in support of each of these 
'b'l't' 26 pOSSl 1.1 1es. 
Change by Congressional statute is a less cmnplicated procedure 
than c.rnending the Constitution. It could be more easily m.odi.Hed if 
experience dictat1~d. Yet, a statute covering Presidential inability 
and succession rnight be open to a court challenge at the very tirne 
when certainty was most needed. A Constitutional mnendment, on the 
other hand, would be a more carefully studied, tightly defined solu-
tion with wide backing and acceptance. It would come as near to per-
fection as possible. The very difficulty of gaining the approval of 
Congress and the ratification of the states would help assLire that an 
amendn1.ent would produce the best solution obtainable. It would 
attempt to provide for the contingencies that are known and for those 
that study indicate to be predictable. It could pennit change at some 
/ ,. 
~:'c ' d e1a a, op. cit., p. 7. 
2 611 M . p 1 .• D l' w . .L1 I ' 'l' t II c . l ... aJor .· roposa :-o ea. 1ng 1~1 nao11·y, ongress1ona 
_g_~~-:..:S.~t,_, XLIII (l\.1ay, 1964), pp. 141--143 and 160. --·-·--·---·-
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future date of a given feature by statute, thLIS allowing for the unf.ore-
seen. Such an arnendrnent would be unchallengeable in time of crisis 
and thus, hopefully, provide a clear, certain set of answers. 27 
There seem.ed to be general agreement that neither the statute 
Ol' the amendment, nor the specifics to be embodied in.either, was 
capable of producing the perfect solution. There was equally as gen-
eral agreement that this could not be allowed to delay the drafting and 
enacting of the most suitable possible legislation. With the best of 
legislation, the President and Vice President would still have to be 
relied upon to act with constitutional legality. If it were assumed that 
both men elected to the executive departrnent are scoundrels, there 
could be no legislation that would reasonably assure legal succession. 
Hence, the best possible solution lay in clarification as rnuch as in 
protectioD .. 
------------· 
27 Hansen, op. cit., pp. 108--112. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
SUCCESSION PROBLEMS 
The Tyler Prece~en.!_ 
On April 4, 1841, William Henry Harrison died and the Presiden-
ti.al office was vacant for the first tirne. A man never seriously con-
sidered as a potential President was to be the first to test the Constitu-
tion's succession clause. 
John Tyler took the Presidential oath on April 6 and proceeded to 
sign officia.l papers ''John Tyler, President of the United States. 11 
Mr. Tyle1· thus made it evident that he intended to be President, rather 
tltan sirnply exercise the po\vers of the office. 1 
His motives, both for taking the oath and assuming the office, 
have been debated without final agreement. It is .not even certain that 
it was Tyler himself who made the decision to assume the office. How-
ever, publicly the new President gave the impression that the decision 
had been his, and the basis for that decision was his conviction that the 
word 11 sa1ne 11 in the succession clause referred to "office" rather than 
powers and duties. 
Tyler also sought to m.ake it clear that the office devolved upon 
hixn before he had taken the oath of the Presidency. He did so by having 







Judge Cranch, who achnini.stered the oath, sign a sta tcrneut to that 
effect: ". Whatever devolves on a Vice-President in case of a Pre..: 
sident' s death should do so at the thne of the President's death and 
not when the Presidential oath is taken. ,,z Tyler seems to have taken 
the Presidential oath mainly to preclude any real challenge to the legit-
imacy of his succession, for he had expressed the belief that the sue--
'cession to the Presidency was covered in his original Vice Presidential 
oath of office. 
Tyler's succession was not accepted as automatic by his con-
ternporaries. The question of his status was discussed and debated in 
both Congress and the press. Senator William Allan made the remark-
ably perceptive and prophetic staternent of the future complications 
that might arise with regard to a Presidential disability if Mr. Tyler's 
3 accession to the oHice was allowed to stand. However, both Houses 
of Congress, after debate, accepted Tyler's succession in their own 
peculiar and indirect way, and eventually the opposition press grew 
quiet on the su,bject. Even old John Qu,incy Adams began to refer to 
1\/Ir. Tyler as the President. 
4 
And yet Adams wrote in his journal 
that the correct "style" for Tyler was "Vice-President ... Acting 
President. ".5 
Althou~h Congress was somewhat tardy in establishing a 
2Feerick, Frc)m Failing Hands, p. 92. 
·----------~~·-----·-
3Silva, Presidential Succession p. 23. 
4
Hansen, OJ:?..:_ __ cit.:__, p. 13. 
5F . k "' 'r' • 1" II d 'eer1c 1 L' rom .t' a1. 1ng -an s 1 p. 94. 
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1nonum.<:mt to President Tyler, it is said that he created his own m the 
precedent he set: the office of the Presidency devolves on the Vice 
President when that office is vacant. The resulting vacancy in the 
Vice Presidency---particularly Tyler's suggestion that the second office 
should devolve upon the President pro terrrpore of the S.enate- -was given 
some consideration during his administration. However, no action was 
taken on this seemingly less itnportant n1atter, and thus a second pre-
cedent was allowed to establish itself: the Vice Presidency, when 
vacated, remains so until the end of the term. 
Garfield-Arthur and the Tyler Precedent 
On the rnorning of July 2, 1881, President Garfield was shot by 
Charles J. Gui teau, a disappointed ofEice -seeker. Mr. Garfield lived 
s01ne eighty days in a condition that aroused alternately hope and 
despair. On August 10, he performed the only official act during the 
course of his illness--the signing of an extradition paper. Much 
tnore important 1natters demanded the attention of the Chief Executive 
during this period: there were postal frauds; officers unable to per-
form their duties because the President had riot signed their com-
missions; and there seems to have been a serious deterioration in the 
nation's fo1·cign relations. 
6 
During this first prolonged and publicized period of Presidential 
disa.bility, Vice President Chester A. Arthur proved too weak to fulfill 
his duties under the inability provision of the succession clause. All 
6
Ruth C. Silva, "Presidential Inability, 11 ~2~-~_versi!L__~f. Detroit 
Law Journal, XXV (December, 1957), p, 140. 
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the govertllnent leaders, including himself, seen1. to have viewed with 
· al~nn the possibility of Arthur succeeding to the Presidency. 7 Headed 
by the Secretary of State, the Cabinet provided whatever leadership 
the government received. Yet it had been described as a body 11 unknown 
to the Constitution, 11 and the type of regency it operate~ was certainly 
never contem.plated. 
At the time Garfield was shot, three Vice Presidents had sue-
ceeded to the highest office and filled out the dead Presidents 1 terms 
in accordance with Tyler's precedent. As a result of this precedent, 
it was argued that a Vice President actually becomes President for the 
remainder of any term in which he acts as President. If Arthur 11acted, 11 
would Garfield also ren1ain President? Could there be two Presidents 
at the same time? JVIost critical question of all, would Garfield be 
able to resun1e t.he exe1·cise of his power if his disability ceased to 
exist? 8 
Such uncertainties worked to prevent the Cabinet from inviting 
Arthur to substitute temporarily for the President. By the time Gar-
field had lived two n1onths, the Cabinet was in agreement on the desir-
ability of such a course. However, the majority of the Cabinet men1- · 
bers held that Arthu.r 1s exercise of executive power vvould. be equivalent 
to removing Garfield fron1. oHice. 9 
And what of Garfield? Could he not himself decide how to re-
7 
F'eerick, .~r?rr: _ _!~iling H~n~-~-' p. 120. 
8suva, 11 Presidential Inability, 11 pp. 139-140. 
9Ibid., p. 140. 
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sol\re the situation? It i3 reported that for som.e tir:ne after the shoot-
ing he was, for the most part, alert and in possession of his faculties. 
But he was discouraged from participating in government and deciding 
the question of his own inability by the advice of his doctors, that his 
only chance for survival depended on absolute rest and no involvement 
in affairs of state. 10 The President, the Vice President, the Cabinet 
and the press all appear to have accepted the physicians' advice. In 
addition, the personal history of Garfield's friends and their fear that 
he would in effect abdicate the Presidency if its powers were exercised 
by another led them to minimize the extent of his disability and the 
d ~ t" t" 11 nee ror an ac tve execu 1ve. 
Another cause for inaction was the absence of clear guidelines 
fm: deciding the issue of disability. Opinion on this question was con-
flicting. Although some thought that the courts, the Congress, the 
President himself, or even the Cabinet ought to decide when the Pre-
sident was disabled, most "informed" opinions agreed that it was the 
Vice President's duty to deterrnine whether his Chief was incapaci-
tated. The question was how to compel the extrem.ely reluctant Vice 
President to take such action. 12 
Arthur found hhnseH in a delicate and somewhat embarrassing 
position. He had been nominated largely to placate the leader of the 
Stah\,art Wing of the Republican Party and thus heal a schism. This, 
1°F . k eertc. , 
11 s·1 1. va, Presidential Succession, p. 52. 
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com.bined wi.th the deranged assassin's proclaimed loyalty. to Arthur 
and to Stalwartism, gave rise to false rumors that the Vice President 
had been involved in a plot that would have put him in the White House.l3 
Arthur's course n1i.ght not have been clear even had there been 
no dispute over Garfield's right to resume control of his office. For 
the fact that Arthur was a Stalwart and the President a member of the 
Halfbreed faction would have most likely led to charges of usurpation. 
So Arthur did nothing but wait, and his contemporaries universally 
agreed that in so doing he conducted himself in a manner above re-
proach. 
Upon Garfield's death the Cabinet, which had at first treated 
Arthur with "silent hosti.iity, 1114 notified him of the President's pass-
ing and advised him "to take the oath of office of President o£ the 
United States, without delay. 1115 
It is to his lasting credit that President Arthur repeatedly ex-
pressed deep concern over the disability problem and asked Congress 
to formulate legal answers in his message to that body in 1881, 1882, 
and 1883. No more complete statement of the manifold nature of the 
problern has been rnade than that of Arthur in his special1nessage of 
December 6, 1881: 
What is the intent of the Constitution in Hs specification of 
"inability 'to discharge the powers and duties of the said 
office'' as one of the contingencies which calls the Vice-
President to the exercise of Presidential functions? 
Is the inability limited in its nature to long-continued 
13:1Teerick, From Failing Hands, p. 120. 
14Ibid., p. 123. 15Ib" , 10. ' p. 129. 
intellectual incapacity, or has it a broader irnport? . 
What n~ust be its extent and duration? 
How must its existence be established? 
Has the President whose inability is the subject of in-
quiry any voice in determ.ining whether or not it exists, 
or is the decision of that m01nentous and delicate ques-
tion confided to the Vice-President, or is it contemplated 
by the Constitution that Congress should provide by law 
precisely what should constitute inability, and how and by 
what tribunal or authority it should be ascertained? 
If the inability proves to be temporary in nature, and 
during its continuance the Vice-President lawfully ex-
ercises the functions of the Executive, by what tenure 
does he hold his office? 
Does he continue as President for the rernainder of the 
four years' term? 
Or would the elected President, if his inability should 
cease in the interval, be ernpowered to resume his 
office'? 
And i{, having such lawful authority, he should exercise 
it, would th<:: Vice ·-President be thereupog empowered to 
resum.e his powers and duties as such? 1 
24 
All three Congresses considered inability, its effect on the status a·nd 
tenure of: the disabled President, and even the question of how dis-
ability should be established. 17 Instead of producing any solution to 
these proble1ns, Congress in 1886 named a statutory successor to act 
as President in case of v3.cancy or disability in both the Presidency 
and Vice Presidency. 18 While this action may not be without merit, 
I 
16James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 
(Washin.gton, D, C.: Bureau oCNationaf Literatur·e-ai1d ~T909T,-­
Vol. VIII, p. 65. 
17 Silva, "Presidential Inability, 11 p. 142. 
18Ibid. 
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Congress appears to have found the problem of Presidential inability 
as a whole so difficult that it turned to a facet with which it could cope. 
With the enactment of this so-called succession law, the subject of 
Presidential disability was again tacitly ignored. 
Cleveland's Concealed Inability 
-·------------
Shodly after beginning his second term, in May of 1893, Cleve-
land noted a. rough spot on the roof of his mouth. A 1nonth later a 
White House physician discovered a tumor, the size of a quarter. A 
biopsy was performed and a specimen sent to a leading pathologist 
who con.firmed the diagnosis of malignancy and advised immediate 
19 
surgery. 
However, at the sa1ne time there was a financial panic envelop-
i.ng the nation. Cleveland believed that the prirnary cause of this panic 
and the resulting depression was the Shennan Silver Purchase Act of 
1890, and accordingly, on June 30, 1893, he called for a Special 
Session of Congress to convene on August 7. The stated purpose of 
this call was the repeal of the Sherrnan Act. It was believed that only 
Cleveland was capable of forcing through repeal and that, i[ something 
should happen to him, not only would the Shennan Act be permitted to 
stand, but the Vice President, Adlai E. Stevenson, wonld bring the 
20 
nation to the silver stc1.ndard. 
For these reasons, and the possibly adverse effects on the 
--------· ---
l9Karl C. Wold, Mr. President-How is Your Health? (St. Paul: 
The Bruce Publi s hi. ng C on'ipa n y-;-Tcf-19T~-p-:14-~--- .. 
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public of a revelation that he had cancer. Cleveland in;;;isted that the 
operation be performed in the secrecy of a trusted friend's yacht. 
On the same night that he issued the call for a Special Session, the 
President boarded the yacht, Oneida, where, on July 1, the first 
operation was performed. On July 17, a second operation was under-
taken to remove some suspicious tissue. 21 By August 7, Cleveland 
had recovered, returned to Washington, and addressed Congress 
urging the repeal of the Sherman Act. Ostensibly, he had been cruis-
ing on his friend's yacht and vacationing at a smnrner home. 
Because of the lack of any scar and the norrnal, or perhaps even 
improved, quality of Cleveland's speech, a contetnporary newspaper 
account of the operation, which was essentially correct, was passed 
off by the President's friends with the explanation that he had just had 
sorne teeth extracted. It was not until twenty-four years later that the 
truth came to light in an article in the Sa~urd~y ~~~ning_Pos_!, written 
by one of the doctors who had participated in Cleveland's operation. 22 
Cleveland's reasons for concealing his disability stemmed h·orn 
the political and economic conditions of his time, including the fact 
that his Vice President adhered to a policy, with 1·egard to the silver 
question, different fr01n his own. There is no record that the ques-
tions raised during Garfield's illness were a consideration in Cleve-
land's decision to avoid admitting to disability. 
21 Feerick, _Fr~m Failinfi!Iat~ds_, p. E->0. 
2 ~bid., p. 149. 
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McKinley is Shot and T. R. Succeeds 
On the afternoon of September 6, 1901, Willi.arn McKinley 
attended a public reception at the Pan-Arnerican Exhibition. in 
Buffalo. Hundreds waited in line to shake hands with the President. 
Among thern was Leon Czologosz. Although McKinley was well guard-
ed, Czologosz was able to approach the Chief Executive and fire two 
shots before being subdued. 23 
Vice President Roosevelt and all but one m.ember of the Cabinet 
hurriedly assembled in Buffalo. By Tuesday, the lOth, McKinley 1 s 
condition was improved to such a degree that tl~e Vice President and 
Cabinet were inforrned that there was no longer any need to remain. 24 
Roosevelt returned to his vacation in the Adirondacks. He believed 
25 the :President was out oE danger, . and perhaps, by his action, sought 
to reassure the nation. 26 
On Friday, September 13, Roosevelt received a messa.ge that 
McKinley was dying and he promptly set out a second tirne to reach 
his stricken C)lief. He was notified on his way of the President's 
death. Upon his arrival in Buffalo, Roosevelt was requested by Elihu 
Root, senior Cabinet member present, to take the oath of the Presi.-
dency in accordance vvith the precedent established by Tyler and con-
finned by Arthur. 
I 
23 
Young, ~L cit., p. 120. 




Young, loc. cit. 
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In making his reqnest, Root may have wanted to avoid any ques-
ti6n or m.isunderstandi.ng regarding RoOsevelt's succession during the 
critical period following McKinley's death. 2 7 McKinley had lived 
only eight days after bei.ng shot, perhaps too short a period for the 
question of inability to have arisen seriously. The principal concern 
of both the Cabinet and the Vice President appears to have been the 
President's recovery. The question of who, if anyone, should govern 
see1ns not to have been raised. Both national and international affairs 
seem to have been quiet enough that even though the President was dis-
abled, the Vice President did not hesitate to return to his interrupted 
vacation in a remote area where few knew his whereabouts. 
Wilson: A Refusal_to_}\.dmit Inability Result~_2.~. Go\rernment by 
Household Junta 
It was at the P<l1'is Conference following World War I that the 
pressures and responsibilities of hi.s office first overwhelmed Presi-
dent Wilson. Regarded by some as a "messiah of peace, " Wilson 
suffered in Paris a complete collapse and was confined to bed with 
what was, at the time, described as influenza. There was son1e talk 
of a slight shoke, which may not have been the first, and of impaired 
judgrnent. 28 MernbeJ:s of the official entourage noted marked and 
peculia1· changes in the Presi.dent's personality. 29 
27silva, Presidential Succession, p. 28. 
·---------~---·-----
28r., . k -'' eer1c ., 
29 
Wilson was still recupe1·ating from the effects of his illness when 
he reached Washington in July 1919, to face opposition to his country's 
participation in the League of Nations. The President was in no con-
clition for the battle to come. Against the advice of his doctor, his 
personal secretary, and his wife, he decided to meet s.enatorial oppo-
sition with popular support, and set out on a speaking tour of the 
western states, a tour that proved too much for a frail and aging 
man. 30 
The President had stated at a Cabinet meeting that he would be 
willing to give up his life for the League. He very nearly did so. At 
Pueblo, Colorado, on September 25, almost blinded by pain in his fore-
head, Wilson delivered his last, and perhaps his finest, speech. The 
next rnorning, the President's personal physician, Dr. Gary T. Gray-
son, noted that Wilson's left side was paralyzed. 31 Wilson's tour was 
abruptly canceled and the Presidential train speeded the 1, 500 miles 
to Washington, whereupon the President disappeared into the White 
32 House. 
On the return trip he had regained the use of his left arm and 
leg, but on October 2, 1919, Wilson's l.eft side was again partially 
3~ . 
paralyzed by a cerebral thrornbosis. J For nearly a week the Presi-
dent's life hung in the balance. Then began a recovery that was to 
---------' 
30 Young, _?F_: __ ~i!:__, p. 131. 
31Feerick, From .Failing_Hand~-' p. 166. 
32young, op. cit., p. 132 .. 






prove both agonizingly slow and incornplete. 
Tbc exact point at which Wilson 1 s disability as a President began 
might be open to question, but it clearly did not end until he left the 
I!::xecutive Mansion at the end of his term in 1921. During the interim., 
two groups sought to fulfill the executive responsibilities. The first, 
which has been termed a 11household junta, 11 consisted of the President 1s 
wife, his personal secretary, Joseph Tumulty, and his physician, Dr. 
Grayson. The second group was composed of the rne1nbers of the 
Cabinet, led by Secretary of State Lansing until the President re-
t d h . . t' 34 ques e ts restgna ton. 
lVIrs. Wilson recorded in her mernoirs that, before undertaking 
\vhat she termed her 11 stewardshin, 11 she had proposed to Dr. Decurn, 
. L I 
who \vas consulting on her husband 1s case, that the President resign 
in order to obtain the rest he so needed, and that the Vice President 
be permitted to succeed. Mrs. Wilson further stated that the doctor 
advised, 11H he resigns, the greatest incentive to recovery is gone. 
and suggested the course she was to take in screening the President 
from all but the most im.portant matters and decisions. 35 She pointed 
out in defense of her actions, II . I myself never rnade a single 
decision regarding public affairs. The only decision that was mine 
was what was irnportant and what was not, and the very irnportant 
decision of vvhen to present m.atters to rny husband. 1136 It 
34
Feerick, -~~~-~rn~ Fai~ing Hand~-' p. 172. 
3 ~dith :Bolling Wilson, My Mernoir (Indianapolis: Dobbs-
Merrill, 1938), pp. 228 -·291, dtedl)y Hansen, .~!:.:._cit:., pp. 34··· 35 . 
. , 1 .J • bld. 
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seems obvious that this false modesty of Mrs. Wilson was responsible 
for charges that the President was out of touch with reality, if not for 
graver national questions. Mrs. Wilson evidently considered only a 
Vice Presidential success-ion of a perrnanent nature, and she put this 
thought aside upon Dr. Decum's advice. She reveal'3 in her memoirs, 
"Woodrow Wilson was first my beloved husband whose life I was trying 
to save, . after that he was President of the United States. 1137 
On October 3, Secretary Lansing called on Tumulty to suggest 
that Vice President Marshall be requested to act in Wilson's place. 
The President's secretary raised the question of who should ce:rtify 
Wilson's inability. Lansing indicated it should be either Tumulty or 
Dr. Grayson. The President's secretary assured Lansing that he 
WOL!ld take no part in "ousting" Wilson. It thus appears that Tumulty, 
and by implication, Wilson, believed that the Tyler-Garfield prece-
dents would result in an ostensibly ternporary assumption of power by 
the Vice President rernaining in effect to the end of Wilson 1 s tenn. 
Grayson joined the discus sian and agreed that he also would refuse to 
take any part in declaring the President disabled. The incident closed 
with Tumulty inform.ing Lansing that if Wilson "were in a condition to 
38 know of this episode, 11 he would take decisive steps, a remark plainly 
indicating how truly disabled the President was. 39 
On Monday, October 5, Lansing called a meeting of the Cabinet 
37Hansen, op. cit~_, p. 35. 
38y-oung, ?P· cit., p. 36. 
39-Ibid., pp. 35-36. 
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apparently hoping that this body n:1ight agree on a course of action to 
be followed during Wilson's recovery. Perhaps the Secretary of State 
was really seeking their help to declare Wilson disabled. In any event, 
this was not the result. Dr. Grayson and Mr. Tumulty appeared at the 
tneeti.ng, and Grayson reported the President's condition irnproved. 
He also indicated that Wilson had shown irritation that a Cabinet meet-
ing was being held without his call. 40 This statement seetns to have 
placed Lansing and the already reluctant Cabinet in an ernbarrassingly 
defensive posture and ended hope of Cabinet consideration of Presi-
dential disability. 41 
The Cabinet met without the President twenty-one titnes in all 
between October 6, 1919, .and February 10, 1920, to transact such 
business as they were able. On February 11, Wilson requested 
Lansing's resignation on the grounds that he had assumed Presidential 
authority by ccnducting Cabinet meetings without the President's 
order. Wilson considered that he thus "spiked" Lansing's disloyalty. 
42 
During the early days of Wilson's disability, Congress refused 
to pave the way for a Vice Presidential succession by suggesting to 
Marshall that, since the powers of the Presidency devolved upon him, 
it was his duty to establish the President's disability. He might do 
this "indirectly'' by acting as Chief Executive. '
13 
The Republican 
40I-I ·t ., · an sen, op. cr . , p. .:> 7. 
41Ibi~.:..' pp. 37-38. 
42 
Ibid., p. 38. 
11 Pre~:>idential Inability, " p. 146. 
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leaders who controlled Congress had refused to consider Wilson's 
disability, partially out of fear of being critici<ced for taking advantage 
of the illness of a Democratic President. 44 It is suggested that they 
hoped s01ne drarnatic disclosure might take care of the rnatter for 
them. The Congressional De1nocrats naturally wanted to avoid pub-
licizing their Chief's incapacity; it might prove detrimental to the 
passage of the Treaty of Versailles and it would not help at election 
time. 
During this critical period, the Vice President stood on the side 
lines, cornplained of being kept in the dark, and refused to take any 
i.nitiative. 45 The only executive function he fulfilled for the President 
was that of entertaining the visiting Belgian 1nonarchs. This was a 
duty he was "unofficially requested" to perform by the White House. 46 
.Nbrshall feared that if he acted on the President's behalf, 
Wilson rnight accuse him of usurpation. He is reported to have said, 
"I a1n not going to seize the place and then have Wilson-·-recovered--
come around and say 'get off, you usurper. ' 1147 The Vice President's 
fear was not without basis, for Wilson viewed Lansing's actions as 
usurpation; actions that had helped to keep the government functioning 
and thus perhaps forestalled a possible Congressional m.ove to declare 
44F · 1 F~ ~ '1' H d 172 eer1c <., ron1 l:' at 1~g an s, p. .. 
4
\-oung, op:~~t_:_, p. 13 7. 
4cteerick, From Failing Hand~, p. 175. 
47silva, "Presidential Inability, 11 p. 146. 
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the President disabled. 48 While the Vice President could hardly be 
forced to resign by a Chief Executive who considered hirn disloyal, 
Marshall m.ay have been serious when he reportedly told his wife that 
his :=:ttternpt to assume the executive functions "could throw this country 
into civil war. 1149 Such an atternpt would almost certainly have dan1-
aged both parties politically and shaken hopes for Wilson's beloved 
League of Nations. 
The Vice President said he '!\'Ould assun1e the Presidency only 
in the event of a resolution by Congress, and only with approval, i.n 
writing, of both Mrs. Wilson, with whom Marshall otherwise feared 
entanglement, and Dr. Grayson. 50 Neither of these conditions was 
e\rer rnet and so the government continued to limp along, barely func-
tioning for a year and a half. 5l 
Mnch has been written about the nature of Wilson's illness and 
the degree to which he was disabled by it. From this considerable body 
of writing it is possible to draw two conclusions .. First, the President 
during IT?-uch of the time after his speech at Pueblo, Colorado, was 
seriously ill. Second, he may or may not have been rnentally as well 
as physically ill, but his judgment was inipaired. 
During the Special Session of the Sixty-Sixth Congress, sorne 




5°Feerick, From Failing Hands , p. 176. 
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although he vetoed the Prohibition Enforcen"lent Act of October 2 7, 
1919, the President failed to pass on fifteen of the sixteen acts sent to 
the White House between October 28 and Novem.ber 18. He did not meet 
with the Cabinet for eight months after his collapse. When he finally 
did meet with the Cabinet, Mrs. Wilson stood by to call a halt when 
the President tired. 52 He failed to answer the repeated requests 
from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for information on the 
Shantung Settlement. 53 These failures to act form clear evidence 
that Wilson was, beyond doubt, unable to sustain Presidential respon-
sibility and that governrnental business suffered as a result of his 
disability. 
On August 2, 1923, President Warren Harding, who had been on 
a western speaking tour and fallen ill in San Francisco, died suddenly 
while his wife was reading to him. Death was probably due to a cere-
bral thrombosis but, since Mrs. Harding would not permit an autopsy, 
the exact cause ren1.ained undeterrnined. In the absence of autopsy 
evidence, and of any evidence that Har_ding ha·d eaten crab meat, al-
though the Surgeon General originally diagnosed the illness as acute 
5 ~oseph Daniels, The Wilson Era (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press 1946) p. 54s,-cite-d by Hansen, op. ·cit., p. 41. 
-·----·-
53Silva, 11 Pre.sidential Inability, 11 p. 142, and Presidehtial 
Succession, p. 58. -··--·-------
----,Tile!act that the Senate Committee on FOJ~eign Relations was 
unable to get action or in£onnatior1 from the President on the Shantung 
Settlement caused Senator Albert B. !<,all to suggest that, if the Presi--
dent was too ill to discharge his duties, lhe Senate ought to recess un-
til he was able to do so .. However, nothing came of this suggestion. 
36 
indigestion caused by crab rneat, rurnors of poisoning arose. 54 
When Congress recessed in the surnm.er of 1923, Vice President 
Coolidge had gone on vacation to his father's home in Plyrnouth, Ver-
mont. Coolidge was awakened after rnidnight, August 3, by his father, 
informed of Harding's death, and advised by the Attorney General to 
take the Presidential oath. 55 The oath was administered by Coolidge's 
father, a notary public of the State of Vermont, who was so excited by 
these events that he stayed up the rest of the night while his son, the 
new President, returned to bed. 56 
On August 21, he again received the oath, this time from. a 
justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Coolidge 
did so on the advice of the Solicitor General, who feared a contra-
versy over whether an oath adrninistered by a state official was valid. 
57 The oath was taken secretly to avoid alarming the country, and 
because of the wish to preserve the appealing story of the first oath 
taken in Vermont. 58 Coolidge was later to say tl;tat it was not clear to 
him that he was required to take the oath at all in view of the Vice 
Presidential oath which covered the possibility of his succession to 
5
4:Feerick, _E'r~::n Failin~ Hands, p. 183. 
55suva, Presidential Succession, p. 28. 
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57Feerick, From Fa~!ing Hand~, p. 187. 
5!$uva, Presidential Succession, p. 29. 
37 
the Presidency. 5 9 
After this it seemed agreed that Coolidge was President. How-
ever, when there was talk of his running for re-election in 1928, 
objection was raised on the grounds that, if he were elected, it would 
violate the two--term t1·adition. On the other hand, it was argued that 
during Coolidge's so-called first term, he was only Vice President 
acting as President, for no man could become President without be-ing 
elected in accordance with the Constitution. 6° Coolidge, in his own 
·words, did not choose to run m 1928, and so the question rernained 
untested and the Tyler precedent remained intact. 
T~·um~_:-~_he Vice Preside~t N~! Prop_:=rly Prepared to Take Ove: 
On Thursday, Aprill2, 1945, Harry Truman received a tele--
phone call while visiting Speaker Sam Rayburn in the latter's office. 
The President's Press Secretary told the Vice President to come to 
the White House as quickly as possible. Mr. Truman did so and was 
inforrn.ed that he had just become the thirty-third President of the 
United States. 61 
The Presidency had fallen to a man who had' spoken with the 
President fewer than ten tin1.es since their n01nination. Trurnan re-
corded that only a few Cabinet meetings were held because Roosevelt 
was either abroad or, after his return, at Warrn Springs a great part 
-----·---·-----· 
59Feerick, From Failing Hands, p. 186. 
60suva, Presidential Succession, p. 29. 
61 Young, op_:_ cit., p. 241. 
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of the titne. Yet Truman would now face the p1·oblems of the war, 
the post war period, and over three years and nine months of the Pre-
'd 62 s1 ency. 
Questions regarding Roosevelt's health had been wide spread and 
becam.e a rnajor issue during his fourth term campaign. His personal 
physician, Dr. Mcintire, at that time issued a statement that the Presi-
dent's health was good, but Roosevelt was reported by his son, Jarnes, 
to have suffered at least two attacks of severe pain that were concealed 
from his doctor. 63 Roosevelt had entered upon his fourth term at the 
age of sixty--three. There is considerable mystery surrounding the 
state of his health in those last years of his life, much of it engendered 
by wartime secrecy and cornpounded by the President's lack of C8.ndor 
with his own physician and hi.s staff's loyal efforts to screen their Chief 
from criticism. 
Many at the crucial Yalta Conference were shocked by Roosevelt's 
appearance but opinions regarding the state of his health, and its effect 
on decisions reached, are conflicting. Secretary of State Stettinius 
insists the President's mind was clear, 64 yet it has been suggested 
that some of the controversial agreernents reached at the conference 
were affected by Roosevelt's ill health. 65 On his return to W::,shington, 
----------·----
62
Feerick, Fro~-!~a~_!._~ng H~d~, p. 200. 
6
1Jansen, .<:?.P~~!:-• pp. 53-55. 
6'Feerick, From Faili~~_!::!aJ?-d~, p. 196. 
65.r·oung, op. cit., p. 331. 
Roscoe-Drummond studied the vast collection of notes, min--
utes, position papers, and personal exchanges ar.nong the partici-
pants at the Yalta Conference in 1945. Drummond concluded that 
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people who saw him were also shocked by his. appearance. He was 
physically exhausted and left on March 29 for Warm Sprin~s, Georgia, 
where he continued to work until his unexpected death on the afternoon 
of April 12. When death did come, it was with such swiftness that the 
problems of disability and of keeping the Vice President informed did 
not arise. 66 
Harry Truman had over three years as Chief Executive tore-
fleet on the problem of Vice Presidential vacancy before Alben W. 
Barkley became famous as the "Veep. " Mr. Truman 1 s approach to 
the problems of succession was to propose, not a means for filling the 
vacant second office, but rather a change in the succession statute. 
Jarnes A. Farley was the first rnajor public figure behind the 
mo\ren:..ent to repeal the Presidential Succession Act of 1886. In a 
speech at Hazelton, I'ennsylvania, on May 9, 1945, he pointed out that 
President T1·uman was in a position to pick his own successor, which 
he, and later Trurnan, believed circum.vented the dernocratic process. 67 
without a doubt Roosevelt had not done his homework; he had failed 
to master the essential briefing papers, and was . . at the rnercy 
of the . . negotiators with whom he met . . . FDR's top advisors 
were unable to hold the President's attention while trying to convey 
the information he needed to know. He seerned unable to conccn-
h·ate on the matters before the conference for any length of time. 
Adm.iral Ernest King believed that the President had shrunk from 
facing controversial issues because he could not stand the physical 
strain. Was this an instance of presidential disability? 
Corwin, op. cit., pp. 54 and 345, concurs and goes further by 
stating 11 F. D.TC'T' s] inability was clearly evident to his close 
associates even before his last election. 11 
6{,.- •t· r..7 'Hans en, op_: _ __:_:__:_, p. :J • 
6silva, Presidential Succession , p. 124. 
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Criticisrn was also made by Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, 
who stood first in line of succession. Many Congressmen felt 
that he lacked schooling in politics and sufficient governmert experi--
ence to act as President should anything happen to Trmnan. 68 
Before departing with Stettinius for the Potsdam Conference, 
;' 
President Truman sent a special rnessage to Congress requesting a 
change in the succession law. He suggested that the Speaker of the 
House and the President pro tempore of the Senate should replace the 
members of the Cabinet as heirs apparent. 69 Truman's stated rea·-
sons for such a succession change, like those of his Co"Q.gressional 
supporters, were based on the idea that it was more 11 den'locratic 11 to 
have men who were elected rather than appointed at the top of the list 
of potential successors. 
A rneasure sim.ilar to the President's suggestion passed the 
House by a vote of 167 to 32, amid cheers for the able Speaker Sarn 
Rayburn. It had received only the most perfunctory consideration. 70 
The Senate was less enthusiastic because of grave doubts over the 
constitutionality of some of the bill's provisions and, further, because 
of its natural opposition to placing the Speaker ahead of its own pre-
siding officer. Not surprisingly, the Senate kept the measure in 
com.n'litt:ee until, as a result of the 1946 Congressional elections, the 
Republicans won a controlling majority in both Houses. 71 
68F'eerick, ~ro_:_n Fai~~ng Hand~, p. 204. 
69su.va, Presidential Succession , p. 124. 
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Republicans who previously had been indifferent to Truman's 
plan now becm:ne interested in a change that would place two met:nbers 
of their party- -Speaker Joseph W. Martin and Presiden-t Pro Tempore 
Arthur Vandenberg--in direct line of succession. Truman, unmoved 
by the results of the election, insisted that if the plan were sound when 
the Democrats controlled the Speakership, it was so when a Republican 
occupied the chair. 72 The succession bill was passed by the Republi-
can Congress in short order, over the opposition of Sena-te Democrats. 
It was quicldy signed by the President and became law on July 18. 
The Presidential Succession Act of 1947 contains all of the pro-
visions of Truman's original proposal except that of calling for a 
special election of President and Vice President at the next Congres-
sional election to :replace an acting Chief Executive drawn from the 
73 succession line. 
The Eisenhower Letter: Precedent and Application 
Dwight D. Eisenhower knew som.ething of the problems of in--
ability and succession even before his three illnesses as President. 
He had lived through Wilson's prolonged disability and, as a result, 
came to feel that the nation had a right to know 'the exact status of its 
President's health. 
ShrJrtly after his nomination in 1952, Eisenhower related to 
Nixon how unprepared Truman had been for his succession at F'. D. R. 's 
72suva, Presidential Succession , p. 128. 
73see Appendix F (or the text of the Succession Act of 1947. 
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death. The General expressed his earnest convictions that this should 
never happen again and that the Vice President should be trained and 
prepared to take over smoothly if necessary. 74 It is to Eisenhower's 
credit that he made serious efforts to re-establish the Vice Presidency 
as a vital working part of the Executive Branch of governn'lent, so that 
Richard Nixon could become probably the best equipped Vice President 
in our history to face the contingencies of succession. 
Nixon was the third Vice President to confront the problem of 
Presidential disability. Like his predecessors, Chester Arthur and 
Thornas Marshall, he faced an extremely delicate situation. Unlike 
any other Vice President, he was forced to deal with disability on three 
different occasions, during which the problem, as he saw it, was to 
provide leadership without appearing to lead. 75 
Ei.s enhower 's first illness, which r·:'!sulted from a "mild 11 heart 
attack, began early in the morning of September 24, 1955. He com·-
menced daily conferences with his assistant, Shennan AJmns, on 
October 1 to deal with official matters. The President m.et with his 
Cabinet on November 22, but did not return to Washington uutil 
J f+ • . 76 anuary a oer COnvaleSClng. 
7teeri.ck, From Failing Hands, p. 213. 
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On the evening of Saturday, September 2.4, Vice President 
Nixon, General Persons, and Acting Attorney Cieneral William P. 
Rogers 1net at Rogers' home. They discussed the situation and 
spoke by telephone with Secretary of State Dulles and Secretary of the 
Treasury George M. Hmnphrey. A consensus was reached that the 
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During his illness, Eisenhower saw to it that the pu.blic was in-
form.ed o£ his condition and also, as a result of his knowledge of 
Wilson's treatment of SeCl .. etary Lansing, that the Cabinet and National 
Security Council should continue to meet under the chairmanship of 
the Vice P1·esident. Some thought was given to the delegation of pow-
ers to Nixon, but this was dropped in favor of what was called team 
leadership. In accordance with this decision, the President's assis-
tant, Mr. Adams, wen.t to the hospital in Denver where Eisenhower 
was being treated to act as official spokes·man and liaison officer. 
I-Ie met with the President every few days beginning with the second 
week following the heart attack. He performed something of the role 
of Mrs. Wilson during the early days of treatment, deciding who and 
what should reach the President's attention. 77 Nixon remained in 
"~l{ashi:1gton to conduct Cabinet meetings- -from the Vice President's 
chair. 
Nixon recorded that, during the President's three illnesses, 
"Although I did not take over the reins of government, I was captain 
of the tearn that kept the ship of state on course while the President 
was incapacita.ted. 1178 Yet, if Nixon was captain, Sherman Adams 
was quarterback and, according to the opinion of political scientist 
Louis Koenig, Adams was nothing less than Acting President of 
I 
adn1inistration of the government should be continued by the Cabinet 
and White House staff. This was the course followed until October l 
when the P1·esident was able to meet with his assistant, 1\/Ir. Adams. 
77F' . k F I., ·1· L 3 d 216 221 • eenc , .. rot? 'a1 ::':?-g_:::~~~· pp. - - · 
7iVoung, op. cit., p. 265. 
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the United States. '79 These authorities, disagreeing in detail, do 
agree that the tearn-government approach probably worked only be-
cause there had been no existing crisis at the time the President 
became incapacitated and none had developed during the course of 
his recovery. 
Eisenhower himself had raised questions about his own ability, 
during the early period of his treatrnent, to make any vitally impor-
taut decision such as the use of retaliatory force against an attack. 
He also expressed doubts as to who would have had undisputed author-
ity to assume leadership in the absence of an able Chief Executive. 
On July 7, 1956, less than nine months after his heart attack, 
the President was to suffer a second disabling illness. He underwent 
emergency surgery to relieve an obstruction in the lower intestine. 
The ilei.t.is operation wa:3 successful, but Eisenhower was to endure 
greater pain over a longer period of time than in the case of his heart 
attack. 80 
The day following his operation, the President walking and 
a few days later began to perform official acts. But it was not until 
late July that he was able to function ori a full time basis, when he 
went to Panama to attend the m.eeting of American presidents. While 
in the hospital the second time, Eisenhower told those near hirn that, 
if another illness should occur, he would l'esign for he was profoundly 
disturbed by the fact that, during the two hours he was under anesthesia, 
7 9rbid., pp.- 265-266. 
sn, .d 
'101 • ' p. 269. 
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the country was without either a Cornrnander-in-Chief or an officer 
who had undisputed authority to act for him. 81 
President Eisenhower's third illness occurred late in 1957, 
seventeen and one-half months after the ileitis episode. On Novem-
ber 2 7, he su£fe1·ed what was diagnosed as an occlusion of the srnall 
branch of the middle cerebral artery on the left side, probably caused 
by a vascular spasm or blood clot. The doctors stated that the effects 
of this stroke, the rnost obvious of which was a speech impairment, 
we1·e m.ild and transitory, and that his reading, writing, and reason-
ing powers were unaffected. 82 On the basis of this infor.mation, the 
Attorney General concluded that it would not be necessary to delegate 
any power to the Vice President. So, once again the enorrnous prob-
lems of a disabled Co:mmander-in-Chief had been side-stepped, But 
this time the decision had been made by the nation's highest legal 
officer; in Wilson's tirne, a similar decision had been taken by those 
so close to the President that their only consideration had been his 
personal we Hare. 83 
President Eisenhower's battle to secure a solution to the in-
ability problem bega.n in January, 1956, after his recovery frorn his 
first illness. He ordered Attorney General Brownell to make an in-
depth study of the problem so that a plan might be drafted to protect 
the country in case of Presidential di.sa bility at a tim.e when imn1ediate 
81Feeri.ck, Fron1 F<:~~ing Hands, pp. 224-225. 
82 Young, op. cit., p. 272. 




execL1tive action was essential. Brownell went so far as to enlist 
the aid of Ruth Silva, whose work has often been cited in this paper, 
but the project was postponed by the 1956 election lest it become an 
. . t' l't' 85 tssue tn par tsan po 1 tcs. 
As a result of the Cabinet meeting on February 8, 1957, i.t was 
qecided to push for a Constitutional amendment along the lines favored 
by the Attorney General: 
Section l. In case of the removal of the President from office, 
~Of-his death or resignation, the Vice-President shall become 
President for the unexpired portion of the then current term. 
Section 2. If the President shall declare in writing that he is 
·una5le to discharge the powers and duties of his office, such 
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as 
Acting President. 
Section 3. If the Prer~ident does not so declare, the Vice-Presi-
<renf;Tfsatisfied of the President's inability, and upon approval 
in writing of a majority of the heads of executive departments 
who are mernbers of the President's Cabinet, shall discharge 
the powers a.nd duties of Acting President. 
Section 4. Whenever the President declares in writing that his 
lllabi.Iityis terminated, the President shall forthwith discharge 
the powers and duties of his office. 86 
A meeting of C01l.gressional leaders was held on March 29, 1957, 
at which opposition to the proposed amendment was first manifest. 
Speaker Sam Rayburn stated that the public would be suspicious of any 








Ibid. , p.· 70. 
87 
Young, ~L cit:...., p. 331. 
47 
According to Nixon's view, the Democratic Congressional leaders 
were not going to approve any plan that might place Mr. Nixon in the 
White House before the 1960 election. 88 
The Democratic Speaker's opposition, the lack of unanimity as 
to the form and details a solution should take, and the absence of 
enthusiasm am.ong Republican leaders, all made it apparent that the 
proposed amendment would not get far. It did not. 89 
Following Eisenhower's speech in1pairment, a second attempt 
was made to get Congt·ess to take action on the problem, but it, too, 
rnet with failure for the same two reasons as the first attempt: politi-
cal and personal opposition to Nixon, and the inability of Congress to 
unite behind a single proposal. 
As a result of the failure of Congress to produce a solution to 
the inability problen~, Eisenhower worked out a "stopgap" agreement 
to take the form of a letter, copies of which would be sent to Nixon, 
Attorney General Rogers, and Secretary of State Dulles. He first 
showed the letter to Nixon and Rogers early in February, 1958. 
They approved it with minor suggested changes, and it was made 
public on March 3, 1958. 90 
The President set forth the following pJ:ocedures: 
H the President were unable to perforrn his duties, he would 
so inform the Vice President, who would become Acting 
President. But if the President were unable to comrnunicate 
90 rbid. 
with th.;; Vice President, the latter ''after such consultation 
as seerns to hirn appropriate, 11 wo~ld decide if a state of 
disability existed, and if so, he would take over. In either 
event, the President would determine when the disability 
had ended, and he would then resume his duties. 9l 
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What Eisenhower did was to take from Brownell's proposed amend-
rnent those provisions relating to inability and in1plant them in an 
Executive Agreement. His was the first action of any real signifi-
cance in meeting the inability problem. 9Z 
The agreement has been criticized on the grounds that it was 
on.ly as good as the will of the two men involved to rnake it so. It 
was an Executive Agreement and, as such, would have no perrnanence 
beyond the adtninistration in which it was written. It is further charg-
ed that the letter could not prevent a Constitutional crisis, if there 
werr; disagreement over the determination of inability or recovery. 9 3 
It rnust be :remernbered that Mr. Eisenhower had sought a Constitu-
tional amendment first which might have obviated some of the fore-
going criticisms. When that approach failed, he had to rely upon a 
stopgap expedient. Although the im.perfections of the Eisenhower Letter 
as a solution are apparent, it was at least an attempt to permit the 
Vice President to act for a disabled Chief, where no such clear nJ.an-
date had heretofore existed, and as such it formed the basis for simi-
lar ag1·eements between President John F'. 'Kennedy and Vice President 
91 Young, op.:. cit., pp. 273-274. 
The c01nplete text of the letter agreement as made public is 
reprinted in Fee:dck, ~!·om_ Fa~lin_g Hands, p. 228. 
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Lyndon B. Johnson, and later between President Johnson and S1;·eaker 
John W. McCormack, and finally between President Johnson and Vice 
President Hubert H. Humphrey. 94 
The precedent of Eisenhower's Letter was to have its first appli-
cation when President Johnson entered Bethesda Naval Hospital, in 
October, 1965, for the removal of his gall bladder. It was announced, 
prior to surgery, that Vice President Humphrey would stand by 
while the President was under anesthesia and for an indefinite period 
thereafter, to make Presidential decisions should the need arise. 95 
The same agreement was again invoked when, on November 16, 
1966, the President underwent surgical removal of a non-malignant 
polyp from his throat and the repair of a small abdominal hernia. 96 
The need for Vice Presidential action did not arise during either 
disability, and it is perhaps just as well. Any action Vice President 
Humphrey might have taken at such a time could, because of the extra·-
legal nature of the agreement, have precipitated .a major Constitutional 
or political challenge. 97 
Lyndon Johnson: Our Eighth Unexpected President 
John Kennedy's Presidency was ended abruptly by bullets on 
November 22, 1963. Before Air Force One, the Presidential plane, 
94rbid., p. 229. 
9~ew York Times, October 6, 1965, p. 1. 
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departed for Washington that same day, the Vice President had taken 
the President's oath of office. Kennedy had said of Mr. Johnson be-
fore their election, "Lyndon Johnson is the only other 1nan (after my-
self) I can think of with the equipment for the job of president. ,r9S 
F'ew besides Leonard C. Jones, a New Mexico attorney, ques-
tioned Mr. Johnson's succession to the office of his deceased prede-
cessor. Shortly after L. B. J. became President, Jones unsuccess-
fully requested Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and the United 
States Attorney for the District of Columbia to institute a suit to "try 
President Johnson's right to the office. 11 In June, 1964, having failed 
in his first attempt, Mr. Jones instituted his own suit in the United 
States District Court for the District o€ Columbia, in which he sought 
to prove that Lyndon Johnson's becon~ing President was unlawful, 
illegal, and unauthorized by the Constitution. His suit was dismissed 
in September of 1964. 99 
The death of President Kennedy stirred widespread demand for 
a return to the 1886 Succession Law. The accession of Mr. Johnson 
to the Presidency left the usual vacancy in the second office for a 
period of fourteen months, 100 and placed Speaker of the House John 
McCormack, 71 years olJ at the ti1ne, and Senate President Pro 
Tempore Ca,rl Hayden, 86, next in line. 
98F . 1 ., eeru: ~. 
99Feerick, "The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amen.dment to the 
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The possibility that Hayden might be called upon to succeed 
seemed remote since elevation of the Speaker to the position of Acting 
Vice President required the election of a new Speaker, thus effectively 
101 precluding the succession of the President pro tempore. On the 
other hand, it seemed n-:tore than possible that Johnson _might die be-
cause of the pressure of the job; he had already suffered one heart 
attack. If this happened, it was not irnpossible that leadership of the 
Executive Department might first pass rapidly into the hands of one 
"old man" and then of another. 102 
John McConnack had held positions of leadership in the House 
for more than twenty years before he had been elected to the Speaker 1 s 
chair i.n 1962. However, there was the question of his age which he, 
hin1.self, conceded was a "legitimate" subject for discussion, although 
he had previously lost his temper at the suggestion he resign in favor 
of a younger potential Presidential successor. 
103 
McCorrnack was not 
regarded as conspicuously qualified to be President, particularly in 
foreign affairs. Perhaps he suffered by comparison with Sam Rayburn. 
But, through 1964, in the absence of a call from the White House for 
a succession statute change, the Speaker 1 s colleagues chose not to 
injure. further McCormack's already bruised feelings. It was also 
suggested that the Democrats did not wish to revive mernol'ies of Pre·· 
101
Young, op. ~~!.:._. p. 327. 
10 ?wrichael Harwood, In The Shadow of Presidents (Philadelphia: 
J. B. Lippincott Company, -19bbJ-:-p:-2:-----·---------






















sident Johnson 1s 1955 heart attack, inevitable in any consideration of 
such a change before the 1964 election. 104 It was further suggested 
that Congress adjom·ned in 1964 without the House taking action on an 
inability-succession amendrnent already passed by the Senate because 
of resentrrtent in the House over criticism directed at its Speaker. 105 
This regard for the Speaker 1s personal feelings and the natural 
desire not to diminish his office in any way, resulted in delay of Con-
gressional action on a proposed 25th Arnendment to the Constitution 
until 1965, and delay of reconsideration o£ the 1947 succession statute 
indefinitely. 
In 1963, following Kennedy 1 s death, President Johnson agreed in 
writing with lVIr. McCormack that the latter was to attend such key 
decision-making meetings as would not be inconsisten-t with his legis-
l t . ff' 106 .a .lve c. 1ce. The Speaker expressed great relief upon his re-
rnoval from the status of heir apparent. by the inauguration of Vice 
President Hubert Humphrey. For all the criticism leveled at 
McCorrnack, he is generally conceded to have done a creditable job 




Feerick, 11 The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution, 11 p. 196. 
106 
New York Tilnes, Decetnber 4, 1963, p. 1. 
CHAPTER III 
CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE 
THE PROBLSMS PRIOR TO 1965 
Attempts to Solve the Inability Problem -----·-·-------
At the Constitutional Convention, only John Dickinson posed any 
question regarding the disability provision. He asked his colleagues, 
on Septem.ber 7, 1787, to tell him what was meant by "inability" and 
who should decide that it existed, but no one present found it necessary 
or perhaps possible, to answer him. 1 
Indeed, no persistent attempt to settle these problems was rnade 
even during per.iods when their gravity was proven. Following Garfield's 
death, Congress turned instead to a question that had not yet occurred 
in reality and designated a successor to act in the case of a sirnul-
taneous inability or vacancy in both Executive offices. 2 And during 
President Wilson's long disability, all proposals to deal with the 
problems introduced in Congress died in Committee. 3 
Not until 1955--shortly before President Eisenhowe1·'s heart 
attack in September- -was the problem of Presidential disability seriou.sly 
raised again when Emanuel Geller, Chairrnan of the House Judiciary 
1clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (New York: Mentor 
Books, Revised Edition, 19b4f,p:--26Z:--
Zsuva, Presidential Succession , pp. 83-84. 
3rbid:_, p. 84. 
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Committee, ordered a study of it. During the course of this study, the 
Comrnittee 1 s staff distributed to various jurists, political scientists, 
and public officials a list of fundamental questions relating to Execu-
tive inability. The replies were varied and indicated no consensus. 4 
However, six proposals gleaned from the analysis of the replies were 
put into legislative drafts, two in the form of statutes, and the rest as 
Constitutional an1endr:nents. At this point, President Eisenhower 1 s 
first disability, the heart attack, moved the House Committee on the 
Judiciary to set up a special subcommittee to study the matter. Hear-
i.ngs were held in April, 1956, and still more varied opinions were 
heard. 5 
In .t'\pril, 1957, Attorney General Herbert Brownell testified be-
fore the House Subcornmittee on behalf of a Constitutional amendment 
proposed by the Adm.inistration. His proposal was criticized because 
it allowed a President to declare the end of his own disability and thus 
would nullify the ability of the Vice President and Cabinet to act i.n those 
cases where the President was unwilling to admit his inability and 
im.mediately declared his own recovery. 6 
After consideration of various other proposals involving either 
separately or in combination the Vice President, Cabinet, Congress, 
4:Presidential Inability, Cornr:nittee on the Judiciary, House of 
R.epresentatl.ves, 84th Cong]:ess, 2nd Session, January 31, 1956. 
5Feerick, "The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendmen·t to the 
Constitution, " p. 181. 
~Iearings before the Special Subcommittee on Study of Presi-
dential Inability of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Repre-
sentatives, 85th Congress, 1st Session, Serial 3, April l., 1957, pp. 4-32. 
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Supreme Court, and a Special Inability Commission, the Subcomrnittee 
found itself unable to reach agreem.ent on a single approach. This lack 
of consensus was communicated to the full Committee on May 16, 1957 
and, as a result, no recon1.mendations v;ere made to the House. 7 
In January and February of 1958, the Senate Subc91nrnittee on 
Constitutional Arnendments, under the Chainnanship of Estes I<efauver, 
began its own hearings on the subject. Attorney General William P. 
Rogers testified on behalf of the same Brownell Proposal previously 
studied by the House Subcommittee but Rogers had added to the origi-
nal a provision by which a Vice President and Cabinet had a chance of 
making effective their disagreement with the President's declaration of 
ability. In such a case, the Vice President, with the approval of the 
majority of the Cabinet, could bring the disagreement before Congress 
and, if a rn.ajority of the House voted that the President was disabled 
and the Senate concurred by a two-thirds vote, the Vice President 
would continue to exercise the Chief Executive's powers until the Pre-
sident's term expired or a majority of both Houses decided the in-
ability was ended. 8 The Brownell Proposal with the Rogers 1 modifi-
cation was approved by the Senate Subcomn1.ittee on Constitutional 
Amendrnents on March 12, 1958. But Congress adjourned without con-
si.dering it and took no action in 1959 or 1960, although the proposal was 
reintroduced by Senator Kefauver in January 1959 and was still on the 
parent comrnittee 1 s agenda when Congress adjourned in the smnmer 
of 1960. 
-----------
7 Feel'ick, "The Propos cd Twenty-Fifth Am.endrnent to the 
Constitution, 11 p. 181. 
~bid., p. 182. 
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Congressional failure to solve the problem after the rnost con-
certed effort up to that time was the result of several factors. Al-
though there was general agree1nent on the need for a Constitutional 
arnendment, there was considerable disagreernent on a procedure for 
deterrnining the existence and termination of a disability. Each of the 
numerous proposed solutions had its supporters and critics and none 
proved able to conunand the support necessary for pas sage .. 9 Action 
" was further inhibited by a reluctance to pass any measure that might 
have placed Richard Nixon in the Vthite House, as Acting President, 
b-e-Eore-th-e--l9 60-election-ancl-thus--uncle ubte dly-have-in G-l~('}aS@d-his-GhanG to:.;,, ___ ----;; 
of being nom.inated and elected as President. 
10 
Although Congress as a whole had still not decided upon a solution 
to the inability problem, its discussions had brought about a consensus 
on certain aspects of the problem: a Vice President who succeeded in 
cases of death, resignation, or removal would becorne President for 
the remainder of the tenn; and in cases of Presidential disability, the 
Vice President would act as President only for the duration of that dis-
b 'l't 
11 
a 1 1 y. 
With the election of John Kennedy to the Presidency, the problen1 
of executive disability seemed to recede from both Congres~ional and 
public consciousness, and the new administration itself showed little 
concern to find a lasting solution to this recurring dilemma. 12 
9rbid .. 
10 Young, op. cit. , p. 331. 
ll F . , eerlc;<, 
12 Feerick, 11 The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendm.en.t to the 
Constitution, 11 p. 183. 
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However, in 1963 Senators Kefauver and Keating, who realized that 
previous attempts to legislate had failed because of disagreement on 
detail, put aside their own pet proposals and jointly sponsored Senate 
Joint Resolution 35 which, by Constitutional an.1.endment, would clarify 
the status of the Vice President in cases of disability and empower 
Congress to legislate later a solution to the problem of the cornmence-
m.ent and termination of inability. 13 At hearings which began on June 
11, 1963, testirnony was taken from seven witnesses, one of whom, 
Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB Katzenbach, indicated adminis-
- ---- tration-support o£S.J. Res; 35: Shortlythereafter, the Subcommittee-
favorably reported S. J. Res. 35 to the full Committee. The sudden 
14 death of Senator Kefauver in August 1963 brought progress to a stop. 
The death of President Kennedy drmnatically revived interest in the 
disability problern once again for, as Senator Keating put it, II 
n1atter of inches spelled the difference between the painless death of 
John F. Kennedy and the possibility of his permanent incapacity to 
exercise the duties of the highest office of the land. 1115 
a 
There descended, in the aftern1ath of John Kennedy 1 s ass as sina-
tion, such a flurry of proposals dealing with Presidential inability 
16 
13 nearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amend-
rnents of the Cornmittee on the Judiciary, Senate, 88th Congress, 1st 
Session, June 11-June 18, 1963, pp. 5-6. 
14Feerick, !:.?rn. Fai~ing_!:-!_ands, p. 243. 
1~eerick, "The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution, " p. 183. 
16The idea~ embodied in these bills can conveniently be divided 
into four major categories, perm.ii:ting the matter of Presidential in·-. 
ability to be resolved by: (a) the Congress, (b) the Executive, (c) a 
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and Vice Presidential vacancy that Senator Birc~1 Bayh, Kefauver's 
successor as Chairman of the Senate Subcomrn.ittee on Constitutional 
Amendments, announced in December 1963 that hearings on the sub-
ject would be held early in 1964. The new Chairman himself, along 
with several other senators, introduced Senate Joint Resolution 139, 
·which contained provisions relating to inability, Vice Presidential 
vacancy, and the line of succession beyond the Vice Presidency. Senator 
Bayh' s inability provisions were essentially those of the Brownell-
17 Rogers Proposal. 
Meanwhile, the American Bar Association came to the assis-
tance of Congress. It sponsored a conference on the subject of Presi-
dential inability and succession in Washington on January 20 and 21, 
1964. 18 Frorn that conference e1nerged a proposed amendment to the 
Constitution inade up of the following parts. 
19 
(1) In the event of the inability of the Presid~nt, the powers 
and duties, but not the office shall devolve upon the Vice Presi-
dent or person next in line of succession for the duration of the 
special commission, or (d) a combination of government entities. 
Examples of each are to be found in the Congressional Digest, XLIII, 
#5, (May, 1964), p. 143, along with the Vi.ewsOITormer"""""Pre""Z-;idents 
Hoover, Truman, Eisenhower and fonner Vice President Nixon. 
17F . J II Th•" p- ' d F . f h A d t ' tl ee:nc _,, .. . ropose Twenty- '1 t rnen men w · 1e 
Constitution, 11 p. 184. 
18 A1nong those present were John D. Feerick, author of Fr01n 
Failing Hands , and Richard H. Hansen, Nebraska attorney andauffior 
or-r:rne-Yea1·--we Had No President. Bayh, op. cit., p. 46. ·--------------·---- ------
19In 1960 the American Bar Association, after an ''elaborate" 
study of the entire problem of inability and succession, had "· 
recornmended t1wt such an arnendment grant to Congress the power to 
establish, by law, the necessary machinery which would be needed in 




inability of the President or until the expiration of his term. 
of office; 
(2) in the event of the death, resignation or removal of 
the President, the Vice President or the person next in line 
of succession shall succeed to the office for the unexpired 
terrn; 
(3) the inability of the President may be established by 
declaration in writing by the President. In the event that the 
President does not make known his inability, it may be estab-
lished by action of the Vice President or person next in line 
of succession with the concurrence of a majority of the 
Cabinet or by action of such other body as the Congress may 
by law provide; 20 
(4) the ability of the President to resume the powers and 
duties of his office shall be established by his declaration in 
writing. In the event that the Vice President and a majority 
of the Cabinet or such other body as Congress may by law 
provide shall not concur in the declaration of the President, 
the continuing disability of the President may then be deter-
mined by the vote of two-thirds of the members of each House 
of the Congress; and 
(5) when a vacar:..cy occurs in the office of the Vice Presi-
dent the President shall nominate a person who, upon approval 
by<.!. majority of the m.ernbers of Congress meeting in joint 
session, shall then become Vice President for the unexpired 
term. 
59 
The Conference also considered the related question of Presidential 
succession and concluded that: 
(1) The Constitution should be amended to provide that in 
the event of the death, resignation or removal of the President, 
the Vice President or the person next in line of succession shall 
succeed to the oHice for the unexpired ter·m.; 
(2) It is highly desirable that the office of Vice President be 
filled at all times. An amendrn.ent to the Constitution should be 
adopted providing that when a vacancy occurs in the office of 
Vice President, the President shall norninate a person who, 
2 ~enator Bayh states that this 11 ••• addition had been made in 
order to broaden the base of support . . . Thl.1s those favoring .. 
[ the disability comrnis sian] approach could be brought into the fold 
in support of S. J. Res. 139. 11 Bayh, .c.?_:P_· .:_~:_-' p. 50. 
upon approval by a majority of the elected. 1nembers of Con--
gress rneeting in joint session, shc.ll then becom.e Vice 
President for the unexpired term. 21 
All these proposals were released to the press immediately 
60 
following the conference, endorsed by the American Bar Association 
on February 17, 1964, and presented to the Senate Subcomm.ittee on 
Constitutional Amendment on February 24 by the president and presi-
dent-elect of the A1nerican Bar Association. 22 
The hearings of the Subcommittee were concluded on March 5, 
1964, and by May 27 the Subcommittee had favorably reported to the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary a revised S. J, Res. 139, which 
embodied the recommendations found in the A1nerican Bar Association 
consensus and deleted those original provisions dealing with succession 
b d ., v· r=> · 1 23 Tl J d. · c~ ·t+ · t eyon t.1e lCe reSlC ency. 1e U lClary ,omml vee, 1n .urn, 
unani.rnously approved it on August 4, 1964, and on September 28 
2 \-Iearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amend-
ments of the Comrnittee on the Judiciary, Senate, 89th Congress, J.st 
Session, January 29, 1965, pp. 59-62. 
Bayh, op. cit. , p. 49, states: 11 The final draft [of the ABA con-
sensus] was almost identical to the language of Sections 1 and 2 of S. J. 
Res. 139; for most part they [Walter Craig, Herbert Brownell, Ed 
Wright, Lewis Powell, and Ross Malone J had simply changed a word 
here and a word there, sharpened the language and clarified the intent. 
The controversial Section 3, however, had been dropped c:ornpletely. 
They had felt as I had, that no a1nend1nent v1ith such a provision, deal-
ing with the line of succession beyond the Vice Presidency, capable of 
being interpreted as offensive to the Speaker of the House, could pass 
through the House. 11 
2~eerick, 11 The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution, 11 p. 185. 
2 i\mong those who testified at these hearings in favor of S. J. 
Res. 139 were John D. Feerick, of the ABA, and Professor Ruth C. 
Silva of Pennsylvania State University. Bayh, op. cit., p. 66. 
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S. J. Res. 139 was passed by a voice vote of the senators on the floor 
at the time. There were fewer than twelve senators in attendance, and 
it was suggested that such a procedure would set a dangerous prece-
dent for the passage of Constitutional Ame1~dments; therefore, the 
following day, a roll call vote was taken and the sixty senators present 
unanimously voted in favor of Bayh 1s revised S. J. Res. 139. 24 
These actions by the Senate represent the first time either House 
had passed a measure to deal with the problems of Presidential in-
ability or Vice Presidential vacancy. 25 Even then, the complete Con-
gressional approval needed to send the Amendment to the States for 
ratification was delayed because Congress adjourned before the House 
of Representatives took action. 26 
Attempts to Solve the Vice Presidential Vacancy Problem 
---··--.--~O"OW~N-·-----·- .. -·--~----·- ... ~·-------------·· ' ···-----
F'or .more than thirty--seven years, or over twenty percent of our 
history, the United States has been without a Vice President. 27 Yet it 
21teerick, 11 The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution, 11 p. 185. 
2 1:3ayh had worked hard to convince Senate Majority Leader lVIike 
JV[ansfield to bring S. J. Res. 139 to the floor for a vote before adjourn-
m.ent even though both recognized that there was 11 • • • no chance what-
soever of its passing the House. 11 Bayh reasoned that if his resolution 
was passed once by the Senate, it n1ight be n1ore easily passed a second 
time, during the next session, by that body. The result could be that 
attention might then be focused 11on getting action in the House. 11 Bayh, 
op. cit., p. 138. 
29.<'eerick, 11 The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution, 11 p. 186. 
2711 The Office of the Vice-Presidency, 11 Congressional Digest, 
XLIII, #1j, {May, 1964), p. 134. See Appendixe·s;i\-8."iic!B,-Vice -Pre-












was not until the assassination of President I<:ennedy that any serious 
effort. was 1nade to devise a 1neans whereby the Vice Presidency might 
be filled prior to the next regular election. 
When Lyndon Johnson entered the White House, the Vice Presi-
dency was left vacant for alrnost fourteen months. Thi~ fact, com.bined 
with the age of the potential President~al successor and the increasing 
importance given to the Vice President's office, forced politicians and 
scholars alike to recognize that the Vice Presidency must be kept filled 
at all times. The Vice President was, after all, the person best able 
to prepare himself to succeed either to the Presidential office itself 1n 
an emergency or to exercise temporarily its powers and duties. 28 
The record of previous Congressional contetnplation of the prob-
lem of Vice Presidential vacancy enforces other evidence of the low 
esteern in which the office was long held, and indicates that Legislative 
thinking continually turned to deciding the line of succession by statute 
as a .means of assuring continuity of the executive functions. Three 
times Congresses have changed the statutory line of succession beyond 
the Vice Presidency but until recently no Congress seriously thought 
of avoiding the use of that line by assm'ing that the Vice Presidency 
would always be occupied. Suddenly, during the 1964 Senate hearings, 
there was almost con1plete agreernent on the need for a Vice President 
at all times. Senator Bayh noted it in every measure on the subject of 
Presidential inability placed before his Committee, and many witnesses 
were 'Lo point out that the Vice President is the official best prepared to 
2 ~eerick, 11 The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution, 11 p. 181. 
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succeed because of his knowledge of and· experience with the Executive 
m~chinery. 29 President Johnson publicly added his influence when, at 
a press conference on March 15, 1964, he stated it was "important'' 
that something should be done to keep the office filled, but he doubted 
Congress would rnake any progress in 1964. 30 
One of the many suggestions made for assuring succession was 
that a special election be held whenever a vacancy existed.· This was 
criticized on the ground that such an election would con1.e at a time, 
most likely, when a President had died and the great need for unity 
could be disrupted by a political campaign. Furthermore, a special 
election could conceivably bring to the office a Vice President of a party 
different from the late President's. 
Forrner President Truman and former Vice President Nixon had 
both recon:nnended the reconvening of the last Electoral College to 
choose a new Vice President, stressing the elective rather than appointive 
process. Criticism of the Electoral College proposal pointed out that 
such a process was a step away fr01n dernocratic control because the 
Electors would have no mandate hom the voters. It was also men-
tioned that this approach was unwise be'cause Congress had for many 
31 years been studying the possibility of abolishing the College altogether. 
Former Senator KennethB. Keating suggested the creation of a 
29Feerick, !.~.:_o~ Faili~:_~-~Iancls, pp. 258-259. 
3~ew York Tim.es , .March 16, 1964, p. 18. 
31Feerick,. Fro:? Failil:.t5 __ Hc:nds, p. 259. 
64 
plural Vice Presidency. One Vice President would be an Executive Vice 
President first in the line of succession and would, under normal cir-
cumstances, be available to undertake Presidential assignments. The 
second would be a Legislative Vice President acting as President of the 
Senate and second in the line of succession. The great advantage of 
this proposal, according to I"<:eating, was that both Vice Presidents 
would be of the President's party and would have been popularly elected. 32 
---s Richard Nixon criticized Keating's suggestion when he pointed out that 
by dividing the already limited functions of the Vice Presidency, it 
would be downgraded at a time when the Vice Presidency became most 
important. 33 Keating's proposal also received criticism on the grounds 
that one or both Vice Presidents might be chosen to balance a ticket with 
the result that neither n1an would be of the desired caliber, and neither 
would be adequately prepared to succeed. 
Another suggestion for filling a Vice Presidential vacancy was to 
give Congress the power to r.nake the selection. Senator Jacob K. 
Javits, one of the leading advocates of this proposal, changed his bill 
to allow the President an absolute veto when it was pointed out that 
otherwise a Vice President from a different party than the President's 
could succeed. 34 
------··--------
32"From an address given on the Senate floor on December 19, 
1963, introducing S. J. Res. 140. . 11 by Kenneth B. Keating, 
Congressional Digest, XLIII, #5, (May, 1964), p. 152. 
3311 From testimony given bef.ore the Senate Subcomn'littee on 
Constitutional Amendments on March 5, 1964 11 by Richard Nl. Nixon, 
Congressiona_~Digest, XLIII, #5, (May, 1964), p. 153. 









Many, including Sen8.tor Birch Bayh whose S. J. Res. 139 con-
tained such a provision, felt the best way to fill a vacancy in the second 
office was to give the .President the power to n01ninate a person, whose 
name would then be subrnitted to Congress for that body's approval. 35 
This method would assure the President of a compatible Vice President, 
just as does the current practice of the Presidential candidate in an 
election year selecting his running mate. 
Critics of the foregoing method saw it as giving Congress the 
role of rubber-starnping the President's nominee and suggested, instead, 
that the President submit to Congress a list of names frorn which one 
could be chosen. There is precedent for such a proposal in the way 
Dwight D. Eisenhowe:c· allowed the convention to select his Vice Pre si-
dential running n1ate, just as there is precedent for Senator Bayh's 
m.ethod in the 1nanner Lyndon B. Johnson went to his convention to 
name his choice for a nominee. Further objection to the last proposal 
is that the President might not get the person with whom he could best 
work or that Congress might become deadlocked on the choice. 36 
Supporters of the Presidential nomination approach were not agreed on 
whether the name or names should be submitted to one or both Houses 
of Congress and arnong the adherents of joint participation there was a 
difference of opinion. as to whether the Houses should meet separately 
or jointly. 
3511 From a state1nent of January 22, 1964, opening hearings before 
the Senate Subcom1nittee on Constitutional Amendments, 11 by Birch 
Bayh, C~:m.gressio_na~ Diges.!_, XLIII, #5, (May, 1964), pp. 148, 150. 
3 ~eel'ick, _!i'r~_:n Failit:[_!-~~nds, p. 261. 
66 
Most of the proposals thus far had been embodied in Constitution-
al amendments. Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller suggested the creation 
of a statutory office of first secretary. This office would be filled by 
appointment of the Chief Executive, with the approval of the Senate. 
The first secretary would be a member of the Cabinet and National 
Security Council, and would assist the Pre~ident in areas of national 
security and internal affairs. The Governor felt that a person with such 
knowledge and experience as would be gained from this office would be 
well prepared to succeed. 37 
Senator Eugene J. McCarthy backed the creation, by statute, of 
an office of deputy president. This office would be filled within thirty 
days of a vacancy in the Vice Presidency. The President would choose 
a norninee fron1 arnong the following: mernbers of Congress, the jus-
tices of the Suprerne Court, and State governors. The nominee would 
then be subject to confirtnation by the Senate. According to the Senator, 
the choice of a deputy president would be r:nade under conditions more 
politically realistic than those of the past, for the possibility of a deputy's 
d . ld b th t . d t' 
38 
succec 1ng wou e e paramoun_ cons1 era 10n. 
It had even been suggested that Congress could abolish the "need-
less n office of Vice President and provide, in the event of the President's 
death, the procedure for choosing a successor for the unexpired term. 39 
3 7 ~::__~- YC?._rk Tirne ~· February 2 7, 1964, p. 16. 
38Feerick, Frorn Fa~ling !--1an~ls, pp. 262--263. 
3 ~enry Hazlitt, "To Reduce Uncertainty, 11 Newsweek, LXXXVI 
(December 9, 1963), p. 63. 
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For, it was argued, the institution of the Vice Presidency. forces the 
voters to choose a m.an they may not like in order to elect a man they 
do. A successor chosen by the House and Senate to fill a Chief Execu-· 
tive's unexpired term would, presur:n.ably, be a person chosen ohly for 
h d f 40 is Pr esi ential potential and or no other reason. 
After studying the foregoing proposals and their rnany va1·iations, 
Senator Bayh's Committee decided that: "Whenever there is a vacancy 
in the office of Vice-President, the President shall nominate a Vice-
President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of 
both Houses of Congress," each House to meet separately. This was 
designed to deal with two sets of contingencies: when the Vice President 
succeeds to the Prcsiden'cy upon the President's death, resignation, or 
removal; and when the Vi.ce President dies, resigns, or is removed. 41 
This proposal was embodied inS. J. Res. 139 and suffered the fate of 
the resolution when the House adjourned without taking action in 1964. 
Attempts to Solve the Problern of Succession Beyond the Vice Presidency 
The Constituti01i. provides fo1· the contingency of succession beyond 
the Vice Presidency by granting Congress the power to declare, by law, 
what officer should act as President when both a President and Vice Pre-
sident die, resign, or are removed from office. Congress has passed 
three la·ws u'nder that grant of power made in the succession clause, 
the original in 1792, a second in 1886, and the still current one passed 
in 1947. 42 
4<l-Jenry Hazlitt., "The Vice-Presidency, 11 Newsweek, LXXXVI 
(Dece1nber 2, 1963), p. 62. ------·-· 
263. 
4 2suva, Presidential Succession, p. ll2. See Appendixes· D, E, 
and F £or Succes.sionSfatuf;:s·:-·-------------
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The Second Congress passed the first succession act on March 1, 
1792, with rather scant discussion of either the possible Constitutional 
objections or the practical problems of its application. 43 During the 
debates, the only Constitutional question raised concerned the definition 
of an "officer" of the United States Government, and thus those eligible 
for designation as a successor. 44 The act provided that the Senate 
President pro tem.pore and the Speaker would follow the Vice President, 
in that order, in the line of succession. It is believed that this order 
resulted from. Alexander Hamilton's determination that the successor 
should not be the Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson. 45 Madison 
\vas one of those who, in criticism, pointed out that there was no re-
quirem.ent in the act that 1.£ any one of those named went to the White 
House, he would give up his original duties to avoid a conflict with the 
principle of separation of powers. 46 It was also later noted that since 
the President pro tempore was not "held over" from one Congress to 
the next the office was frequently without an occupant, as was that of 
the Speaker shi.p. The Second Congress had overlooked the fact that a 
new Congress, elected in Novem.ber, would norn1ally not assemble for 
thirteen nJ.onths, which left the House without a Speaker from March 3, 
43Lindsay Rogers, "The Line of Succession, 11 The Reporter, 
XXIX (Decerhber 19, 1963), p. 21. -----
4 'Suva, Presidential Succession, p. 113. 
4 s.1 "d In . ' p. 114. 
4 6:Rogers, loe. cit. 
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the end of the old "lame duck" session, until D2cernber. 47 
The foregoing two defects were, for the most part, corrected by 
a change in Senatorial procedure, allowing the 11hold over 11 of the 
President pro tempore and by the Twentieth Amendrnent which, in 1933, 
abolished the "lanJ.e duck 11 session. Apparently unanticipated, however, 
by both the Constitutional Convention and the Second Congress, was the-
development of political parties. It becarne quite possible that the 
President pro tempore and Speaker might not be of the same political 
philosophy and hence not the same party as that of the President and 
Vice President. It does not seem altogether democratic for the voters 
to choose one party to occupy the executive by election and be given 
th b 'll . d t . t• 48 a no·. er y 1 . ness, acc1 en , or assass1na 10n. 
With the passage of the Act of 1792, Congress did not seriously 
concern itself with the line of succession again until 1820, at v:ihich 
time Senator James J. Wilson introduced a resolution requesting the 
Senate Judiciary Comn1ittee to make a study to detennine whether or 
not the law should be amended. On February 1, 1821, the Committee 
reported that it was inexpedient to attem.pt to legislate further on the 
matter of the line of succession. 4 9 In 1856, the Judiciary Comtnittee 
rendered the opinion that the Act of 1792 was in all i'ts pa1.'ts Constitu-
tional, and rccomtnended that if no President pro ternpore or Speaker 
we1·e available, the sucq::ssion should pass to the Chief Justice of the 
4'L 
Kogers, ol?_·_:it. , p. 21. 
4~bid. 










Supre1ne Court and then to Associate Justices in order of seniority. 
The bill was read twice and discussed in the· committee of the whole, 
but no action v;,ras taken then or for the next twenty-five years. 50 In 
1864, another bill to extend the line of succession was introduced; it 
passed the House but was ki~led in the Senate. 
The im.peachment of Andrew Johnson made clear the danger of 
designating the President pro tempore or the Chief Justice as succes-
sors, both of whom sit as m.embers of the tribunal by whose verdict a 
Presidential vacancy might be created. Following his acquittal, Presi-
dent Johnson requested that Congress pass a Constitutional amendment 
which would place Cabinet officers immediately after the Vice President 
in line of. succession. Although Congress took no action on Johnson's 
proposal, it eventually became the basis for the Presidential Succession 
Act of 1886. 51 
On September 19, 1881, President James A. Garfield died and 
Chester Arthur succeeded to his office. If anything had happened to 
Arthur there would, because of a flaw in the Act of 1792, have been no 
immediate successor for there was no President pro tempore until 
October, and no Speaker until Decembe·r. A silnilar situation occurred 
following the death of Grover Cleveland's Vice President,· Thornas A. 
Hendricks, in November 1885, when Congress was not in session. 52 
50 
Rogers, _OP.:_ ci~, p. 21. 
51suva, Presidential Succession p. 117. 
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The situation was so precarious that President Clevela-nd was advised 
not to attend the Vice President 1s funeral in Indianapolis for fear that 
he n::tight suffer son1e accident during the journey. 53 The President 
telegraphed his condolenses and remained in Washington. 
These two incidents inspired the Succession Act of 1886. It 
stated that, after the Vice Presidency, succession to the Presidency 
would be \rested in the Secretary of State, and other Cabinet rnembers 
in the order of their department 1s seniority. The Act further declared 
that when the powers and duties of the Presidency devolve upon any 
such successor, Congress, if not in session, should be convened within 
twenty days. 54 
This Act differed from its predecessor in two fundamental re-
spects: Cabinet members were substituted for the presiding legislative 
officers, and an Acting President was to complete the term to which he 
had succeeded. Prior to the Act 1s passage by the Senate, its author, 
Senator George F. Hoar, had explained the reasons for the changes. 
He pointed out that there was often, as had recently been demonstrated, 
neither a President pro tempore nor a Speaker, and also argued that 
nearly all of the past Secretaries of State had been greater leaders 
than the legislative officers who were not chosen with their succession 
potential in mind. In the House, Representative Andrew Cald\vell spoke 
for the Hoar bill because he considered it, in contrast to the Act of 
1792, to be clearly Constitutional in retaining the principle of separa.tion 
------·------




of powers. Although the Hoa:t.· bill was originated in a Republican Sen-
ate, and Hoar hixnself was a Republican, Representative Jonathan H. 
Powell thought it was motivated by a desire of the Democrats, who 
controlled both the Presidency and the House, to take the line of suc-
cession away from. the Senate and vest it in a Dernocratic Cabinet. 55 
For the next sixty years, the order of Presidential succession 
spelled out in the Act of 1886 was considered sati~factory and no seri--
ous effort was made to change it. Even bills introduced to add the 
more recently created Cabinet posts failed to become law, because of 
their seerning unimportance.-5 6 
However, when Franklin Roosevelt died and Harry S. Truman 
became President, the Secretary of State was the able but unknown 
Edward R. Stettinius. Almost immediately, some public officials who 
believed that Stettinius in the White House might not inspire the nation's 
confidence, attacked the Act of 1886 as "undemocratic 11 on the ground 
that a President, in appointing a Secretary of State, was in effect naming 
his own successor. 57 On June 19, 1945, President Truman sent Con-
gress a rnessage urging a new Presidential succession law. He argued 
that the r:nan next in the line of succession after the Vice President 
should have been elected to sorne office and, further, that the Speaker 
was the official whose selection, after the President and Vice President, 
I 
could be said to stem frorn the people themselves. Both arguments 
5 ~ilva, Pr·esiclential Succession , p. 122. 
5 ~bid., p. 123. 





now appear somewhat faulty. It is not considered undemocratic for a 
Presidential candidate to natne his imrnediate successor in the f.onn of 
his Vice Presidential running mate, and as for the Speaker, he tnust 
come frotn a "safe" district in order to gain the seniority necessary to 
58 be elected by the Representatives of the people. 
Nevertheless, the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 was to 
embody all of Truman's original suggestions except the one that called 
for a special election. According to its provisions, if for any reason 
there is a vacancy in both Presidency and Vice Presidency, the Speaker 
of the House will resign that position and act as President. If there is 
no Speaker able to succeed, the President pro tempore of the Senate, 
following his resignation, is to act as Chief Executive. Should there be 
no presiding legislati\'e officers, or if neither qualifies to act as Presi·-
dent, the Secretary of State is to succeed to the Executive Office, and 
the Cabinet members are placed in the line of succession in an order 
similar to the Act of 1886, with the addition of the Secretarie·s of 
Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. 59 
President Kennedy's death generated a great deal of retiewed dis-
cussion and criticism of the 1947 Succession Law but, as in the case of 
the first two succession acts, much of the discussion was moore con·-
cerned with the individuals who stood in the line of succession than with 
the question. of what officers should, in principle, be placed in the 
58
Ibid. 
59-. '1 • ::n va, Presidential Succession , p. 130 . 
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succession line after the Vice President. 60 The abilities of both 
Speaker lVIcCorrnack and President Pro Te1npore Carl Hayden were seri-
ously questioned, and it was even suggested that they resign their re-
spective positions so that persons better qualified as potential succes-
sors might replace them. 61 It has been argued that the 1947 law is 
not practical even without considering the relative merits of the two 
incumbent presiding legislative officers. Neither the Speaker nor the 
President pro te1npore is chosen on the basis of his qualifications for 
the Presidency. The Act of 1947 also allows for a person of a political 
party different from the President's to succeed to the White House 
without election. It has further been suggested that the legislative 
leaders are not officers within the meaning of the Constitution's sue-
cession provision and, even if they were, Congress would have no 
power to authorize the1n to act as President. 62 
Following John Kennedy's death, the lines were drawn for and 
against the 1947 law. Former President Truman .stated that he still 
supported the law he had recomrnended, as did President .Johnson, who 
had voted for it in Congress. Fonner President Eisenhower, perhaps 
the foremost exponent of the return to the Cabinet line of succession, 
pointed out the need for continuity in the Executive branch of govern-
ment, which he felt could be jeopardized by the possibility of a Speaker 
6°Feerick, From Failing Hands, p. 264. 
6 ~ogers, 01::_ cit., p. 22. 
6 ?~, · 1 F F ·1· r~T d 264 265 -1• eer1c <, .. rorn ~ a1 1ng -:~an s, pp. ·- . 
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of the opposition party succeeding to the White House. 63 
The 1947 succession law still stands. Reconsideration of it will 
be hampered by the fact that criticism of particular Speakers and 
Presidents pro tempore have made it virtually impossible to act on the 
matter without insulting the presiding officers of both !:louses. Those 
who wish to avoid casting such insults will most likely argue that the 
problen1 has been solved by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment which, as 
described in the next chapter, provides almost certain assurance that 
there will always be a Vice President- -a primary successor. The 
Amendment thus has made the reconsideration of the line of succession 
beyond the Vice Presidency less urgent. Nevertheless, it remains 
entirely possible that both the President and Vice President could be 
killed in a natural disaster, nuclear conflict, or by assassination. 
It the.refo:re remai.n.s irnportant that a line of succession be found to 
provide potential successors who are agreed to be the best qualified 










CONGRESSIONAL PASSAGE OF THE AM.ENDIVIENT 
The Course of the Debate 
Senate Joint Resolution 139 was reintroduced in early January, 
1965, as S. J. Res. 1 by Birch Bayh and over 70 other senators. 
Not all the senators were active supporters. Senator Bayh relates 
that: 
We had arranged for the Bar Association people to bombard 
the n10re reluctant Senators with requests to co-sponsor; and, 
as usual, the ABA was extrernely efficient in this enterprise. 
Thus, Conrad 1 s last-minute call to the office of . . Senator 
... Harry Byrd, produced surprising results. His bGwilder-
ed legislative assistant told Conrad, "I don't know what it is,
1 but the lawye1·s are all over us. Put us down as co-sponsor. 11 
A simi.lar proposal 'Nas almost simultaneously introduced in -the 
House by Representative Emanuel Geller as House of Representatives 
Joint Resolution 1. 2 
These resolutions both p1·ovided that upon removal, death, or 
resignation of the President, the Vice President would become Prcsi-
dent. The President would be required to nominate a per son who n1et 
the Constitutional qualifications for the Presidency, to be Vice Presi-
-- .. -------·-·-;-.--
1 Bayh, op._ cit., p. 170. 
211 Constitutional Arnendxnent on the Preside~cy, 11 Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac, XXI (1965), p. 575. 
----1"3-a:yh. enTiSTeo the aid of Herbert Brownell to persuade House 
Judiciary Chairman Emanuel Geller to introduce an identical bill into 
the House. Senator Bayh felt that· if Chairman Geller backed his pro-
posEd, "the odds were 1nore strongly in its favo1· than they had ever 







dent whenever a vacancy occurred in that office. The nominee would 
take office as Vice President upon confirmation by a majority vote of 
both Houses of Congress. 3 
Provisions for determining the commence1nent and tennination 
of Presidential inability made it clear that the President could declare 
his own inability in w:riting. If the President did not declare his in-
ability, the Vice President, with the written approval of a majority of 
the Cabinet, would assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting 
4 
President upon the trans1nission of such declaration to Congress. 
Both resolutions would have permitted the President to resume 
the powers and duties of his office upon transmission to Congress of 
his written declaration. that inability no longer existed. If the Vice 
President, with a 1najority of the Cabinet, felt that the President was 
still disabled, they could prevent him from resum.ing his powers and 
duties by transm.itting their written declaration to the Congress and 
Congress supporting their contention by a two-thirds majority of both 
Houses. The Vice President would then continue as Acting President. 
Should Congress fail in any manner to cast a vote of at least two-thirds 
in both Houses, the President would then resume the powers and duties 
f h . £f' 5 0 lS 0 lCC. 
----·---~--'---
3Raymond J. Celada, Presidential Continuity and Vice Presiden-
tial Vacancy Amendment (Washington; n.c-:-=-Legis1afl"ve-ReTel.:en:ce-· 
se:rvrce-:---r96"7J,"--p:--·r.··----
4 Ibid., p. 9. 
- 5Ibid. 
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S. J. Res. 1 and H. R. J. Res. 1 required Congress to decide the 
issue ''immediately. 11 Proposals introduced by Representatives 
Richard H. Poff and William .McCulloch were similar but their bills 
would have lin1ited Congress to ten days in deciding a disputed Presi-
dential recovery. H Congress failed to do so within the specified 
period, the President would autoxnatically resmne his powers and 
duties. 6 
With Senator Bayh's prompting, President Johnson lent his sup-
port in a special passage to Congress on January 28 when he urged 
Congress to "approve [the resolutions J forthwith for submission to 
ratification by the States. 117 
The following day, the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amend-
rn.ents of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held hearings at which 
Attorney G·~neral Katzenbach, among others, were heard. .Mr. Katzen-
bach, who presented for the record his interpretation of several areas 
of the proposed amendxnent, concluded by stating that "Senate Joint 
Resolution 1 represents as formidable a consensus of considered 
opinion on any proposed amendment to the Constitution as one is likely 
to find. 118 
6Feerick, "The Proposed Twenty-l< .... ifth Amendment to the 
Constitution, " p. 186. 
7Presidential .Messages, Complete 
January 28th 1nessage to Congress 
:0-lma_~':~-' XXI (1965), p. 1407. 
text of President Johnson's 
, C ~? g ~ e s s i o n~.!._ . S.~~-:_ t e_r 1 ~ 
B:Presidential Inabi.lity and Vacancies in the OHice of Vice Presi-
dent, :Aearl.ng oe·fO"re-flie Suocommtttee on c.TonstifirtTonalA.mendinents 
ortKe Comm.ittee on the Judi.ciary, United States Senate, :Eighty- Ninth 
Congress, First Session, January 29, 1965, pp. 7-30. 
79 
On February 1, 1965, the Subcomrnittee .unanimously approved 
S. J. Res. 1 and reported it to the full Judiciary Committee, which 
approved it on February 10, with several changes. The Cornrnittee 1 s 
amendments specifically designated the Senate President pro ternpore 
and House Speaker to receive a President's written declaration of in-
ability and recovery, and provided that if the President and Vice Presi-
dent disagreed on termination of inability, Congress "would immediately 
proceed to decide, 11 rather than the original "immediately decide 11 the 
i.s sue. It was specified that such written declarations be 1nade to the 
presiding legislative officers in order that Congress, if not in session; 
could be convened. 9 
On February 19, the Senate passed S. J. Res. 1 by a vote of 72 
to 0, and sent to the House a modified version of the Bayh Resolution. 
During debate on the 1neasure, the Senate adopted certain clarifications 
of wording proposed by Senator Bayh: the wording was changed to re-
quire that the "Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet" transmit 
their written challenge (rather than "the Vice President, with the con-
currenceof a majority of the Cabinet") to "the President pro tempore 
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House. . . " (rather than "to 
10 Congress"). The Senate also adopted changes proposed by Senator 
Hruska that would permit the Vice President and Cabinet seven days, 
rather than two, to challenge the termination of the President's dis-
ability. 
9"Constitutional Amendrnent on the Presidency, 11 op..:_.~i.t._, p. 577. 
lO Ibid. 
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Three other aspects of the Resolution were debated by the Senate 
on February 19 but did not lead to changes. These were: contingencies 
not covered by S. J. Res. 1, ·such as what might happen should both the 
President and Vice President be disabled; whether the language of S. J. 
Res. 1 was specific enough to avoid delay in implement~ng its proce-
dures; and whether a Constitutional Amendment Ol' a statute was the 
best rnethod Eor prescribing procedures to deterrrline Presidential in-
ability and its termination. 
On the third aspect, Senator Everett Dirksen offered an amend-
rnent providing: 11 The connnencement and terrnination of any inability 
shall be determined by such method as Congress may by law provide. 1111 
The Senator stated that 11 it has been pretty much a rule in our Consti-
tutional histo:ry that we do not legislate in the Constitution. We . 
offer some latitude for statutory implementation thereafter, depending 
upon the events and circumstances that tni.ght arise. 1112 
Opponents of the Dirksen amendment argued that latitude was 
not required and could, indeed, be dangerous. Senator Bayh, floor 
leader for S. J. Res. 1, pointed out that the Constitution was quite 
specific in its provisions regarding the Presidency, citing Article II 
and the Twelfth Arnendn"lent as example. He also stated his view that 
the principle of separation of powers would be violated if specific 
methods of establishing and terminating Presidential inability em.bodied 
11c· · 1 R a s t ongress1ona .. ecor -- ena· e (Daily Edition), February 19, 
19 6 5, · p ::·:Tf7"5-:::-·----·-·-·---. -
1lrbid., p. 3183. 
81. 
in his bill were not retained. The Senator also noted that the state 
legislature would rather deal with an amendment containing specific 
proposals, 13 and that further, unless the amendment were specific, 
Congress might never agree on procedures, since interest would wane 
once the amendment had been ratified. 14 
Senator Sarn J. Ervin opposed the Dirksen amendment on the 
grounds that it ignored the Vice Presidenti~l vacancy issue and argued 
that a 11power-hungry 11 Congress, in providing for Presidential in-
ability by statute, might 11take charge· of the Presidency. 11 He offered 
Andrew Johnson 1s impeachment as proof that his fear was 11.0t hypothe-
tical. Only by setting out specifics in the Constitution, argued the 
Senator, would the President be suff.iciently protected. 15 At the con-
elusion of this debate, the Dirksen Amendment was defeated by a vote 
of 60 to 12. 16 
Three other amendments were rejected: one by Stro1n Thurmond 
called for filling a· Vice Presidential vacancy by vote of the electoral 
college; another, by John 0. Pastore, stipulated that whenever Con-
gress considered the confirmation of a Vice Presidential nominee or 
the issue of Presidential inability, 11no other business shall be trans-
13:rbid.,, p. 3189. Bayh 1s committee had sent copies of S. J. 
Res. 3S~n enabling amendment such as Dirksen proposed, along 
with S. J. Res. 139 to the state legislatures. Only three states 
seemed to favor the enabling approach. 
14Ibid., pp. 3170-3171. 
.15congressional Recoxd- -:$en<J.tE! (D<3.ily E~_iticm), February 19, 
1965, p:3Tf{7. -----------
1~bid., p. 3190. 
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acted 11 until such issues were decided; and the third, made by Ross 
Bass who, because he feared deliberate Congressional delay, moved 
to require Congress to consider 11imrnediately 11 the confirmation of a 
V . P ·a ,_. 1 . 17 1ce res1 e1Ye1a nom1nee. 
Following ~he Senate 1 s approval of S. J. Res. l, w.ithout a dis-
senting vote, Senator Magnuson was recognized and said, 11I believe 
. after all the discussion today, that the Senate should wish the 
18 President and Vice President good luck and good health. 11 
Meanwhile, the House Committee on the Judiciary held its own 
hearings on February 9, 10, 16, and 17 at which time support was ex-
pressed for the ten-day limitation suggested by Representatives 
NlcCulloch and Poff with regard to Congressional action on disagree-
rnent concerning the termination of disability. Such a limitation was 
considered essential because of the possibility that Congress might 
delay an unreasonable time in deciding the issue, or might reach no 
decision at all. It was feared that the consequences of such inaction 
might prove disastrous for the nation. l9 
Former Attorney General Herbert Brownell testified to the 
opposite. He felt that a disagreement between the President and Vice 
President over disability was remote. If. such a disagL·eement did 
occur, however, Congress would act with all due speed, II . I 
think public opinion would force them to do it or destroy their useful-
"1711 Constitutiona1 Amendment on the Presidency, II ~E_:__::it., p. 578. 
18 
Bayh, op: cit., p. 274. 
19Feerick, 11 The Proposed Twenty--Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution, 11 pp. 189-190. 
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ness as public officials thereafter. 1120 
Senator Bayh, after answering questions regarding his S. J. Res. 
l, made the following statement in sununary: . 
The 1nain barrier ... to our ability to find a solution has 
been the fact that so far we have had so many different opinions 
that we have never been able to co1ne close to a consensus. 
Now we have, it seems to me, arrived at a situation where the 
Chairn1an of this Committee in the Senate, 76 of my colleagues 
in the Senate, the American Bar Association, and others are 
joining in this consensus. . . I would ask you to consider once 
again the impossibility of finding perf~ction and the gravity of 
the situation which now exists. 21 
On March 24, 1965, the House Committee on the Judiciary favor-
ably reported an amended version of H. R. J. Res. 1. The main change 
would have permitted the President, if he had voluntarily declared his 
own inability, to recover· his powers and duties immediately upon his 
declaration of the termination of such an inability, without possible 
challe-nge by the Vice President and Cabinet. This point had been 
assumed but not explicitly stated inS. J. Res. 1. It was reasoned that 
to permit the President to be challenged under such circumstances 
m.ight work to discourage him from voluntarily relinquishing his 
powers. The right to challenge the tern1ination of a disability should 
therefore be Teserved for cases under which the President had been 
declared disabled. 
22 
2 <i?residential Inability, Hearings before the Committee on the 
Judiciar-y-;- Hotise ()-C'R.epre-sentatives, Eighty-Ninth Congress, F'irst 
Session, February 9, 10, 16, and 17, 1965, Serial No. l, p. 243. 
21Ibid., p. 95. 
21:>residential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of the Vice 
Pres i d e11t,-"FI o use OT-R:ep res e uta ti v es:K"epo rf-:No:-z.-cr3--;---89t11'C::-o ng res-s , 









The ten-day limitation for the settlement of a dispute, when such 
a disagreement arose from a disability declared by the Vice President 
and Cabinet, was adopted and Congress was required to assemble 
immediately, if not in session, to decide the issue within the pre-
scribed period. H. R. J. Res. 1, as amended, would have further 
speeded up the process by allowing the Vice President and Cabinet only 
two days, rather than the seven granted by S. J. Res. 1, in which to 
challenge the recovery of the President. 23 
The House Resolution, as amended, was cleared by the House 
Rules Committee on March 31, and was debated before the House of 
Representatives on April 13. 24 
25 Prior to its pas;..>age, the House accepted an amendment by 
Richard H. .Poff which stipulated that if Congress were not in session, 
i.t V·lOuld convene ''within forty-eight hours 11 to decide a case of disputed 
inability. 26 Other amendments to H. R. J. Res. 1 were offered from 
the floor but were rejected by vote: 
--Roman C. Pucinski moved to delete Section 2, which allowed 
the President, in case of vacancy in the second office, to nominate a 
new Vice President. 27 
23
Ibid. 
241Constitutional Amendrnent on the Presidency, 11 op. -~!:_, p. 579. 
25rhis proposal originally had been suggested by Speaker McCor-
mack who, during the debate, had moved about the chamber urging 
members of the House to support it: Bayh, ~r.:_ _ :it., p. 278. 
2 ~ongressional Record--House, (Daily Edition), Aprill3, 1965, 
pp. 769T::7fi9E. 
Zt;'Consti.tt.itional Amendment on the Presidency, 11 op. cit., p. 580 . 
... --·---
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··--Charles M. Mathias, Jr. moved to substitute for Section 2 
language perrnitting Congress to provide 11 by law'' for the case of re-
rnoval, death, resignation or inability of both the President and Vice 
President. 28 
--Arch A. Moore sought to amend that part of H. R. J. Res. 1 
under which the Vice President would continue to act as President pend-
ing resolution by Congress of a disagreement involving inability, in 
order to ensure that a President rnay always resume his powers imme-
diately upon declaring l~is inability terminated. 2 9 
--H. R. Gross proposed to amend the resolution to require a 
roll call vote whenever Congress voted on a President's Vice Presi-
d t . 1 . 30 en Hl nomu1ee. 
Although, as Representative Clarence J. Brown pointed out, the 
A1nendn'1.ent would tab~ away 11 from the House a Constitutional right it 
now has to select a Presj_dent'' by selecting the Speaker, who is the 
successor to the President when there is no Vice President. 31 
Speaker John W. McCormack gave his fullest support to the measure 
when he stated: 
I have lived for 14 months in the position of the man who, 
in the event of an unfortunate event happening to the occupant 
28rbid, I 
2 tbid. 
30Ibid., pp. 7696-7697. Representative Gross stated that he 
would rna~ the same proposal regarding a vote on a disagreement 
involving inability, but the defeat of his first amendrnent seen1s to 
have precluded such action. 
31Ib' d 1. ., p. 7673. 
of the White House, under the law then would have assun'led 
.the office of Chief Executive of our country. l can assure 
you . . . that a matter of great concern to me was the 
vacuum. which existed in the subject of determining inability 
of the occupant of the White House, if and when it should 
arise. : .. We h32e made a marked contribution by this 
resolutlon. . . . 
86 
Representative Emanuel Geller gave perhaps the .best smnmary 
of H. R. J. Res. 1 when he stated: 
This is by no m.eans, ladies and gentlemen, a perfect bill. 
No bill can be perfect .... But none the less, this bill has 
a minimum of 'draw backs. It is [ a] well-rounded, sensible, 
and efficient approach toward a solution of a perplexing prob-
lem that has baffled us for over 100 years. 33 
In closing, Mr. Geller quoted Walter Lippmann's thoughts on 
the proposed Constitutional Amendment: 
It is a great den.l better than an endless search for the 
absolutely perfect !30lution, which rnay never be found and, 
indeed, is not necessary. 34 
H. R. J. Res. l, as arnended by Mr. Poff, was approved by a 
vote of 368 to 29 after the debate of April 13. 35 
In order to resolve the differences between the House and Sen-
ate versions of the Amendment, a Conference Committee was appointed. 
The conferees from the Senate were: Senators Birch E. Bayh, James 
0. Eastland, Sam J. Ervin, Everett M. · Dirksen, and Roman L. 
Hruska; and frorn the House: Representatives Emanuel Geller, Byron 
G. Rogers, James C. Corman, William M. McCulloch, and Richard H. 
Poff. 
32Ibid., p. 7698. 33 Ibid, p. 7667. 
31bid., p. 7668. Cited by Geller from the New York Harold 
Tribune~June 9, 1964, p. 20. 
3 ~:bid., p. 7698. 
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The chief difficulty the conferees had to settle was whether to set 
a time limit for decision by Congress, in the event a Vice President and 
rnajority of the Cabinet challenged the assertion by the President that 
hi.s inability had ended. The House had set a limit of ten days, the Sen-
ate none. The House conferees, who feared that a Senate filibuster 
might hold up action in a critical period and thus place the nation in 
jeopardy, insisted on a time limit. After a two-month deadlock, the 
conferees agreed on a 21-day limitation. 36 
The conferees settled three other matters o£ timing. They com-
promised on four days as the period during which a Vice. President and 
a majority o£ the Cabinet could challenge the contention of a disabled 
President that his inability was tenninated; the House had wanted two 
days, the :!lenate seven. The conferees agreed with the House that, in 
the event of a challenge to the termination o£ a Presidential inability, 
Congress, if not in session, would assemble within 48 hours. And the 
conferees settled on 21 days as the period in which Congress should 
decide the issue of a challenge. The Senate version provided only that 
Congress would 11immediately proceed to decide" such an issue and 
placed no limit on either the time within which Congress must assemble 
or by which a decision had to be reached. 37 Thus, a crisis arising f.rom 
a disputed termination of Presidential disability could not be permitted 
to continue indefinitely because of the difficulty o£ obtaining a cloture on 
Senate debate. 
3 £:i.Jresidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of the Vice 
Preside-nt ,House o£ Representatives Report No-:-?.n:>-4-;-·s-9tfl. Congress, 
1st Session, p. 2. 
31bid., p. 4. 
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The conferees also reached agreement on two n1atte:r s of language. 
They accepted the House language in Section 3, which specified that a 
President who voluntarily decla1·ed his own inability would resume his 
powers and duties irnmediately. upon transmitting his declaration of 
recovery to the President pro ternpore and the Speaker. 38 And they 
changed the expression "the Vice President and a rnajority of the prin-
cipal officers of the executive departments, or such other body as 
Congress rnay by law provide, 11 to read "the Vice President and a 
rnajority of either the principal officers of the executive departments 
or of such other body as Congress may by law provide. 11 This change 
was 1nade at the suggestion of Senator Hruska in order to make it clear 
that, if and when Congress should create a comrnission to replace the 
Cabinet, the Vice President would remain in a position to establish the 
Presiden.t 1s dis2.bility or challenge his recovery. 39 
The unanirnous Conference Report40 was adopted with little de-
bate in the Bouse by voice vote on June 30, 1965. 
41 
It was considered 
later the same day in the Senate, where Senators Robert F. Kennedy 
and Eugene J. McCarthy expressed reservations regarding the method 
3 ~Ibid., p. 3. 
3~eerick, 11 The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution,'" p. 194. 
40Bayh, op. cit., p. 304, states: 
Both Charrman Geller and I were glad that the report was unan-
hnous. Even though the Democrats were in the majority on both 
sides, and that majority alone could have reached an agreeinent, 
neither Chairman wanted to see his delegation vote break down 
along party li-q.es. 
4111 Constitutional Amendment on the Presidency, 11 op_._cit., p. 580. 
of detennining inability. Senator Kennedy feared that a President 
might discharge his Cabinet, and a conflict could then arise as to: 
. whether the President had, in fact, fired the Cabinet 
at the time they had met and decided to put in a new Presi-
dent. What we could end up with, in effect, would be the 
spectacle of having two Presidents both claiming the right 
to exercise the powers and duties of the Presidency,. and 
perhaps two sets of Cabinet officers both claiming the 
right to act. 4 2 
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The concern of Senators Kennedy and McCarthy was somewhat lessen-· 
ed when it was pointed out that Congress could establish a body to re-
place the Cabinet in acting with the Vice President to determine Presi-
dential inability. 43 A body thus created by Congress could, most 
likely, not be dismissed by a President. 
Senator Albert Gore, referring to the "other body'' provision, 
raised the last substantive objection to the Arnendment. The Senator 
argued that the use of the expression ''either/or'' placed the Cabinet 
and the "other body" on a par, 44 and would allow a Vice President to 
choose between thern. 45 Senator Bayh pointed out that there was an 
abundance of legislative history46 offering proof that the "either/or" 
42congressional Record---Senate,· (Daily Edition), June 30, 1965~ 
p. 14668:--- ·---
4i:<'eerick, "The Proposed Twenty--Fifth Amend 1nent to the 
Constitution, '' p. 194. 
4 'Congressional Record- -Senate , (Daily Edition), July 6, 1965, 
p. 1483il-. ~-----------·----------
4!ibid.:_, p. 15023. 
---- 4 b---- ---------------------------- ---------------------------
. Bayh, ~P· ci_!_:_, p. 145, states: 
The co1irts· have stated that where the language of a proposal 
does not clearly state its intent, they will look to congressional 
debates, co1nmittee reports, and particularly the statements of 














language was intended to vest exclusively in one or the other of the 
bodies. He stated that, if Congress created another body, "the Cabi-
net loses the responsibility and it :r.ests solely in the other body. 1147 
Senator Gore requested, and was granted, a postponenJ.ent of further 
discussion in order, as he said, to study this point. 48 
On July 6, 1965, when the Conference Report was again con·-
sidered, Senator Gore renewed what appeared to be a fight to return 
the whole n1atter to conference. He continued to contend that, by 
allowing Congress to name a second body, the Amendm.ent W011ld, in 
effect, permit the Vice President to 11shop around 11 between the Cabinet 
and the other body for support of his view that the President was dis-
abled: 49 Senator Bayh again stated that he felt the language of the 
Arnend1nent was sufficiently clear. Senator Dirksen agreed, and added 
that he could not imagine a Vice President acting in such a manner, but 
that if he did, his political future would be ruined; 50 the Senator noted 
that: 
Fashioning language to do what we have in mind, particularly 
when we are subject to the requirem.ent of compression for 
ConstitutionaJ Amendment purposes, is certainly not an easy 
undertaking. 1 
Senator Sam J. Ervin, one of the conferees, added his com.ment: 
'±tongressional Record---Senate, (Daily Edition), June 30, 1965, 
p. 14835:""·- ·-------
4~bid., pp. 14838-14839. 
~------ --- -- ---- <4J:~0ngressiona1-Record~--Senate_, --(-Daily_Edition), __ 3_uLy_6,_L9_65_, _______ ------•-------
P· 15025. -
50rbid., p. 15027 .. 51Ibi.d,, p. 15026. 
\Ve have more cooks with rn.ore zeal concerned with pre-
paring this broth than any piece of proposed legislation I have 
ever seen .... I am of the opinion that the Conference Report 
. . . would submit to the States the very best possible r esolu-
tion on the Sll;bject obtainable in the Congress ... as it is now 
constituted. 52 
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Following the conclusion of the July 6 debate, the Senate approv-
ed the Conference Report without change by a vote of 68 to 5. 53 The 
Joint Resolution was then formally transmitted to the General Services 
Adrninistration on July 7, 1965, for certification and transmittal to the 
state legislatures for their action on ratification. 54 
Opposition and Compromise 
Senator Birch Bayh, with his staff, 55 not only drafted the proposed 
Arnenchnent and worked effectively at developing the necessary support 
for its Congressional passage, they also prevented the Amendment from 
becorning a partisan issue and recomr.nended compromise where it seern-
ed both necessary and possible without allowing the proposal to be 
5 trbid., p. 15030. 
5:tongressional Record- -Senate , (Daily Edition), July 6, 1965, 
pp. 15o:rr:rso32.-Senato-r-Irayh recaiTs his thoughts at that moment: 
The final outcom.e, of course, was in the hands of the state legis-
lators, but for the moment I could relax and enjoy the exhilaration 
of victory. It had not always been that way. 
Bayh, ~."¥:· cit._, p. 333. 
54'Constitutional Amendment on the Presidency, 11 op. cit., p. 581. 
55:fhe Senator would be the first to admit the value of his staff 
which consisted o£: Larry Conrad, the Senate Constitutional A1.nendments 
Subcormnittee Chief Counsel, and Stephen Lesher, a young newspaper 
man who was-on the_sta£Las_th© 1:_esult of a fellowship fro1n the American 
Political Science Association. Also, Cio-sefy associat'ed wi.th the Sena-~ 
tor 1 .s efforts to amend the Constitution was Bernard P. Fensterwald, 
former Counsel of the Senate Constitutional Amendments Subcornmitte. 













The ABA contributed to the passage of the Amenchnent by supply-
ing a consensus outside of Congress that could rally support and by 
lobbying to gain co-sponsors and votes for the pJ:oposal. 
The support given by President Johnson, first in ~1is State of the 
Union 1nessage and later in his specific endorsement of S. J. Res. 1, 
was a significant factor in aiding Senator Ba yh to convince. his fellow 
Senators that the President wanted a solution, and that the President 
supported his particular solution. 
The opposition to the Amendment, like the support for it, was bi-
partisan. It was directed against possible ambiguities in the langl.tage 
of the original Bayh proposal, and possible disadvantages in writing of 
detailed procedures into the Constitution and, most important, possible 
disadvantages in specifying, or not specifying, time lirnitations in the 
Amendment. The greatest single point of contention, and the reason 
for the two-month deadlock in Conference Com:mittee, was the questio'n 
of whether or not. to place a limit on the time Congress could take in 
deciding a disputed disability. Disagreement on this point came close 
to killing the proposal at that stage. The greatest threat, however, was 
not this question but rather the stand taken by Senator Albert Gore on 
the 11 either/or 11 language relating to the Cabinet or other body that 
Congress might establish to determine disability and that might allow 
the Vice President to 11shop around 11 for support in his efforts to declare 
the President disabled or challenge his recovery. It is not clear whether 
Gore was trying .to perfect the language of the proposal or kill the Amend-








to the Conference Cornm.ittee the results, whether intentional or not, 
rnight well. have been tantamount to killing the Amendment, 
He did not succeed, and the A1nendrnent went to the states fo1~ 
ratification. 
CHAPTER V 
RATIFICATION BY THE STATES 
Progress in 1966 
The last step necessary to incorporate the Joint Resolution into 
the Constitution as the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was the approval of 
three-fourths of the states (Appendix H gives details of the Ratification 
Procedure). Senator Bayh records that he felt: 
. the process of State ratification would be the most long 
and drawn out, if not the 'most difficult, stage of the ·journey . 
. . . Moreover, we were not merely uncertain how long it . 
would take to pass; the q1estion o£ whether it would pass at 
all was a very real one. 
Once Congressional passage was cornpleted, a n1ember of each 
.state bar association was assigned the responsibility of mobilizing 
support within his state. Many of the junior ba.r associations forrned 
speaker 1 s bureaus. Senator Bayh and his staff did what they could to 
hasten the process of ratification. Letters were addressed to each of 
the state governors requesting their assistance and "masses" of 
detailed correspondence were sent to state legislative leaders. The 
state bar associations supplied comprehensive critiques of the Amend-
ment. 2 
Less than 24 hours after Congressional passage, New Hampshire 1 s 
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Senator Tom. Mcintyre m.ade a valiant effort to obtain the t~ecessary 
docmnents so that his state might become the first to rati.fy. Many 
long distance telephone calls on July 7 were to prove of no avail, when 
the General Services Administration (hereafter referred to as G. S. A.) 
finally indicated that it would not be able to prepare the proper docu-
ments in time, and so the New Hampshire Legislature adjourned with-
out being able to consider the proposed Amend1nent. 3 
Within a week of New Hampshire's failure, both Nebraska and 
Wisconsin were eager contenders for first place in rati.fica tion. 
Nebraska notified the National Archives and Records Service, G. S. A., 
that its unicameral legislature had ratified the Amendment on July 12. 
The following day, the Ca'pi~al Ti.n_:es reported that "Wisconsin today 
became the first state ... to ratify the proposed am.enclment. rr4 
Yet it was not and still is not certain which of the two states actually 
ratified first. 5 The proposed Amendment was introduced in the Nebras-
ka State Legislature as Resolution 72 and was passed the san1e day by 
a vote of 47 to 0. 6 However, a dispute arose over whether a resolution 
ratifying a Constitutional An1endment must be signed by the Governor. 
4capital [ 1\IIadi.son, Wisconsin] Tin1es, July 13, 
clippi.ng).--.fil"e New York Times, July T4,T965, p. 21, 
that "WisconsitllJeat o-u.tNebraska by just four minutes. 
the first State to ratify ... " 
1965, (Zerox 
proclaimed 
. to become 
. 5Tb,e New York Times of July 15, 1965, _reported that on July 14 
,-------t1ie Ne 5raska Legt-Sla ture vofea-fc)notiTy-Wasliingtonofficially -tli.a t--------------'--
Nebraska claimed the status of the first State to ratify. The G. S. A. 
would seem to ag-ree, for it records Nebraska as the first. 
6 Letter received from Hugo F. Srb, the Clerk of the Nebraska 
State Legislature, dated August .21, 1967. 
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He was away frorn the State Capital and it was not until 10:.19 a. 1n. on 
July 13 that it could be ar·ranged for the Lieutenant Governor to sign 
as acting chief executive for hi.s State. 7 That same 1norning, the 
Wisconsin State Assembly ratified by a vote of 84 to 11, and the House 
by 28 to 0. 8 
The next state to complete the ratification process was Oklahorna, 
on .July 16, 1965; Massachusetts granted approval on August 9 without 
. 1 d. t' t 9 ' 10 a s1.ng e · 1ssen tng vo e. S01ne two weeks later, Senator Bayh 
was told that the Amendment had passed the State Sena.te of Pennsyl-
vania, but that the Chairman of the House Committee to which it had 
been referred intended to "sit on it. '' The Senator notes that, after 
''many telephone calls'' between Washington and Har·risburg, the 
11 12 Pennsylvania Legislature corr1pleted ratification on August 18. ·' 
Kentucky m.ade its elf the sixth state to ratify, acting on Septe1n-
ber 15 pursuant to the call of a Special Session of the State Legislature 
by the Gove1:nor of that State. 13 Arizona approved on September 22, 
7 
Bayh, ~}?_:__::.it:_, p. 337. 
8Ibid. 
10 
I .... etter received fron1. Daniel M. O'Sullivan, the Director of the 
Legislative Research Bureau of the State of Massachusetts, dated 
August 1'7, 1967. 
11 
Bayh, op.:__.~_~!:_., p. 337. 
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and Michigan brought the nun-:tber to eight in favor on October 5. 14 
Passage was as smooth in Senator Bayh's horne state of Indiana. The 
Governor, who had called a Special Session to consider legislative 
reapportionrnent, placed the Amendment on the State Legislature's 
agenda and invited the Junior Senator of Indiana to ad~ress a joint 
session. 15 The Amendment was ratified that same day, October 20, 
by an "overwhelming" vote. 16 The next day California became the 
17 . 
tenth state to approve the Amendment. Then a snag occurred. 
As the Arkansas State Legislature was preparing to consider 
the Amendment, Representative Paul Van Dalsen distributed to each 
member a copy of an article printed in the South Carolina Law Re~iew 
-- ------
that was extrern.ely critical of certain aspects of the Amendment. 
Representative Vc.r.nDalsen also convinced the Speaker of his Legisla-
ture that the Amendment should not be brought to the floor for a vote. 
However, as a result of argun1ents presented by members of the 
Arkansas State Bar Association and the ABA's request that Governor 
Orval Faubus use his "good ·offices, II the Speaker was moved to re-
consider his position and, on November 4, ratification was accon1-
plished. 18 
1411Presidential Disability Amendment Ratified by States, 11 
op. cit., p. 301. 
15Ibid. 
j 
l6Letter received frorn Sa1nuel T. Lesh, Law Division Director, 1 
-~~----c!nE1i-.:t-na-be g-i-sl-a-ti-ve-Bur-eau-, -da-ted-Augus-t-_:_:_10-, -1-96-7-, -i-ndi-cates-:-the-vote~-----~~-· -----
in his state's legislature was 50 to 0 in the Senate and 88 to 1 in the 
House. ~ 
1711PJ.·esidential Disability Amendm.ent Ratified by States, 11 ~ 
op. cit., p. 301. I --- l 
18 
Bayh, "P· ._::_i:_t,_, p. 338. I 
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New Jersey followed with its approval on November 29, 11without 
major opposition, 1119 and Delaware ratified on December 7--the day 
that was, by something more than coincidence, the I 78th anniversai·y 
of its ratification of the original Federal Constitution. 20 Utah granted 
its approval on. January 17, 1966. 
West Virginia became the fifteenth to verify, on January 20, 21 
but not without a problem. A few days before, a member of Senator 
Bayh 1s staff received a phone call from the Floor Leader of the West 
Virginia Senate who said his Legislature was very much concerned by 
the Arnendment 1s disability provision. The Floor Leader wanted to 
know if it were possible to ratify one part of the Arnendment and not 
another. He was told it was not and, after Senator Bayh had a long 
phone conversation with the Floor Leader and the Chairman of the 
State Senate Judiciary Committee--the value of which Senator Bayh 
admits is uncertain- -the Legislature finally granted its approval. 22 
Four days later, on January 24, Maine ratified, 23 closely 
19Letter received from Donald E. Wardle, Assistant Couusel 
to the Governor of New Jersey, dated Decernber 5, 1967. 
21 
11Presidential Disability Amendment Ratified by States, " 
Ol?":_~cit. , p. 301. 
22 Bayh, op. cit., pp. 338-339. 
===~~==~23 ..•... ·· · .. · ............... · .... · .. . 
-Letter received from Edith L. Hary, Law Librarian, Maine 
State Library, dated August 15, 1967. The letter is cited because it 
speaks not only for Maine, but for rnany other states for whioh little 
more than the date of ratification is noted: 
... here we were deciding on approval or rejection of an 
:'.8. 24 followed by Rhode Island, on January ~ 
Colo1·ado was to prove quite a p.t·obleln. In July, 1965, the 
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Governor of that State had called a special session of the State Legis-
lature to deal with recent floor problems. The A1nendment was intra-
duced, although it was not on the agenda presented by the Governor and 
the session was to be limited to just three days. The Denver Post 
attacked such action as inappropriate during a special session. 25 How-
ever, the Am.endment was brought to a vote and adopted almost unani-
mously in the Colorado House but was "deemed" to have died in the 
Senate where it received four votes short of the necessary two-thirds. 26 
Ratification by a two-thirds vote of each house of a state legislature is 
27 
not req1.tired by the constitution of any other state, or by the U.S. 
Code. 
28 
Therefore, it appears that Colorado's failure to ratify on its 
first atte1npt m.ay have been at least partially due to a misunderstanding 
amendn1en.t to the U.S. Constitution and yet no attention was called 
to the significance of the occasion, no hearings were held, no de-
bate or com.ment was offered. The Joint Resolution was simply 
read by the clerks in either house and declared adopted by the pre-
siding officers simply by a tap of the gavel. It bothered me then 
and does now in thinking about it. .·Possibly national attitudes 
were already well conditioned as to its desirability and the final 
action less perfunctory here than it seerns. 
2411Presidential Disability Amendment Ratified by States, 11 
op. ~~!:_• p. 301. 
25 
Ba.yh, _?p.___:it:., p. 339. 
26Leonard Larsen, "Vote Delayed on Succel3sion A1nendment," 
.Denver Post, January 20, 1966, p. 3 . 
. -.-____ ~-... -. -.. ------~ -
27Bayh, op. cit., p. 339. 
28 







on the part of the State Legislature of its own Constitution. 2 9 
Senator Bayh records that efforts in Colorado were 11hastily 
abandoned 11 for the time, since it was hoped that the 11 black rnark 11 of 
an outright defeat by a legislature might be avoided. The Senator 
mentions that early in the ratification process, great care had been 
taken to avoid such 11 blen1ishes on our record of ratification. 11 30 
The Amendment was again brought before the Colorado Legisla-
ture during its 1966 regular session. This tirne the Denver Post 
criticized not the timing but the wisdom of the Amendment: 11 ••• if 
enough states refuse to accept it, an itnproved atnendment will come 
out of Congress in a form which will be generally acceptable. 11 31 
29 La1·s en, loc. cit. In 1966, a theory was propounded by Ty 
J?atteTson, a .Dep"uTyi>-ttorney General of the State of Colorado, and 
advanced by House Speake1· Allen Dines, along with other legislative 
leaders, that the Legislature may actually have approved the Amend-
ment in the Special Session of July, 1965. The line of reasoning was 
that, while the Colorado Constitution requii·es that amendments to i.t be 
adopted by two-thirds majorities, there is actually no such requirement 
concerning ratification of amendments to the National Const.il;uti.on. The 
possibility of submitting this matter to the Colorado Supreme Court was 
considered, but proved unnecessary when both houses voted approval by 















Bayh, op. cit., p. 339. The Senator states: ~ 
In Alabama:·-·:--:-we had discussed with the State Bar Associa- I. 
tion the advisability of trying for ratification .... My own feel- ~-: 
ing was that no one could be certain what would happen in Alabama. 1: 
f, 
I could imagine Governor George Wallace seizing on the criticism " 
contained in the South Carolina Law Review, and making opposition 1
1
.; ..
of the Amendmel11-intoa statesrrightSissue. This could hurt us i 
not only in Alabama, but elsewhere as well. We delayed our efforts , 
there, and the Alaba1na State Legislature never got around to con- f 
~sidering the Twenty-Fi£th-Amend1nent [untH aftel' the 1·equisite ] " -l-
1 nmnber of states had already approved, thus n1aking it a part of the ! 
-~ --Gonstitution~ -:--- -- -------- -- -- - - ---- --- - - - - --- --'1 --











On the floor of the Colorado House, opposition to the Amendment was 
led by Representative John Carroll who suggested that it was 11 vaguely 
drawn and potentially dangerous. 1132 In the upper house, Senator L. T. 
Skiffington had led the opposition during the 1965 Special Sessio~, 
stating that the United States had done without the Amendment for more 
33 than 175 years and still could. He again led the forces opposed to 
ratification. 
Senator Skiffington 1s principle objection was that the Amendment 
set no standards for filling a Vice Presidential vacancy. 11 The President 
could put some political hack, or a personal friend in, 11 he said, and 
added: 
I think it 1 s a dangerous thing to have an office as important 
as that of Vice President filled by one man, instead of being 
elected by the people .... If there were a requirement for 
p:i:ior Congr.essionG.l sel'•rice the man would at least have been 
elected by some o£ the people. 
Skiffington admitted that h!O! favored a Constitutional Amendment on the 
subject 11 but not this one. 1134 
As a result of a. one-hour Senate Judiciary Cornmittee hearing, 
at which proponents of the Amendment, including representatives of 
the Colorado and American Bar Associations, were in the majority, 
the Amendment was cleared for floor debate on January 11. The 





tarsen, loc. cit. J 
~~-_a~~ew~York'·'Tiffie·s,--·J\ll)i·~ls-;--'19 65';-p';'-.::5-3--. -~----~~~--~--------"--~--~_:_::__::_::_;c::: .- -- - ·!'-! ---
,I 
_ ----·- ----~----3-4fJ1E;-nenveiJ?_o_sr·,--Ja.-~uary~9~~~19-66~-Tz-e-J:.Oxe_c1 __ c1ipp ~iir: ~--- --------~ --- == -1 
I 
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attorney, agreed that there were many hypothetical situations that the 
Am.endm.ent did not meet, but that it was "the best alternative avail-
able" to what he referred to as the "present dangerous void in Presi-
dential succession. 113 5 
Senator Bayh records that he and his staff spent t]:le weekend of 
January 30 working desperately to prepare a careful analysis of the 
Amendment, along with a rebuttal to the arguments raised- in Colorado 
against it. Early Monday morning, they mimeographed these in 
quantity planning to send a copy by air to each member of the Colorado 
Legislature. But all planes were grounded by a blizzard. Since a vote 
was scheduled for the next day, the entire critique was dictated by 
phone to bar representatives in Denver, who mimeographed it there 
and distributed a copy to each mernber of the Legislature as originally 
planned. Senator Bayh concludes that this effort 1nust have won sorne 
support for, on February 3, Colorado became the eighteenth state to 
~atify. 36 
Twenty more states were needed. 37 New Mexico ratified on 
February 3, 38 and Kansas on February 8 duri~g its 1966 budget session 
and with the encouragement of the Governor. Vermont gave its approv·al_ 
on February 10, and Alaska on February 18. 
-----------
35The Denver Post, January 12, 1966, p. 18. 
3 ~ayh, op. cit., p. 340. 
\-· -~·-·'-.----~~---3..:~ 1 Pre~si..:d-entta-I-_:_I'>i-sa~bi-li:ty-Am:e·ndm-ent..:Rattfi-ea.:__oy~gta:te-s-;-''-
- ' op. cit., p. 301. 




Steady progress continued throughout the first half of 1966. 
Idaho39 ratified on March 2, and Hawaii on the following day. 40 
11 Virginia, reacting to the strong leadership of its native son, ABA 
President Lewis Powell, 11 on March 8 unanimously approved the 
Council, in a letter dated August 8, 1967, stated: 
As is true in most of the states, New Mexico keeps no 
records of committee hearings or floor debates. This was, 
however, a cornpletely non-controversial measure without 
expressed opposition other than the negative votes. There 
was no evidence of activity either for or against by any 
organized group, and the press gave no coverage except 
for brief notice of its passage. 
391Presidential Disability Amendment Ratified by States, 11 
op. cit. , p. 301. Judith Austin, Historical Librarian for the Idaho 
HGto"i:-·lC:al Society, wrote of the Am.endrnent 1 s passage in her state in 
a letter da.ted March 29, 1967: 
I am afraid that the story of Idaho's ratification of the 25th 
Amendrn.ent to the Constitution is not going to add much color 
to your paper. 
The arnendment was ratified in the course of a special 
session called by Governor Ro6ert F.. Smylie to redistrict the 
state. As a result, the attention of everybody--legislature, 
newspapers, etc. --seems to have been focused prirnarily on 
this issue, and rnost of the other twenty-one specified items 
of business (of which the amendinent was number 13) were 
acted upon in fairly routine fashion. 
4CLetter from State Archivist Agnes C. Conrad, dated August 
4,. 1967, explaining the process of ratification in her state: 
If the Twenty-Fifth Amendment passed through all State 
Legislatures as readily as it did through Hawaii 1s you will 
not have much rnaterial. . . . It was adopted by both houses 
by a voice vote and there was no debate or opposition. It was 
offered in the House and adopted on February 16 without any 
referral to cmnmittee. It was then offered in the Senate and, 
upon being reported out of corn.mittee, was adopted ilnrnediately 
on March 3. As far as I can ascertain, there was no opposition 
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Arnendment. 41 Mississippi, 42 New Yo:rk, Maryland, 43 and Missouri 
also ratified during March, bringing the total to twenty-nine, or nine 
44 
states away frorn the necessary three-fourths. 
By the end of March, Ba yh and his staff realized that few of the 
remaining states would be convened in regular sessions during 1966. 
They therefore began to concentrate on the handful of states that were 
holding special sessions in response to the Supreme Court decision on 
reapportionment. 45 Among these was New Hampshire, which had tried 
to be the first state to ratify; it beca1ne the thirtieth on June 13 by a 
voice vote in both houses. 46 Louisiana was the last state to ratify in 
1966 approving the Amendment on July 5. 
41 Bayh, op. cit., p. 340. 
Letter fro-m G.---M. Lapsley, Director of the Virginia Legisla-
tive Advisory Council, dated August 17, 1967, indicating the vote was 
36-0 in the Senate, and 86--0 in the House of Delegates. 
44'Presidential Di.sabili.ty Amendment Ratified by States, 11 
op. cit. , p. 301. 
41 letter from the Director of the Maryland State Department 
of Legislative Reference, dated August 24, 1967, indicates the vote 
was unanimous in both houses. 
41\. letter from William R. Nelson, Director of Research for 
the Cornmittee on Legislative Research, State of Missouri, indicates 
that the vote was unanimous in the Senate, 24-0, and the Amend1nent 
was passed by the House with 93 ayes, 42 noes, 27 absent, and one 
p1·esent but not voting. Mr. Nelson further notes that "no party line 
vote was present on the vote in the House as both Republicans and 
. Democrats are listed as voting on each side of the question. " 
413ayh, .op. cit., p. 341. 
4~ letterfrOin John W. King, Governor of the Stateof New 
Harnpshire, dated August 21, 1967, reports the voice voting. 
~ -- ----~ 
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The Year Changes -------------
The Bayh forces resigned themselves to await the opening of 
regular legislative sessions the following year. The Amendment was 
only seven states away from the thirty-eight required. Early in 
January 1967, Bayh wrote to the governors of all the xemaining states 
and uxged them to use their influence to help complete the process of 
ratification. "We were coming into the home stretch. 1147 Tennessee 
xatified at the end of the second week in January, followed by Wyoming 
on January 25, and both Washington and Iowa on the 26th; Oxegon's 
48 ratification was on February 2. Thexe were only two more states 
required. 
North Dakota's two houses passed a resolution of ratification on 
February 9, with the understanding that they were the thirty-eighth 
;3tate to ratify. To their great disappointment, they were informed by 
the G. S, A. that "someone" had miscounted and that North Dakota was 
only the thirty-seventh. The State Legislature, still hoping to gain for 
North Dakota the honor of being the state responsible for incorporat .. 
ing the Amendment into_ the Constitution, declared their ratification 
vote illegal on the technicality that it had been. a voice vote in one 
house. Their intent was to pass the measuxe again after one more 
state had ratified and thus achieve their goal. 49 However, before the 




~--~-__ -·----~- 4&•E.r.esidenti.aLDisahilit-y_Amendment_Raiifi:e_d_hy_States_, __ ,, _________ ~~ 
· op. cit. , p. 301. 
49Bayh, loc. cit. 
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approval on February 10, 1967, thus m.aking the Amendment a part of 
the Constitution. 50 
Ceremonial Approvals 
Although there is no requiren1.ent that the President add his 
signature to a Constitutional Amendment ratified by the requisite num-
ber of states, President Lyndon Johnson, "desi.Ting to give recognition 
to the irnportance of our accomplishment, held a formal ceremony in 
the East Room of the White House. lr After G. S. A. Administrator 
Lawson Knott had signed the proclamation, Mr. Johnson affixed his 
signature, not as an official part of the amending process but merely 
as a witness to the G. S. A. proclamation. 51 













SQ 1Presidentia1 Disability Amendment Ratified by States, 11 I 
op. cit. , p. 301. f 
------:rn the race to be last, Nevada had ratified the Amendment ~ 
on February 8, but nullified that action when it learned it was 1: 
only 37th .... Ohio, North Dakota and Montana ... also ~ 
were vying for the distinction of being 38th. The Minnesota ~-
Legislature acted ai ll:31 A.M. (GST) on Feb. 10, becoming r 
the 37th state, and Nevada, in a time zone two hours earlier I 
than that in Minnesota, made its decisive move 'one hour and ~ 
13 1niuutes later. ~ 
The G. S. A. lists Minnesota as the 37th and Nevada as the 38th ~ 
in order of ratification. f: 
Letters from Fred Krohn, Research Assistant in the Office of i! 
the Governor of Minnesota, dated August 14, 1967, and Russell W. li,· 
Donald, Legislative Counsel of the State of Nevada Legislative Counsel 1: 
Bureau, also dated August 14, 1967, indicates that the chief concern ~ 
of both legislatures was the attaining of the distinction of being the ~· 
~~~~:::~~~~:::~o~:dfu~=·~o~·~=~-~-J----~ 
Vice Presider1CBumplirey, Senate President Pro Tempore Carl Hayden, ~ 
Speakerof the House John McCormack, Congressmen Geller and . L- _____ _ 




In 1787, John Dickenson of Delaware, a delegate to the 
Constitutional Convention meeting in Philadelphia, had 
asked, "What is rneant by the term disability and who shall 
be the judge of it'? 11 On February 23, 196 [ 7] at 1:18 P.M. 
179 years later, in the East Room of the White House, John 
Dickenson received his answer. :>2 
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There is a denouetnent to the story of state ratification. Nine 
states completed their ratification process after it was no longer 
necessary, leaving only Georgia, North Dakota and South Carolina 
as states which failed to grant approval. 53 All three states appeared to 
experience the same human weaknesses in their legislators that, while 
of little consequence in this instance, had delayed federal legislators 
in settling the basic questions of leadership succession for six 'genera-
tions. 
About Georgia, Senator Bayh notes: 
On February 18, [ 1966 ] ... Georgia was on the verge 
of becoming the hventy-third state to ratify, but they never 
quite rnade it. It was late in the evening of the session's 
final day; both houses had gone through the procedure re-
quired for ratification, but somewhere along the line a 
5 tBayh, op. cit.; p. 342. An interesting side light on Senator 
Bayh 1 s sense o£ tir.ning is given in an article which appeared on June 
25, 1965, in the New York Times just after the Conference Committee 
had reached a com.pi:-omise on the Joint Resolution: Senator Bayh pre-
dicted then that ratification would occur in "earlv 1967 11 because some 
state legislature would not be in session [in 196,6 ] . E. W. Kenworthy, 
"Conferees Back Succession Plan, 11 New York Tirnes , June 25, 1965, 
p. 8. 
5311Presidential Disability Amendment Ratified by States, 11 
op. ci.t., p. 302. The G. S. A. lists the following states as ratifying: 
"COnnecticut on February 14, 1967, South Dakota on March 6, Ohio 
on March 7, Alabama on March 14, North Carolina on March 22, 
·--,--------Ill~n9tsc QB:_JYl1!;t:~~h:C:~!h~-Sf~~~~~~Q_ t!~4p.:r-=-il~4:S~~.Jid=c_~LQ;J;"-j.::Q~~2.n~=1'4~-Y~~.:_:-l~~I~.• 
-- -- ----- -- - ---- ------
·-- --- --·------------ ----·---·-----------·------·-
- --=-c::----
relatively insignificant procedural step necessary for 
.finalizing the process never was taken. We never dis-
covered what actually took place, but it appeared that, 
in the rush which surrounds adjournment .
5 
.. the 
necessary papers had been lost or mislaid. 4 
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North Dakota, as previously noted, had hoped to become the signifi-
cant--thirty-eighth--state to ratify; however, it was lec;trned that 
North Dakota had delayed too long and the Amendment had gone into 
effect. It was then the consensus of that State 1 s House that-any action 
by North Dakota would have no legal effect, so no vote was taken. 55 
Senator Walter J. Bristow, Jr. of South Carolina, who introduced a 
ratification resolution in 1967, indicates that, although a bill for 
ratification was introduced during both the 1966 and 1967 legislative 
sessions, it did not pass on either occasion: 
. the1·e was no great interest in the passage of this 
Ar:nendrnent. . . . After the Amendment had been ratified 
by a .sufficient nurnber of States to become a part of the 
Constitution there was no longer a need for the South 
Carolina Legislature to take any _(lc;tign .. _. . Th~re'lv'as _
56 no organized opposition to the Bill insofar as I am aware: ·-
CHAPTER VI 
AN EVALUATION OF. THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The Four Sections 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Amendment remain unchanged since they 
were first introduced in Congress as joint resolutions in January 1965. 
SECTION l. In case of the removal of the President from 
office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall 
becorne President. 
The first section confirms the Tyler precedent by which Vice 
Presidents have assumed the Presidency when their Chief Executives 
have died. The precedent has proven .satisfactory in practice but is 
contrary to the intentions of the authors of the Constitution. It there-
fore seerns wise that the custorn has been incorporated in a Constitu-
tional amendment. 
The section extends the occasions upon which a Vice President 
would succeed to the Presidency. Although no President has been re-
n~oved or has resigned from office, the political chaos that could be 
precipitated if a President did so leave 'his office and there were un-
certainty about his successor justifies the inclusion of these contingen-
cies in the Amendrnent. 
In any of these three cases, the Vice President would serve as 
President for the ren:1ainder of the unexpired term. 1 
1John Feerick, 11 The Proposed Twenty-FHth Amendment to the 
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SECTION 2. Whenever there i.s a vacancy in the office 
.of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice 
President who shall take office upon confirmation by a 
majority vote of both Houses of Congress. 
llO 
A vacancy could occur in the Vice Presidency either when a Vice 
President has become President or when he hirnself has been removed 
from office or has resigned or died. In any case, the President would 
submit his nornination to Congress and, upon confinnation, the new 
Vice President would serve for the unexpired portion of the Presiden-
tial term. 
By assuring that Congress participates in the appointment of a 
Vice President when the office falls vacant, the An~endment does t:ot 
assure that the office would be filled immediately. If Congress is not 
in session, the Vice Presidency could remain vacant at least until the 
next regular session or a special session was called. 2 During this 
tir.ne, the Speaker of the House would be heir apparent. The present 
succession law WOLtld also apply in the case of simultaneous vacancy 
in the Presidency and Vice Presidency. 3 
The nominee for the Vice Presidency must be a citizen born in 
the United States, at least 35 years of age, and a resident within the 
United States for no less than 14 years. 4 He would therefore have the 
Z:Feerick, "The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution," p. 196. Presidential Inability, Hearings before the 
Comrnittee on the .Judic.lal;-y;-1-Jouse oT Representatives, Eighty-Ninth 
Congress, First Session, February 9, 10, 16 and 17, 1965, Serial 
No. 1, pp. 45, 49. 
~ __ c~ --~ ~-:::c_ ~~g~:~~~::~::_ -~:::::_~::-~~~- ::~::-~- ::~_::- ::: ~ _____ c -~--~-- ~ ~ _ ~--: :~~ ~~-::~~ ~~:::-::: -~ ~-=-~~~~-=c~~~:: ~--:::c c~~~ __ -~~::_:~~-:: ~~ _ -~~--~-~=~:-=:::_=.:-~:-.:_c~--=--=-~~C-C~-_-c__=~.=.===~c_c=== 
Statements orSenators-Bayli ana-Hollana~ongressional· 
!<-~~o:_d- -Senat~,. (Daily Edition), February 19, J.9t)5-;--p:-52lHJ:-
'\Jearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 1965, 
op.~~-· p. 48. 
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proper Constitutional qualifications to succeed to the Presidency if 
the need arose. 
On January 29, at hearings held by the Senate Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Amendrnents, Senator Dirksen had brought up the ques-
tion of lirniting the President's possible choice of a new Vice Presi-
dent to n1em.bers of Congress and heads of the departrnents of govern-
ment. 
Attorney General Katzenbach replied that he did not believe the 
choice should be limited at all. 
The Presidential candidate customarily has a free hand 
in choosing his running mate. . . . I [ Senator Bayh J 
stepped in n<omentarily to point out that Senator Dirksen's 
limitations would excll!-de state governors; with some under-
stater:nent, the Attorney General replied that "it would be in 
the interest of ratification not to eliminate the Governors"--
a contention with which I was in complete agreement. 5 
There is in theory no limit to the number of nominees the Presi-
dent could offer and Congress reject, and any nominee might be re-
quested to undergo hearings in either or both the House and Senate. 
Nevertheless,. the Twenty-Fifth Amendment appears to be as politically 
practical and Constitutionally sound as any proposal f()r keeping the 
Vice Presidency filled. While retaining the initiative in selecting his 
Vice President, just as a Presidential candidate does at a convention, 
the Presiden,t could seek out the views of Congressional leaders before 













the Presidential candidate, however, he would want to consider the ~ 
~=:-c~=c_::c=_~a.=cc=enfal:)i-lif)'=-oF:J?_Qterit@:l==-o:oix1.ft1ee=s::to~th~~Qpposition==p_~)-•ty--ascwe1-Facs=-=-c-'="'-'CO"-=c"··-~~----
5 Birch Bayh, One Heartbeat Away {Indianapolis and New York: 




to his own, particularly if the opposition were a majority or large 
rninority in either House. 6 Congress, for its part, would feel the 
pressure of public opinion if it rejected or failed to act on a Presi-
dent's nor.nination, or at least on his second or third try. 
Yet Congress has an active part to play. Accordi:ng to the 
Constitution, only the Senate need approve Presidential appointments. 7. 
By giving the House of Representatives a vote on the Presidential 
appointment of a Vice President, Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amend-
ment gives the people, through their Representatives, a greater par-
ticipation in this uniquely important appointment than if the power of 
confirmation were limited to the Senate. 8 
Although Section 2 does not guarantee that the Vice Presidency 
will always be filled 1 and leaves to the present untested law the matter 
of succession beyond the Vice Presidency, its solution to the problem 
of Vice Presidential vacancy appears to be workable. Only under 
conditions of extraordinary partisan disagree1nent between the Presi-
dent and Congress, or of extraordinary national e1nergency when other 
questions would take priority, would the nation be likely to remain for 











--~-6-H-e-a~·-i-n-gs ~·efore the House Committee on the Judiciary, 1965, ~ 
o:~...:_ cit., p. 50. ~ 
7u. S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2. ~ 
. . and he shall nominate, ... with the advice and consent 
of the Senate. . all other officers of the United States, whose J 
a-pp0i:ht-nlehts---a:re -not--.--~~-.-Qtliei·wise----pro\1-ided-for-;---~-~- .. c _______ . ________ ·. -~-i__:__.:____:.:_:__: 
~eerick, 1.1The Proposed Twenty-Fifth 1\.mendrnent to the 







Sections 3 and 4 of the Amendment are the attem.pts ·to solve the 
rnuch n1ore difficult problems of establishing Presidential disability 
and assuring that Presidential responsibilities always and clearly rest 
with one person. 
SECTION 3. Whenever the President transmits to the 
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives his written declaration that he is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and 
until he transmits to them a written declaration to the con-
trary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the 
Vice President as Acting President. 
Under this section, a President is authorized, and indeed en-
com·aged, to take the initiative in declaring Presidential disability, 
and would know that his Vice President would not assume the office of 
the Presidency but only act as President, and only for so long---except 
as provided under Section 4- -as the President wished to be free of his 
povvers and duties. 9 
The section is intended to cover any type of Presidential-in-
ability or disability. As Senator Ba.yh put it: 
The intention of. this Legislation i.s to deal with any type 
of inability, whether it is from traveling from one nation to 
another, a breakdown in cornmunications, capture by the 
enemy or anything that is imaginable. The inability to per-
form the powers and duties of the office, for any reason is 
inability under the terrns that we are discus sing.10 
9congr'essi.onal Record--House, (Daily Edition), Aprill3, 1965, . 
p. 7669-,- citingl.:-ernar"lcsof-Repl:esentati.ve Geller. See also Congres·· 11 
sional Record--Senate, (Daily Edition), June 30, 1965, p. 14830~1ting i 
tneremarks of S'enator Bayh; Senate Report No. 66, 89th Congress, .. ··-·- ····----~·--
1st Session, 1965, p. 3; and House of Representatives Report No. 203, 
'--"-' ---~--'=s9ttt--c0n.-gres:s:'-=r.s"fcsessio=-n--;=r965~--r,-.--z-:=-c:Feefic1<~'"'"' 1Ti1e.::'l?iop8se=a-=-"'-'=-'~=~ -------~~·_o:_::_:_:::=-=-~ 
Twenty-Fifth .Amendrnent to the Constitution, 11 p. 198, suggests that 1 
although, i.n the case where a President has himself declared his in-
ability, there could be no challenge to his restoration, the Vice Presi-
dent and Cabinet would not thereafter be precluded from declaring J 
the President disabled under Section 4 of the Arnendment. 
10congressional Rec:ord---Senate, (Daily Edition), F'ebrmiry 19, 
19 6 s, P .5zcru:---------·--·-----·---------·--
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Again, Section 4 provides for the exceptional case, in which a Presi-
dent was not able to co1nrnunicate with the Congressional leaders. 
The President could declare his disability for either an indefi-
nite or specific period of tilne, and even set the hour when the Vice 
President is to assurn.e the role of Acting President. ll Such a declara-
tion could be conditionaL As Mr. Katzenbach suggested, the President 
might write, "if in the event I am under anesthesia or sim.ilarly unable, 
I wish you to assume those duties. . . " Mr. Katzenbach concluded 
that Section 3 is broad enough to include a prospective as well as an 
actual inability. 12 This Section obviously has some precedence in 
the letters President Eisenhower wrote before his potential and actual 
illnesses to Vice President Nixon. In formulating the Amendment, 
Congress intended that written declaration of inability, recovery, or 
challenge would be rnade public. As stated in the Senate Judiciary 
Cormnittee Report on S. J. Res. 1: 
. notice by all parties should be public notice. The 
Committee feels that notice by transmittal to' the President 
[ pro tempore] of the Senate and the Speaker of the House 
. guarantees notice to the entire country. . . . It is 
further understood by the Committee that should the Presi-
dent [pro tempore ] . . . and the Speaker . . . not be found 
in their offices at the time the declaration was transmitted 
that transmittal to the office of such presiding officers would 
[ serve] for sufficient notice under the terms of the Amend-
ment.l3 
11 Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th 
Congress, 1st Session, Serial No. 1, 1965, pp. 98, 99, 240. 
13senate Report No. 66, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, p. 2. 
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Whenever a Vice President bec01nes Acting President, it would 
appear that he temporaTily loses his position as President of the 
Senate. Less clear is the question of whether he would take the 
Presidential oath upon assuming the role of Acting President. 14 
By clarifying the status of the Vice President who substitutes 
for his President, Section 3 removes the historic fear prevailing in 
tilnes of .Presidential disability that the Vice President will usurp the 
Presidency, or will be accused of doing so. Section 3 also confirm.s, 
without grammatical confusion, the apparent intentions of the authors 
of the Constitution--that the Vice President would carry out the powers 
and duties of a disabled President but would not assume the office itself. 
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, by its very length, 
indicates that it grapples with the rnost difficult. of the three questions 
-< 
which have frequently disrupted the continuity of executive power: 
how to deal with Presidential inability when there is uncertainty or 
conflict of opinion. 
SECTION 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority 
of either the principal officers of the executive departments or 
of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits 
to the Presid·ent pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the 
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his 
office, the Vice President shall imn~ediately assume the powers 
and duties of the office as Acting President. 
Thereafter, when the President transrnits to the President 
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
14Feerick, 11 Proposed Twenty-Fifth Am.endment to the 
Constitution,-11 p~ 198, concludes that it would seem that he- should not,-
since the duty of acting as President would be 11encompass ed 11 in his 
Vice Presidential oath. The legislative history on this point appears 
to be inconclusive. See also Hearings before the House Cornmittee on 




Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, 
he shall resurne the powers and duties of his office unless the 
Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers 
of the executive department or of such other body as Congress 
may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President 
pro tempo1•e of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives their written declaration that the President {s 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. There-
upon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-
eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, 
within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declara-. 
tion, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days 
after Congress is required to assemble, determine by two-
thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to dis-
charge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President 
shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; other-
wise, the President shall resun1e the powers and duties of his 
office. 
An impo:dant aspect of Section 4 is that, while either the Vice 
President or n1em.bers o.f the Cabinet (or "other body") could raise the 
question of Presidential inability, the written challenge would be signed 
by both. Attorney General Brownell stated: 
Undoubtedly the Justice Departrnent would prepare papers 
[ for the inability declaration ], and the action would be 
taken at a joint meeting of the Vice President and the Cabinet 
men'lbers. It might not even be a matter of public knowledge 
. . . who signed first. That particular point would fade into 
insignificance in getting ... group action. 15 
There are several reasons for placing partial responsibility for 
inability determination upon the Cabinet. They are Presidential 
appointees and therefore unlikely to declare a President disabled unless 
he were truly unable to perform the duties of his office. The members 
of the Cabinet work closely with the President and meet with him often. 
They would therefore be better able to judge his condition than some 
1.5pr esidential Inability, Hearings before the House Committee 






















other body. However, should future usage prove that the Cabinet 
is not a viable body to participate in judging whether the President is 
disabled or recovered, Congress has the power under the Amendment 
to create another body that would share with the Vice President the 
responsibility of Presidential inability. 
.Another responsibility that would be shared is the assernbling 
of Congress within the specified 48 hours if the Vice President and 
Cabinet challenged the President's declaration of fitness. It would be 
"incumbent" upon the Acting President to fix a time within 48 hours at 
which Congress must assemble. 16 If he did not do so, it would be up 
to the President pro tempore and Speaker to call their respective 
houses into session within the prescribed time. 17 
The Vice President would retain his position as Acting President 
until either Congress reached a decision supporting the President's 
statement of recovery Ol' the 21...:day limit expired. 18 Congress would 
16 F.eerick, "The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendrnent to the 
Constitution, " p. 201. 
17 Congressional Record--House , (Daily Edition), Aprill3, 1965, 
pp. 769171098--;- Fee-rTcTS:tatestliat 1f11either of these officers issued 
a call, "Congress would have to come into session within forty-eight 
hours on its own initiative, 11 but he does not explain how Congress 
would do so. Feerick, "The Proposed Twenty-Fifth A1nendm.ent to the 
Constitution, " p. 201. 
18 Senate Report No. 66, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, p. 3; 
Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Congress, 
lst Session, SeTial No. 1, 1965, p. 58. Senator Bayh stated before· the 
House Comxnittee: 
The Vice President continues to act as Pres1dent until 
Congress decides the issue. We have given this a consider-
able amount of study and we have tried to arrive at a situation 

















have three cou:rses of action open to it within the 21-day limit: it 
could decide in favor of the President, or in favor of the Vice Presi-
dent, or reach no decision at all. Representative Poff explained: 
Circmnstances may be such that Congress by tacit agree-
ment rnay want to uphold the President in some rnanner which 
will not amount to a public rebuke of the Vice President who 
is the Acting President. [This J . option furnishes 
the graceful vehicle. 19 
All the procedures under Section 4, in fact, weigh heavily on 
the side of the President in the case of a challenge. It was again 
Representative Poff who remarked: 
If one House voted but failed to get the necessary two -thirds 
majority, the other House would be precluded from using the 
21 days and the President would immediately resume the powers 
and duties of his office. 20 
And Senator Ervin observed: 
The only thing that saved Andrew Johnson fr01n impeachment, 
and saves us from behaving as a "banana republic" ... was 
the provision of the Constitution that required a two -tr1irds vote 
before the President could be removed from office. 2 
Nevertheless, in deciding the issue of a disputed Presidential re-
covery, Congress could conduct snch proceedings as it feels are 
warranted. It could request the President to undergo medical or 
psychiatric tests and exarninations or be questioned at hearings. 22 
l9Feerick, "The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution, 11 p. 201, citing the remarks of Representative Pof£ in 
Congressional Record- -House , (Daily .Edition) April 13, 1965, 
p .~7tJ'i3·:-·--· --
2Cbongressional Record- -House, (Daily Edition), June 30, 
19 6 5' p:l4~r31. -----
21congressiona1 Record- -Senate, (Daily Edition), April 13, 
1965, p. 76'73. . 
2 ~earing before the Subcornmittee on Constitutional Amend-
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Section 4 of the Twenty·-Fifth Am.endment drew the greatest 
criticism during passage of the resolution through Congress and 
frorn outside scholars. For example, the participation of the Vice 
President in declaring a President's disability or challenging his 
state1nent of recovery has seemed to some a political impropriety 
and to others a very real danger to the nation. Richard H. Hansen 
felt that: 
As a lawyer, I cannot subscribe to putting the Vice Pre-
sident, a party in interest, in the embarrassing position of 
passing (even indirectly) on his own advancement. He. 
should come to the job free of avoidable public criticism. 23 
Senato:c Albert Gore, one of the Arnendrnent's severest critics, in-
sisted that a coup was not only technically but legally possible now: 
"The Amend1nent, in fact, is almost a bluepriut for ii. 1124 
In answer to such an argumen-t, it can be pointed out that i.n any 
attempt to seize the President's job, a Vice President would first have 
to satisfy the Cabinet and then win a. two-thirds approval of Congress. 
The possibility of a Vice President seizing the Presidency existed 
before the Amendm.ent, and during Presi.denLial disability crisis, 
ments of the Senate Judiciary Con:u::nittee, Janua:ry 2.9, 1965, pp. 
21-23, 29, 35. The remarks on the floor of Senators Ervi.n and 
Hrusk~l appe.3.r to confirn1 that hearings were contemplated. 
Congressional Record--Senate, (Daily Edition), February 19, 1965, 




2itichard H. Hansen, "The Continuing Presidency, 11 Lincoln 'I 
~ .... [ Ne~~~::]tuJ~::l~d,:a;e1:~~;::·.(:~:x{:::,~ 6, 196:-p-p-._ _ _ _ J __ _ 
26-27. 1 
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Vice Presidents have gone to extremes in avoiding even a .suggestion 
of a coup. 
One of the points frequently made during both hearings and floor 
debates was that the President could discharge his Cabinet befo1~e it 
was able to declare him disabled. While this is certainly possible, 
Congress could deal with the situation under Section 4 of the Amend-
ment by exercising its power to establish another body. Such a body 
would be c:reated by statute, which could be subject to the President's 
veto. However, a determined Congress could override a President's 
veto by a two-thirds vote. 
A Vice President serving as Acting President would also appear 
to have the powe:r to appoint or remove members of the Cabinet. If 
he u::H:~d this power to appoint a Cabinet that would back him against 
the President, Congress would not be likely to look with favor upon 
hin.1. and, again, could eliminate the Cabinet as the body to participate 
. in inability determination. 25 
It seems that the advantages of having the Cabinet participate in 
disability determination outweigh the disadvantages. The hi story of 
.l 
Presiden.tial inabilities points toward the conclusion that the Cabinet 
would not decli·.1e to exerdse its pO"\ver if an occasion arose requiring 
it to do so. The Cabinet of President Garfield unanimously agreed 
I 
that the P1·esident was disabled but felt it did not have the power to 
declare hh:n so and hesitated to take such action for fear that the 
2 ~'eerick, . "The Proposed Twenty--Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution, 11 p. 203. 
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Vice President would remain President for the rest of his terrn. In 
the case of Wilson's disability, the Cabinet sought to ascertain the 
President's condition and it appears that, if they had had the power to 
declare hirn disabled, they would have exercised it in a responsible 
way. 26 It seems likely that a future Cabinet would use ~ts power only 
if the President could not be persuaded to make a voluntary declara-
tion, or if the President were unable to make such a declaration. 
Senator Gore's principal criticism of Section 4 dealt with the 
"spectacle of competing claims [ for J the power of the Presidency. 1127 
Such a spectacle could last for 21 days, the time within which Congress 
must decide or make no decision and thus return the President to the 
full duties and po,vers of his office. During those 21 days, the Vice 
President \VOuld be Constitutionally recognized as Acting President. 
Ad1nittedly, a 21-day controversy could be damaging both at home and 
abroad. However, the 21-day limitation was a comp1·omise and the 
best obtainable, as indicated by the two months the conference com-
mittee was deadlocked on this point. 
No legislation can protect against all sources of controversy or 
unethical behavior in the future. The nation is forced, to sorne degree, 
to place reliance upon elected officials to act with a sense of constitu·-
tional morality, particu'larly when they are exposed to the glare of 




i 2tabe11 Phillips, "Disability Plan for Presidency Sent to 
States, 11 -~!!_:_: Y~rk_!im_es_, July 7, 1965, p. 1. ---- -- ---~J __ . j 
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publicity that would inevitably be turned on any situation ?.pproaching 
an inability or succession crisis. Successful i1nplernentation of the 
Amend1nent appears to be conditional upon two aspects of the relation-
ship between the President and Vice President: Vice Presidential can·· 
didates must be selected with the knowledge that they have a very real 
chance of succeeding to the Presidency either ternporarily or for the 
unexpired portion of the tenn; and Presidential candidates must be 
allowed to continue the practice of making the final choice arnong 
potential running mates, so long as this practice provides Vice Presi~ 
dential candidates that are qualified to succeed, in order to assure 
con1patibility and close cooperation between the President and Vice 
President. 
Although the Amendment contains no ironclad guarantee that it 
will cover all future succession situations, its workability is strongly 
suggested by several factors. 
First, both the support and opposition gene~ated by the proposed 
Amendment during the debates on it were bipartisan. The opposition 
in Congress and in the state legislatures appeared to coxne horn the 
conservative elements in both parties as well as from those sincerely 
disturbed by the imperfe.:tions they discerned in the Amendment. In 
the absence of organized opposition, or, indeed, of very much interest., 
I 
ratification by the states required 19 months, only about half the 
average arnount of time required for ratification of previous amend-
rnents. 28 Nevertheless, interest was great enough and survived long 
28senator Keating noted, at hearings held before the House 
Special Subcom.rnittee in 1957, that counsel for the Com1rlittee had 
'jo-oo--_ ----==-=--
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enough to provide the nation with legislation aimed at solving the 
difficult problems of Presidential inability and succession that had so 
often been left unsolved in the past. 
Second, the Amendn1ent found widespread support among influ-
ential groups outside Congress and the state legislature.s, most 
notably among members of the American Bar Association and state 
bar associations. 
Another factor indicating the likely success of the Amendment 
when· the time co1ne s for its application is the long and careful study 
given to the multiplicity of questions involved by the legislators who 
drafted and voted on the Amendment. The documentation of their 
debates should allow future Congresses to understand the weaknesses 
of the Amendtnent and to deal ·with them should the need arise. 
In spite of its imperfections, the Amendment appears to be the 
best solution that was possible. Early in the debate, Attorney 
General Brownell stated that: 
An analogy that has crossed my mind is this .... I 
visualize people trying to determine the cause of airplane 
accidents at an airport where they have had some terrible 
accidents and a lot of near-misses. They have called in 
all the engineers and knowledgeable people and are trying 
to decide what to do, and they find out that most of the 
near-rnisses have corne frotn one set of circumstances, 
called to his attention that the first twenty-one amendments became 
effective in from one to four years. The 22nd Am.endment took four 
years [ 47 rnonths ] . The average time for ratification then is 
somewhat less thati three years. Presidential Inability, Hearing 
-bi:Hore-tlie SpeciaT Stibcbinmittee_o_n_'Studyof "PresidentialHiabilify-
of the Committee of the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 
Eighty-Fifth Congress, First Session, April 1, 1957, Serial No. 
3, p. 23. For the dates on which an1endments were proposed to the 
state.s and dates of final ratification see: The World Almanac and 






and that they could cure 90 percent ... b>; changing .... 
one procedure. . . . [Someone would sa yj "'Nell, let's 
not do it piece meal, let's have a long term program that 
will cover every conceivable kind of accident that can 
occur .... " 
... so I say [the Amendment] doesn't cover every 
conceivable situation, but I believe it covers, in consonance 
with . . . basic Constitutional principles, at least 90 per-
cent of the cases we could reasonably foresee. 2 9 
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After passage of the Amendtnent, authorities on Presidential succession 
agreed on this point. Ruch C. Silva suggest_ed that although "· . cer-
tain features of the . . . Amendment do not conform to rny criteria 
... ·~-~,, .-.-.-lt~was-the~best~that~could~be--got~thl·ough~the~House. •• 30 Richa-1'-d 
H. Hansen has stated: "I think the . . Amendment is the only one 
that could be passed at this time. 1131 And John D. Fee rick answered 
"yes and no, respectively" when asked whether he thought the Amend-
men.t was the best obtainable and whether he could offer any c:dticisnts 
on constitutional or political grounds. 32 
The Amendment eliminates the greatest single difficulty in 
assuring that the Presidential duties and powers will at all tirnes be 
exercised: a President is encouraged to admit disability knowing that 
he can almost certainly reclaim his duties and powers when he wants 
to, and at the same tin1.e, his Vice President can assume those duties 
21?restdential inability, Hearings before the House Conlmittee 
on the r~ialcTary, 89th Congress, 1st Session, February 9, 10, 16 and 
17, 1965, Serial No. 1, p. 242. 
3 'Letter hom Ruch C. Silva dated August 17, 1967. 
·- 31Letter from Richard H; Hansen dated-August 19,--1967.-
?1..,..E;!_tter from John J). :fi'eeri.ck dated August 17, 196?. _ 
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and powers with little fear of being accused of usurping them. 
Senator Bayh and his colleagues worked hard to ensure that their 
Amendment would be consistant with the principle of "separation of 
powers 11 'lv'hich, in practice, has allowed limited application of one 
power over another. Senator Bayh, in testifying before the House 
Judiciary Committee hearings, stated: 
. our forefathers have found it expedient and wise to in-
clude in the body of the Constitution itself, as have subsequent 
arnendments, certain co1nn"lingling of the various branches. 
I cited the veto power of the executive over the legislative 
branch, the confirmation power of the Senate, the role of the 
House in deciding a Presidentia~ election if no candidate re-
ceived a majority of electoral votes, and i1npeachment pro-
visions, which involved the House, the Senate, and the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court. 33 
The Amendment gives the Chief Executive the initiative to 
propose a Vice Presidential non1inee, and places Congress in the 
role of granting or withholding approval. It also allows the execu-
tive branch the initiative in determining and resolving disability, 
with Congress intruding only if the executive branch can not resolve 
the problem. of disability by itself. The Amendment thus appears to 
be fully compatible with historic application of the principle of 
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Vice Presidents Who Succeeded to the Presidency * 
Length of 
Date Unexpired 
Term for Which Vice President Presidential Term :}:>:~~:::: 
President Elected Date of Death Who Succeeded Oath Taken Yrs. M6s. Days ------
Willia:nJ. H. Harrison Mar. 4, 1841-45 Apr. 4, 1841 John Tyler Apr. 6, 1841 3 ll 0 
Zachary Taylor Mar. 4, 1849-53 July 9, 1850 Millard Fillmore July 10, 1850 2 7 23 
Abraham Lincoln ~:·~:· Mar. 4, 1865-69 Apr. 15, 1865 Andrew Johnson Apr. 15, 1865 3 10 17 ........ 
V> 
..P:.. James A. Garfield ~:•~:• Mar. 4, 1881-85 Sept. 19, 1881 Chester A. Arthur Sepct. 20 & 22, 3 5 13 
1881 
William McKinley>~>!< lVIa r. 4, 19 0 1- 0 5 Sept. 14, 1901 Theodore Roosevelt Sept. 14, 1901 3 5 18 
Warren G. Harding Mar. 4,. 1921-25 Aug. 2, 1923 Calvin Coolidge Aug. 3 & 21, l 7 2 
1923 
F'ranklin D. Roosevelt Jan. 20, 1945-49 Apr. 12, 1945 Harry S. Truman Apr. 15, 1945 3 9 8 
John F. Kennedy >!<>:< Jan. 20, 1961-65 Nov. 22, 1963 Lyndon B. Johnson Nov. 22, 1963 l 1 29 
- -
Total: 23 10 20 
~· John D. Feerick, From Failing Hands (New York: Fordham Universi~y Press, 1965), p. 315. 
*•!• Presidents whose deaths were by assassination. 
>!<>!<>!< The computation is based on the dates of the presidents' deaths. 
·~.'="~· =~· ·="'""""""""'-"'=-...-,..:;wtC-=r::::o::~~'ll,~--,.,~ ~--.-~""""'-=·.,.....,~~-~..-.-:;;:i~-.:r~~-=-~•--::--=--;--;;~o:c:.":"c""'~-;.,:.,~ 
APPENDIX B 
Vice Presidential Vacancies~:( 
Termination Tenn for which Dates Office 
Vice President of Office Elected Vacant 
George Clinton Died Apr. 20, 1812 Mar. 4, 1812- Apr. 20, 1812-
Ma:r. 3, 1813 Mar. 3, 1813 
Elbridge Gerry Died Nov. 23, 1814 Mar. 4, 1813- Nov. 23, 1814-
Mar. 3, 1817 Mar. 3, 1817 
John C. Calhoun Resigned Dec. 28, Mar. 4, 1829- Dec. 28, 1832-
1832 to take seat Mar. 3, 1833 Mar. 3, 183.3 
in Senate 
John Tyler Took oath of office Ma1·. 4, 1841- Apr. 6, 1841-
a,s President, Mar. 3, 1845 Mar. 3, 1845 
Apr. 6, 1841 
Millard F'illmore Took oath of office Mar. 5, 1849 ·- July 10, 1850-
as President, Mar. 3, 1853 Mar. 3, 1853 
July 10, 1850 
William. R. King Died Apr. 18, 1853 Mar. 4, 1853- Apr. 18, 1853-
Mar. 3, 1857 Mar. 3, 1857 
Andrew Johnson Took oath of office Mar. 4, 1865- Apr. 15, 1865-
as President, Mar. 3, 1869 Mar. 3, 1869 
Apr. 15, 1865 
Henry Wilson Died Nov. 22, 1875 Mar. 4, 1873-- Nov. 22, 18 7 s-: 
Mar. 3, 1877 Mar. 3, 1877 
Cheste.r A. Arl:hm· Took oath of office Mar. 4, 1881- Sept. 20, 1881-
as President, Mar. 3, 1885 Mar. 3, 1885 
Sept. 20, 1881 
Thomas A. Hendricks Died Nov. 25, 1885 Mar. 4, 1885- Nov. 25, 1885-
Mar. 3, 1889 Mar. 3, 1889 
Garret A. Hobart Died Nov. 21, 1899 Mar. 4, 1897- Nov. 21, 1899-
Mar. 3, 1901 Mar. 3, 1901 
Theodore Roosevelt Took oath of office Mar. 4, 1901- Sept. 14, 1901-
as President, Mar. 3, 1905 Mar. 3, 1905 
Sept. 14, 1901 
James S. Sherman Died Oct. 30, 1912 Mar. 4, 1909- Oct. 30, 1912-
Mar. ":1 -'• 1913 I\/.(a r. 
"2 
J, 1913 
Calvin Coolidge Took oath of office Mar. 4, 1921- Aug. 3, 1923-
as President, Mar. 3, 1935 Ma:r. '2 J, 1935 
Aug. 3, 1923 
Harry S. Truman Took oath of office Jan. 20, 1945- Apr. 12, 1945-
as President, Jan. 20, 1949 Jan. 20, 1949 
Apr. 12, 1945 
Lyndon B. Johnson Took oath of office Jan. 20, 1961- Nov. 22, 1963-
as President, Jan. 20, 1965 Jan. 20, 1965 
Nov. 22, 1963 
>:< The Research and Policy Comrnittee of the Committee for Economic 
Deve1oprnent, Presidential Succession and Inability (New York: 
























APPI!~NDIX B (continued) 
Vice Length of Tirne 
Presidency Office Vacant 
Vacated Yrs-.-1\7Io s :-ua y s 
-- --- ---
Clinton 0 10 12 
Gerry 2 3 9 
Calhoun 0 2 4 
Tyler 3 11 0 
Fillmore 2 7 23 
King 3 10 14 
Johnson, A. 3 10 17 
Wilson 1 3 10 
Arthur 3 5 13 
Hendricks 3 3 7 
Hobart 1 3 11 
Roosevelt 3 5 18 
Sherrr1an 0 4 5 
Coolidge 1 7 2 
Trurnan 3 9 8 
Johnson, L. 1 1 29 





William H. Harrison 1 died 
Apr. 4, 1841 
Zachary Taylor, died 
July 9, 1850 
Franklin Pierce 
Abraham Lincoln, died 
Apr. 15, 1865 
Ulysses S. Grant 
James A. Garfield, died 
Sept. 19, 1881 
Grover Cleveland 
William McKinley 
William McKinley, died 
Sept. 14, 1901 
William H. Taft 
Warren G. Harding, died 
Aug. 2; 1923 
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Franklin D. Roosevelt, died 
Apr. 12, 1945 
John F'. Kennedy, died 
Nov. 22, 196.3 
Total Pe:dod of Vacancy 
Gong. 
APPENDIX C 
Occasions on which the President and the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives or the President pro tempore 
of the Senate were of opposite parties, 1864-1964 ):< 
President Speaker President pro 
Date and Party and Party tempore and party 
---·- -- -------
44 1875-77 U.S. Grant-R Michael C. Ken·-D Thornas w. Ferry-R 
Samuel J. Randall-D 
45 1877-79 R. B. Hayes-R Samuel J. Randall-D Thomas w. Ferry-R 
46 1879-81 R. B. Hayes-R Samuel J. Randall-D Allen G. Thurman-D 
48 1883-85 C. A. Arthur-R John G. Carlisle-D George F. Edmunds -R 
49 1885-87 G. Cleve1and-D John G. Carlisle- D John Sherman-R 
50 1887-89 G~ C1eve1and-D John G. Car1isle-D John J. Ingalls -R 
52 1891-93 B. Harrison-R Charles F. Crisp-D Charles Monderson-R 
54 1895-97 G. Cleveland-D Thomas B. Reed-R William P. Frye-R 
62 1911-13 W. H. Taft-R Champ Clark-D William P. Frye--R 
Charles Curtis -R 
Augustus 0. Bacon-R 
Jacob H. Gallinger -R 
Henry Cabot Lodge-R 
Frank B. Brandegee-R 
66 1919-21 W. Wilson-D Frederick Gillett-R Albert B. Cum.mins-R 
72 1931-33 H. C. Hoover-R John N. Garner-D George H. Moses-R 
80 1947-49 H. S. Truman-D Joseph Martin, Jr. -R Arthur Vandenb~rg-R 
84 .1955-57 D.D.Eisenhower-R Sam Rayburn-D Walter F . George-D 
85 195 7 -·59 D.D.Eisenhower-R Sam Rayburn-D Carl .Hayden-D 
86 1959-61 D. D. Ei.senhower·-R Sam Rayburn- D Carl Hayden- D 
):~ The Research and Policy Com.mittee of the Committee for Economic 
Development, op. cit. , p. 38. , ___ .., __
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APPENDIX D 
An act relative to the election of a President 
and Vice President . . . etc. 
March 1, 1792 
1 U.S. Stat. 240; Revised Stat., ~§ 146, 147, 148, 149, 150. 
"Sec. 9. And be it further enacted, That in case of removal, death, 
resignation or inability both of the President and Vice President of 
the United States, the President of the Senate [pro tempore? J 
then the Speaker of the House of Representatives, for the time being, 
shall act as President of the United States until the disability be re-
n1oved or a President shall be elected. 
"Sec. 10. And be it further enacted, That whenever the offices of 
President and Vice President shall both becon1e vacant, the Secretary 
of State shall forthwith cause a noti.fica tion thereof to be made to the 
executive of every state, and shall al3o cause the same to be pub-
lished in at least one of the newspapers printed in each state, speci-
fying that electors of the President of the United States shall be ap-
pointed or chosen in the several states within thirty-four days preceding 
the first Wednesday in December then next ensuing: Pro_vided, There 
shall be the space of two months between the date of such notification 
and the said first Wednesday in December, but if there shall not be 
the space of two months between the date of such noti.fica tion and the 
I 
first Wednesday in December; and if the term for which the President 
and Vice .President last in office were elected shall not expire on the 
third day of March next ensuing, then the Secretary of State shall 
specify in the notification that the electors shall be appointed or 




















APPENDIX D (continued} 
Dece1nber in the year next ensuing, within which time the electors 
shall accordingly be appointed or chosen, and the electors shall 
meet and give their votes on the first Wednesday in December, and 
the proceedings and duties· of the said electors and others shall be 
pursuant to the directions prescribed in this act. 11 * 
* Ruth C. Silva; Presidential Succession (Ann Arbor: University 





An act to provide for the performa nee of the duties 
of the office of President in case of the removal, 
death, resignation, or inability both of 
the President and Vice-President 
January 19, 1886 
24 U.S. Stat. 1; U.S. C. A: (1940 ed. ), Title 3, §§ 21-22. 
"Be it enacted, etc., That in case of removal, death, resignation, 
or inability of both the President and Vice-President of the. United 
States, the Secretary of State, or if there be none, or in case of his 
removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the Secretary of the 
Treasury, or if there be nor~e, or in case of his removal, death, 
J:esignation, or inability, then the Secretary of War, or if: there be 
none, or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, 
then the Attorney-General, or if there be none, or in case of his 
removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the Postmaster-
General, or i.f there be none, or in case of his removal, death, resig-
nation, or inability, then the Secretary of the Navy, or if there be 
none, or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then 
the Secretary of the Interior, shall act as President until the dis-
ability of. the President or Vice-President is removed or a President 
shall be elected: Provided, That whenever the power .s and duties of 
the office of President of the United States shall devolve upon any of 
the persons nam.ed herein, if Congress be not then in session, or if 
it would not meet in accordance with law within twenty days thereafter, 
it shall be the duty of the person upon whom said powers and duties 
shall devolve to issue a proclamation convening Congress in extra-
ordinary session, giving twenty days' notice of the time of meeting. 
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"Sec. 2. That the preceding section shall only be held to describe 
and apply to such officers as shall have been appointed by the advice 
and consent of the Senate to the offices therein narned, and such as 
are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution, and 
not under impeachrnent by tbe House of Representatives of the United 
States at the time the powers and duties of the office shall devolve 
upon them respectively. 
"Sec. 3. That sections one hundred and forty-six, one hunch·ed and 
forty-seven, one hundred and forty-eight, one hundred and forty-nine, 
and one hundred and fifty of the Revised Statutes are hereby repealed. "* 
~c Silva, Presidential Succession, p. 179. 
--------------
APPENDIX F 
An act to p1·ovide for the performance of the duties 
of the office of President in case of the removal, 
resignation, death, or inability both of 
the President and Vice President 
July 18, 1947 
61 U.S. Stat. 380. 
"Be it enacted, etc., That (a) {1) if, by reason of death, resignation, 
ren1oval from office, inability, or failure to ·qualify, there is neither 
a President nor Vice President to discharge the powers and duties of 
the office of President, then the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and as Representative in 
Congress, act as President. 
11 (2.) The same rule shall apply in case of the death, resignation, 
rernoval frorn office, or inability of an individual acting as President 
uuder this subsection. 
"(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) a Speaker is to 
begin the dis charge of the powers and duties of the office of Presi-
dent, there is no Speaker, or the Speaker fails to qualify as Acting 
President, then the President pro tempore of the Senate shall, upon 
his resignation as President pro ten1pore and as Senator, act as 
President. 
"(c) An individual acting as President under subsection (a) or 
subsection {b) shall continue to act until the expiration of the then 
current Presidential term, except that--
{1) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office 
is founded .in whole or in part on the failure of both the Presi-
dent-·elect and the Vice-President-elect to qualify, then he shall 
142 
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act only until a President or Vice President qualifies; and 
{2) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the 
office is founded in whole or in part on the inability of the 
President or Vice President, then he shall act only until the 
removal of the disability of one of such individuals. 
"(d) ( 1} If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, 
inability, or failure to qualify, there is no President pro ten1pore to 
act as President under. subsection (b), then the officer of the United 
States who is highest on the following list, and who is not under dis-
ability to discharge the powers and duties of the office of President 
shall act as President: Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, 
!1:~ 
Sec:retary of vVar, Attorney General, Poshnaster General, Secre-
tary of the Navy,>~ Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, 
Secretary of Comrnerce, Secretary of Labor. 
"(2) An individual acting as President under this subsection 
shall continue so to do until the expiration of the then current Presi-
dential term, but not after a qualified and prior- entitled individual is 
able to act, except that the removal of the disability of an individual 
higher on the list contab.ed in paragraph (1) or the ability to qualify 
on the part of an individual higher on such list shall not terminate his 
' 
service. 
:>',c Under the National Security Act of 194 7, the Secretary of Defense 
is given the place in the line of succession formerly held by the 
Secretary of War, who along with the Secretary of the Navy is 




APPENDIX F (continued) 
"(3) The taking of the oath of office by an individual specified 
in the list in paragraph ( 1) shall be held to constitute his resignation 
from the office by virtue of the holding of which he qualifies to act as 
P:resident. 
"(e) Subsections (a) (b) and (c) shall apply only to such officers 
as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitut~on. Sub-
section (d) shall apply only to officers appointed, by and with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the death, resig-
nation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, of the 
President pro tempore, and only to officers not under impeacbmen't 
by the House of Representatives at the time the powers and duties of 
the offi.ce of President devolve upon them. 
::(f) .During the period that any individual acts as President 
unde1: this Act, his cornpensation shall be at the rate then provided 
by law in the case of the President. 
"(g) Sections 1 and 2 of the Act entitled 'An Act to Provide for 
the performance of the duties of the office of P1·esident in case of the 
removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the President and 
Vice President, ' approved January 19, 1886 (24 Stat. l; U. S.C. , 
1940 edition, title 3, sees. 21 and 22), a1·e repealed. 11 ~:: 
>!c Silva, Presidential Succession, pp. 180-181. 
APPENDIX G 
Part 1 
(S. J. Res. 1 & H. R. J. Res. 1 as introduced in 
January, 1965 (same as S. J. Res. 139 o.s 
passed Senate in September, 1964) 
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or 
his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President. 
Sec. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy 1n the office of the Vice 
President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take 
office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress. 
Sec. 3. If the President declares in writing that he is unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties 
shall be discharged hy the Vice President as Acting President. 
Sec. 4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice Pre-
sident with the written concurrence of a n1ajority of the heads of the 
executive depa1·trnents or such other body as Congress may by law 
provide, transmits to the Congress his written declaration that the 
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the 
Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the 
office as Acting President. 
Sec. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the Congress his 
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers 
and duties of his office unless the Vice President, with the written con-
currence of a majority of the heads of the executive departlnents or Buch 
other body as Congress may by law provide, trausm.its within two days 
to the Congress }:lis written declaration that the President is unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress 
·shall [ 11will 11 inS. J. Res. 1 ] imrnediately decide the issue. If the 
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Congress determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the Pre-
sident is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office, the 
Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting Presi-
dent; otherwise the President shall resun~e the powers and duties of 
his office. 
Part 2 >:c 
{S. J. Res. 1 as passed Senate on February 19, 1965) 
Section 1. Same as above. 
Sec. 2. San1e as above. 
Sec. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President of 
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written 
~--------------·------~··---
~~-~_?ra~~~!2.._0la!_h=._~~~ unab~~o-~is~h_':lrge the powers_ and_ dut~~--?.!_his 
?.~£ic~, such powers and duties shall b1-:! discharged by the Vice President 
as Acting President. 
Sec. 4. Whenever the Vice President, and a majority of the 
p:_~r_:cip~l ~-fficers of the executive departments_ or such other body as 
Congress may by law provide, transmit to the .€_:esidel~-~ of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declara-
----·· ..... 
tion that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of 
his office, the Vice President shall ilrJ.mediately assun1.e the powers and 
duties of the office as Acting President. 
Sec. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the President of 
------·--
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written 
>!< The underlined words represent the changes made in the basic 
proposal (Part 1} in the Senate (Part 2}, and in the House of 
























APPENDIX G (continued) 
declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and 
duties of his office unless the Vice President, with the written con-
n1ents or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transrnits 
within seven_ days to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
!louse _of Re:ere_~entative~ their written declaration that the president 
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon 
Congress shall immediately proceed to decide the issue. If the Con-
gress determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President 
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office, the Vice 
President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President, 
otherwise the President shall 1·esume the powers and duties of his 
office. 
Part 3 
(H. R. J. Res. 1 as passed House of 
Representatives on April 13, 1965) 
Section 1. Same as above. 
Sec. 2. Sa1ne as above. 
Sec. 3. Vlhenever the President transmits to the President pro 
terr:1-pore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
duties of his office, and until he transmits a written declaration to the 
:ontrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice Pre-
si.dent. as Acting President. 
Sec. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of the 
principal officers of the executive deparhnents, or such other body as 
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Congress may by law provide, transrnit to the President pro tetnpore 
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their 
written de.claration that the President is unable to discharge the powers 
and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assurne 
the powers and duties of the office as Acting President. 
There':_~te~·, when the President transmits to the President pro 
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
his written declaration that no inability exists, he. shall resume the 
powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority 
of the principal officers of the executive departments, or such other 
body as Congress m.ay by law provide, transmit within two days to the 
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable 
to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress 
shall decide the issue, assembling with~~ forty-e~ght hours for that 
purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within ten days after the 
---·---
receipt of the written declaration of the Vice President and a majority 
of the principal officers of the executive departments, or such. other 
body as Congress may by law provide, determ.ines by two-thirds vote 
of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and 
duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the 
same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall resume the 
powers and duties of his office.* 
>:c .John D. l?eerick, "The Proposed Twenty--Fifth Amendm.ent to the 
Constitution, 11 Fordham Law Review, XXXIV (December, 1965), 








The Constitution and federal statutes prescribe a rigid pro-
cedure for ratifying proposed constitutional am.endments. 
Under· Article 5 of the Constitution, an1endments may be 
proposed either by Congress by a two-thirds vote of both 
cha1nbers or by a national convention called by Congress. Under 
the latter rnethod, a convention is convened upon application of 
two-thirds of the state legislatures. No national convention has 
ever been called. 
Arnendments proposed, either by Congress or by a conven-
tion, becom.e part of the Constitution only after they have been 
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states, or by 
conventions in three-fourths o£ the states. Congress is elnpower-
ed to determine whether the states shall ratify through their 
legislatures or through state conventions. Congress also is em-
powered to deterrnine the length of time during which states may 
deliberate on ratification. By precedent, Congress has required 
ratification by amendments by the states within at least seven 
years. 
The procedu:ee for submitting proposed constitutional amend-
ments to the states for ratification is set forth in 1 U.S. C. 106(b). 
The procedure provides that upon approval by Congress a pl·o-
posed arr,endrncnt rnust be transmitted to the General Services 
Administration (GSA), where it is certified, signed by the GSA 
Adn."linistrat.or and transmitted to each governor with a letter re-
questing that the state act. As each state acts on the amen·dment, 
the action mL1.st be certified and notification returned to the GSA. 
When the necessary three-fourths of the states have notified the 
GSA Adm.inist.ra tor of ratification, the amendment is published in 
the :Federal Register along with the Administrator's certification 
of adoption and a list of the ratifying states.* 
~~ "Constitutional Amendm.ent on the Presidency, 11 Congressional 





Ratification of the 25th Amendment by the States )~ 
State and Date *~< 













The final •1ote on Legislative Resolution 72):o:o:r. 
in the state's Unicameral Legislature was 47 
ayes, 0 nays, with 2 not voting. No hearings 
were held. The ernphasis was on becoming 
the first state to ratify. 
The final vote on Assembly Joint Resolution 
103 was 28 ayes to 11 noes in the Senate. In 
the Assembly the vote was 84 ayes to 11 noes. 
No hearings were held. The Wisconsin Legis-
lature made great efforts to becoine the first 
to ratify but failed. 
The final vote in the Oklahoma House of Rep-
resentatives on House Concun·ent Resolution 
568 was 75 for, 17 opposed and 7 excused. 
The vote in the Senate was by voice. No hear-
ings were held. The vote did not break along 
party lines. 
The final vote on Senate Resolution No. 1116 
and House Resolution No. 4135 was unanimous 
with rules suspended. The Amendment re-
ceived the support of the Governor, legisla-
tive leadership, and local press. 
* This table was composed from information supplied to the author 
by: (1) state governors, (2) state libraries, (3) state legislative 
reference services, (4) state legislators and clerks, and (5) state 
newspapers. The information is in the fonn o£: (a) personal 
correspondence, {b) newspaper clippings, and (c) legislative 
:records. 
Dates of ratification are those given by the General Services :, 
Administration. "Presidential Disability Amendment Ratified ~ 
by States, 11 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XXIII (1967), 30 L i, 
Resolution num~ers in this table ref~r -to [~tate- legislative r~-;~lu=-~--~ 























The final vote on Bill No. 1001 was 48 to 0 in 
the Senate and 15 7 to 32 in the House. No 
hearings were held. The An1endment re-
ceived the support of the State Bar Association 
and 219 state chapters of the Junior Cbarnber 
of Co1nmerce. 
The final vote on Senate Resolution 4 was 31 to 
4 in the Senate and 71 to 1 in the House. All 
negative votes were cast by Republicans, al'-
though 1nany members of that party voted in 
the affirmative. No hearings were held. 
The final vote in the Senate was 25 ayes (24 
Democrats, 1 Republican), 0 nayes, and 3 not 
voting (2 Dem. , 1 Rep.). In the House the 
vote was 47 ayes {31 Dem., 11 Rep.), and 22 
not voting (13 Dem., 9 Rep.). No hearings 
were held and there was no floor debate. · 
The final vote in the Senate on Senate Joint 
Resolution 0 was 30 yeas ( 17 Dem. , 13 Rep.), 
0 nays, and 8 r:nembers absent. The House 
vote was 81 yeas (60 Dern., 21 Rep.), and 15 
nays (12 Rep., 3 Dem. ). The Republican 
votes in opposition did not represent a party 
caucus position. The House conducted hearings 
at which support for the Amendment was ex-
pressed by political scienth-;;ts from state 
universities and colleges. 
The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution 8 in 
the Senate was 50 yeas (35 Dem., 15 Rep.), 
and 0 nays. All members voted. The vote in 
the House was· 88 yeas, and 1 nay. The fact 
that Senator Bayh of Indiana was the chief 
sponsor of the Amendment aided the rapid 
action by his home state. 
The final vote on Assembly Joint Resolution 1 
was 66 in favor (27 Rep. , 39 Dem. ), and 1 
against. The vote in the Senate was 32 in 
1 
. favor ( 10 Rep. , 22 Dem. ), and 5 against ·! 
· (3 Rep., 2 Dem. ). Ratification was proposed j 
.~~-----~---------------------------------b_y:_Sp_eak.e_:r_of_ih.e~A_,s_s _ _e_nlbly __ Uil.:r __ uh,~_g_loug_y;.riih _______ ---;i 
9 Dem. and 3 Rep. j 
11. Arkansas 
11/4/65 
The final vote in the Senate was 29 affirmative, 
4 negative, and 1 absent or not voting. The 
House voted approval by voice vote. There 
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19. New Mexico 
2/3/66 
152 
The final vote on Assembly Concur1·ent Reso-
lution 55 in the Assernbly was 55 affirmative, 
0 negative, and 0 abstaining. The vote in the 
Senate was 20 affirmative, 0 negative, and 0 
abstaining. The vote was taken the same day 
the Resolution was introduced. Both houses 
were controlled by the Republican party. 
The final vote is not available. The principle 
concern appears to have been ratifying on the 
date of the state's !78th anniversary of being 
the first state to ratify the original Constitution. 
The final vote in the House on Senate Joint 
Resolution 1 was 67 yeas, 0 nays, and 2 absent 
(1 Dem., 1 Rep.). The vote in the Senate was 
26 yeas, 0 nays, and 1 absent (a Dem. ). No 
hearings were held. The young lawyers actively 
worked in support of the Amend1nent. · 
In the House of Delegates, House Joint Resolu-
tion 1 was declared adopted hy unanimous vote 
by the Speaker. It had been stated that if any 
me1nber wished to vote against adoption, the 
yeas and nays would be counted. The Resolu-
tion was adopted on a 1notion in the Senate. 
The Joint Resolution was read by the clerks in 
both the House and Senate and declared adopted 
by the presiding officers. 
The final vote in the House on Hl004 was 65 
ayes, 0 noes, and 33 absent or not voting. 
The vote in the Senate was 36 ayes, 0 nays 
and 10 absent .. 
The final vote in the Senate on Senate Con--
current Resolution 1 was 28 ayes (14 Dem., 
1'-1 Rep.), and 4 noes (Rep.). The vote in the 
House was 49 ayes (32 Dem. , 17 Rep.), and 
14 noes (8 Dem. , 6 Rep.). The Amendm.ent had 
been considered during the 1965 Special Session, 
at which time it was deemed to have died in the 
Senate where it received less than a two-thirds 
vote. Both hearings at1d floor debate took place 
before final approval in 1966. 
The final vote on House Joint Resolution 1 in 
the House was 59 to 2 (Rep.). In the Senate the 
vote was 28 to 3 ( l Rep., 2 Dem. ). 



























The final vote on House Concurrent Resolu-
tion 512 in the House was 111 yeas, 0 nays, 
and 14 absent or not voting. The final vote 
in the Senate was 36 yeas, 0 nays, and 4 · 
absent or not voting. 
The final vote on the proposed Amend1nent 
was hy Joint Resolution. No vote was re-
corded. No hearings were held and there 
was no floor debate. 
No final vote is available. 
The final vote on House Joint Resolution No. 1 
in the House was 68 ayes, 1 nay, and 10 ab-
sent and excused. In the Senate the vote was· 
39 ayes, 0 nays, and 5 absent and excused. 
House Concurrent Resolution 2 was adopted by 
·both Houses by voice vote without de bate or 
opposition. 
The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution 7 was 
36 yeas, and 0 nays. The vote in the House 
was 86 yeas and 0 nays. 
The fi.nal vote on Senate Concurrent Resolution 
12 in the Senate was 36 yeas, 6 nays, and 7 
absent and not voting. The House vote was 
123 yeas, 4 nays, and 4 absent and not voting. 
The Senate unanimously approved the Amend-
ment. No vote is available but it is known that 
the House did grant approval. 
The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution 5 in 
the Senate was 29 affirmative, and 0 negative 
(the composition of the Senate was 22 Dem., 
17 Rep.). The vote in the House o£ Delegates 
was 99 affirrnative, and 0 negative. 
The final vote in the Senate v.;as 24 ayes, and 
0 noes. The vote in the house was 93 ayes, 
42 noes, 27 absent, and 1 present but not 
voting. No party line vote was present on the 
House vote. Both Republicans and Dem.ocrats 
voted in favor and opposed. Comrni:ttee hear-
ings were held in both Houses and debate was 
allowed on the Tloor. 
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The final vote was by Concurrent Resolution of· 
ratification. It was adopted in both House and 
Senate by voice vote, presumably unanir:oously. 
The final vote on Senate Concurrent Resolution 
1 in the Senate was 21 yeas, and 16 nays. The 
vote in the House was 89 yeas, and 4 nays. 
There appears to have been no hearings or 
floor debate. 
The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution 8 i.n 
the Senate was 28 affirmative, 0 negative, 5 
abstentions (1 Rep., 4 Dem. ). There were 8 
Republicans in the 33 member Senate. In the 
House the vote was 84 affirmative, 0 negative, 
and 15 abstentions (5 Rep., 10 Dem. ). There 
were 40 Republicans in the 99 me1nber House. 
No hearings were held. The only discussion 
on the floor was an explanation of the Amend-
ment by sponsors of the ratifying resolutions. 
'.Both the Tennessee Bar Association and the 
American Bar Association adopted positions 
calling for ratification. 
The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution No. 
2 in the Senate was 22 ayes, and 8 noes (5 
Rep. , 3 Dem. ). The vote in the House was 
60 ayes, and 1 no (Dem. ). The vote did not 
see1n to go along party lines. No hearings 
were held and there was little debate. 
The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution 7 in 
the Senate was 4.5 yeas, 0 nays, 4 absent. The 
vote in the House was 99 yeas, 0 nays, and 0 
absent. The measure received bipartisan spon-
sorship. No hearings were held, and it was 
passed -the sam.e day it was introduced. 
The final vote on Joint Resolution 13 in the 
Senate \vas 54,affirmative, and 0 negative. 
The vote in the House was 121 affirmative, and 
0 negative. The A1nendment was not consider-
ed a political issue by the Legislature. 
The final vote on House Joint Resolution 2 in the 
House was 55 affirmative, 0 negative, and 5 not 
present. In the Senate the vote was 29 affirma-· 
ti.v·e, 0 negative, and l not present. The House 
held only a brief hearing and the Senate none. 
There appeared to be no controversy on the 
issue of ratification. 
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The final vote on H. F. 21 in the House was 
124 yeas, and 7 nays (the negative votes 
were cast by conservatives. 1\IIi.nnesota 's 
Legislature is officially nonpartisan, but 
1nost conservatives have ties with the Repub-
licans). The vote in the Senate was 64 yeas, 
and 0 nays. Short hearings were held, but the 
chief concern appeared to be making Minnesota 
the 38th or decisive state to ratify. 
The final vote on Assem.bly Joint Resolution 6 
in the Assembly was 33 yeas, 0 nays, and 7 
absent. In the Senate the vote was 19 yeas, 
0 nays, and 1 absent. The resolution was 
treated as an emergency measure in both 
houses and adopted in 2 days, with the intention 
of securing for Nevada the distinction of being 
the 38th and therefore decisive state to grant 
ratification. The General Services Adminis-
tration confirms that Nevada was the last state 
necessary to complete the ratification process. 
The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution 12 
was by voice. The House vote was 159 yeas, 0 
nays, and 18 absent and not voting. A brief 
public hearing was held. It appears that the 
Connecticut Legislature was not aware that the 
Amendment had been 1nade a part of the Consti-
tution by Nevada's ratification. 
The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution No. 7 
was unanimous in both Houses. The Senate was 
controlled by the Democrats 30 to 25, and the 
House of Representatives was controlled by the 
Republicans 64 to 40. The1·e was little, if any, 
debate on the .Resolution. 
The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution 9 was 
32 affiemative, and 2 negative (Rep.). The 
House vote was 71 affirmative, and 0 negative. 
The Amendment had pass,~d the House in 1966 
by a vote of 53 affinnativc, and 21 negative, 
but it was killed i.n the Senate State Affairs 
C01nm.i.tte e. 
The final vote on House .Joint Resolution No. 1 
i.n the House was 88 yeas (52 Rep. , 36 Dern. ), 
and 7 nays (5 Rep., 2 Dern. ). The vote in the 
Senate was 31 yeas (22 Rep., 9 Dem. ), and 0 
nays. :Hearings were required by Ohio law. 
Ohio had been vying with Nevada, Minnesota and 
other states to becom.e the 38th to ratify. 
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The final vote on Senate Joint Resolution 6 
was unanirnous. No figures on the nurnber 
voting or absent are available. The Senate 
passed the Resolution of ratification in August 
1966. The Resolution died in the House Rules 
Cornrnittee, apparently for lack of interest. 
The final vote on H. B. 22 is not available. 
There was no record of vote, opposition, de--
bate or hearings. 
The final vote on Joint Resolution No. 3 in 
the Senate was 45 yeas, and 0 nays. The vote 
in the House was 60 yeas, and 0 nays. 
The final vote on House Joint Resolution 1 in 
the House was 146 yeas, 0 nays, and 3 absent. 
The Amendment was approved in the Senate 
through Senate Concurrent Resolution 39 'by 
voice vote. 
The final vote on House Concurrent Resolution 
3 was by voice vote iri the House. HCR 3 was 
adopted on m.otion in the Senate. 




House Resolution 57-97 was adopted by a vote 
of 162 ayes, and 2 nays in the House. The 
reason ratification was not con1pleted by the 
Senate is not clear. 
It appears that the mernbers of the North Da-
kota House of Representatives desired that 
thei.l: state be the 38th or final state necessary 
to complete ratification. When it was discover-
ed tl"}at the Legislature had delayed too long or 
miscounted the states which had already ratified, 
it was decided that any action by North Dakota 
would have no legal effect. Thus no vote was 
taken. 
A bill of ratification was introduced in both the 
1966 and 1967 Legislat.i ve Ses~3 i.ons, but did not 
pass in either. There appears to have been no 
organized opposition, but there was also no 
great interest in passage of the Amendment. It 
was feLt that after the Amendrnent was ratified 
by a sufficient number of states, there was no 
longer any need for South Carolina to take action. 
